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The essays that compose this dissertation investigate the economic distortions caused by subsidies 
and tariffs under the prism of negotiation and litigation processes at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Chapter 1, Potential Impacts of the WTO Doha Round on the Cotton Sector, assesses the 
price, production and trade effects of reforming cotton subsidies and tariffs under alternative 
scenarios.  While the WTO Doha Round could have a positive impact on world cotton prices and 
contribute to the expansion of cotton production and exports in developing countries, the 
likelihood of such an outcome is dependent on the depth of global subsidy reductions. The poor 
record of internal policy reforms in subsidizing countries and the failure of the US to comply with 
WTO recommendations in the US Upland Cotton dispute highlight the importance of trade 
negotiations in addressing the profound distortions that characterize the world cotton market. 
Chapter 2, International Experience with Agricultural Export Taxes, analyzes the evolution 
in the use of agricultural export taxes by developing countries, with a primary focus on Argentina, 
Indonesia and Thailand.  Empirical evidence indicates that export taxes are ultimately self-
defeating.  While they may generate government revenue and curb domestic prices in the short 
run, they shift economic incentives, discourage the adoption of improved inputs, and adversely 
affect yield and output in the long run.  Argentina, in particular, turned a blind eye on comparative 
 advantage and eluded development opportunities by heftily taxing agricultural exports for most of 
the last 100 years.  
Finally, Chapter 3, Measurement of Ethanol Subsidies and Associated Economic 
Distortions:  An Analysis of Brazilian and US Policies, is the only systematic, detailed and 
quantified comparative examination of ethanol support in the US and Brazil.  US ethanol support 
reached US$57 billion in 2002-2011 and was vulnerable to litigation under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, as it depressed world prices, slashed imports, reduced production overseas, 
and significantly increased the US share of the world market.  By contrast, Brazilian support 
reached US$ 27 billion in the same period and was not susceptible to WTO litigation, as it did not 
cause adverse effects to the interests of other countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE WTO DOHA ROUND ON THE COTTON SECTOR 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Cotton has proved to be one of the most politically sensitive issues in the Doha Round of 
multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Substantial subsidies provided 
by developed countries – primarily the United States and the European Union – have continued to 
depress world prices and undermine the viability of otherwise competitive producers in the 
developing world. Cotton-exporting West African countries in particular have championed reform 
of the existing system. Collectively known as the Cotton Four (C-4), Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad 
and Mali have denounced the deleterious effects of cotton subsidies on poverty and food security 
at the farm level and called for the establishment of a mechanism to phase out support for cotton 
with a view to its total elimination. The issue came to dominate the 2003 Cancún Ministerial 
Conference, with the failure of developed countries to make significant concessions widely seen 
as a contributing factor to the breakdown of the meeting. The 2004 Framework for Establishing 
Modalities in Agriculture (WTO, 2004a) and the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 
2005a) recognized the vital importance of cotton for developing countries and established a 
mandate to address it “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” within the agricultural 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the issue has subsequently languished due to little concrete engagement 
by subsidizing countries. In the absence of any counter-proposal from the US or EU, the December 
2008 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (WTO, 2008a) reproduce the C-4 submission. 
In parallel to the efforts to address cotton subsidies through the Doha negotiations, 
countries have also sought to reduce trade distortion in the agricultural sector through the Dispute 
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Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. The United States Upland Cotton dispute initiated by Brazil 
has led to significant developments in WTO jurisprudence on subsidies in general, as well as 
specific findings about the illegality of various US cotton subsidies under existing WTO rules. 
Despite successive DSB rulings against certain aspects of US cotton subsidies, Washington has 
hitherto failed to bring cotton payments into conformity with WTO obligations. 1 Meanwhile, 
unilateral domestic policy reforms in the EU and US have had limited if any impact on world 
cotton markets. The 2003-2004 reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
subsequent amendments changed the guaranteed minimum price for cotton to a mix of coupled 
and allegedly decoupled payments.2 In the US, the 2008 Farm Bill kept cotton subsidies largely 
unchanged and indicated an unwillingness to comply with the DSB panel rulings or the mandates 
from the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. 
Cotton was brought to the spotlight in the Doha Round due to its unique development 
dimension. Three characteristics set it apart from other agricultural products. First, cotton is the 
single most important agricultural export commodity for least developed countries (LDCs) as a 
                                               
1 On 8 September 2004, the DSB panel found that certain United States’ domestic support programs in respect of  
cotton resulted in serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the form of price suppression in the world market, and that 
three United States export credit guarantee programs were in violation of WTO export subsidy disciplines. On 3 March 
2005, following an appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s findings. As a result, the United 
States was asked to withdraw its export credit guarantee programs and user marketing payments by 1 July 2005, and 
to take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of certain domestic subsidies or withdraw these subsidies by 
21 September 2005. On 18 December 2007, a compliance panel found that the United States had failed to comply 
with the DSB recommendations and rulings relating to the original panel’s findings. On 2 June 2008, following yet 
another appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body upheld the compliance panel’s findings. 
2 As long as EU cotton subsidies are only partially decoupled, cotton areas in Greece and Spain are expected to remain 
relatively significant. Rozakis et al. (2008) find that in the absence of the so-called decoupled payments, farm income 
among a significant share of Greek cotton producers would turn negative, thus leading towards abandonment of 
activities. According to the European Commission (2007), full decoupling would reduce the relative profitability of 
cotton: gross margins would fall well below those for other crops and become negative in almost all instances. Without 
specific coupled incentive to produce cotton, cotton areas would decline dramatically: “In Spain it would be expected 
that the cotton area would fall to zero. In Greece there would be a decline in the cotton area; only cotton grown 
extensively under agri-environmental programs would be expected to continue.” In addition, studies that are not 
specific to the cotton sector have suggested that European farm operators, to a large extent, do not treat the new 
decoupled payments as fully decoupled (Hennessy and Thorne, 2005; Howley et al., 2009). As a result, these subsidies 
are believed to maintain a strong supply inducing effect on agricultural production, although less so than the previously 
fully coupled payments. 
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group (Figure 1.1). LDC cotton export earnings were higher than the combined value of bean, 
sugar, tea, cashew nut and cocoa exports in 2004-2007. The share of cotton in total agricultural 
export receipts in 2004-2007 was as high as 80 percent in Burkina Faso, 74 percent in Mali, 59 
percent in Benin and 51 percent in Chad (Figure 1.2). Cotton is also an important agricultural 
export for non-LDC developing countries, most notably in Central Asia. Moreover, cotton is the 
second most important agricultural export for India, a non-LDC that is home to one third of the 
world’s poor. 
 
Figure 1.1: Shares of LDC combined agricultural export receipts, 2004-2007 
 
Source: Author. Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Second, cotton is one of the few sectors in which LDCs account for an important share of 
world exports. Figure 1.3 depicts the shares of LDCs, other developing countries and developed 
countries in world export quantities in 2003-2007 for eight key subsidized agricultural 
commodities. The share of LDCs in world export quantities is highest for cotton (11 percent), 
followed by peanuts (3.5 percent). For corn, rice, sorghum, soybeans, sugar and wheat, the share 
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of LDCs in world export quantities is less than 1 percent. 
Third, cotton is a highly subsidized commodity in developed countries. While other 
agricultural products, such as cocoa and coffee, are also important export commodities for LDCs, 
they are not subject to subsidization in the developed world. Trade-distorting support for cotton in 
the United States corresponded to approximately 50 percent of the domestic production value in 
1998-2007. In years with lower world prices, as in 1999 and 2001, US cotton subsidies were 
equivalent to 70-90 percent of the value of production. In the EU, cotton subsidies were on average 
67 percent as large as the value of production in 1998-2005, with a peak of 140 percent in 2003. 
Since 2006, so-called decoupled payments account for 65 percent of EU cotton subsidies. 
The present chapter assesses the likely implications for exporting and importing countries 
from a trade deal in cotton. It estimates the price, production and trade effects of reforming cotton 
subsidies and tariffs under five alternative scenarios, with a primary focus on the WTO Doha 
Round. The special cotton provisions of the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities are 
contrasted with the general agricultural provisions in the same text, the DSB panel 
recommendations in the United States Upland Cotton dispute, and internal policy reforms in key 
subsidizing countries. 
The chapter is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction. The economic 
model used to assess the likely implication of policy reforms in the cotton sector is described in 
Section 1.2. The data and parameters used in the model, including production and consumption 
levels, import tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, subsidies, and price elasticities of supply and demand are 
described in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes five alternative reform scenarios. Section 1.5 
presents the simulation results and analyzes their sensitivity to the choice of supply and demand 
elasticities. Finally, Section 1.6 summarizes the main findings and concludes.  
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Figure 1.2: Share of cotton in total agricultural export receipts, by country, 2004-2007 
 
Notes: LDCs are indicated by solid bars. Non-LDCs are indicated by crosshatched bars. 
Source: Author. Based on FAO (2010). 
  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Pakistan
Uganda
India
Syria
Greece
Azerbaijan
Senegal
Mozambique
Kazakhstan
Tanzania
Sudan
Cameroon
Egypt
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Kyrgyzstan
Togo
Central African R.
Chad
Benin
Tajikistan
Mali
Uzbekistan
Burkina Faso
Turkmenistan
 6 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Shares of world export quantities, by product and country category, 2003-2007 
 
Source: Author. Based on FAO (2010).  
COTTON PEANUTS
SUGAR
SORGHUM
CORN
RICE 
WHEAT SOYBEANS
Other Developing 
Countries
Developed
Countries
Least Developed 
Countries
 7 
 
1.2. Modelling Framework 
A single commodity, multi-country, non-spatial, partial equilibrium model of trade is used to 
quantify the price, production and trade effects of reducing cotton subsidies and tariffs. The 
structure of the model is similar to that of other partial equilibrium models used to assess the impact 
of policies on agricultural trade, such as the ones in Vanzetti and Graham (2002), Tokarick (2003), 
Poonyth et al. (2004), Sumner (2005), Alston et al. (2007) and Cabral and Jales (2008).  For each 
scenario, the model simulates the prices and quantities that would have obtained in a base year had 
the policy reforms implied by the given scenario been retroactively applied to that year.  
There are three important assumptions behind the model. The first two are common to the 
majority of global trade models of the cotton sector. First, the model assumes perfect price 
transmission between world and domestic markets. In reality, price transmission may be less than 
perfect due to transportation and transaction costs, exchange rates, economies of scale and 
governmental intervention (Conforti, 2004). Second, cotton prices are assumed to be the only 
factor that influences cotton supply and demand. Factors such as rainfall, income, access to credit 
and infrastructure are not reflected in the model. Finally, cotton is assumed to be a homogeneous 
product. This implies that full substitution is assumed between domestic and imported cotton, as 
well as among imports from different sources. The degree of homogeneity of most traded cotton 
is such as to warrant the perfect substitution assumption; the existence of only little border 
distortion also warrants the perfect price transmission assumption for most countries (Poonyth et 
al., 2004). 
The fact that the model is non-spatial implies that it is not solved for trade flows between 
specific pairs of countries. Spatial models are especially suitable for markets where trade 
preferences play an important role, such as sugar or bananas. They allow the modelling of policies 
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that apply distinct regimes to imports from different countries (Anania, 2009). Since preferential 
trade plays a minor role in the cotton sector, the added benefit of adopting the more complex spatial 
framework is close to nil. In 2004-2008, at least 93 percent of world cotton imports occurred at a 
most-favored nation (MFN) basis. Of the remaining 7 percent of world imports that may have 
occurred at a preferential basis, 6.95 percent were imported by countries that will not be required 
to change cotton applied tariffs in the Doha Round.3 If these countries were applying distinct policy 
regimes to imports from different countries, they will continue to do so after the Doha Round. 
Therefore, the balance between preferential and non-preferential policy regimes may potentially 
change for only 0.05 percent of world cotton imports, which is only a negligible fraction of the 
market. 
The model is based on supply and demand relationships for cotton. Change in cotton supply 
in country i is given by: 
 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖𝑑 ln(𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖)  (1.1) 
where 
𝑇𝑖 = {
 0    if country 𝑖 is a net exporter of cotton
?̂?𝑖   if county 𝑖 is a net importer of cotton
 
 
  ?̂?𝑖: Specific applied tariff on cotton in country i, 
  𝑈𝑖: Price wedge caused by cotton subsidies in country i, 
  𝜂𝑖: Price elasticity of supply for cotton in country i, and 
  𝑃: World price of cotton. 
The price wedge caused by cotton subsidies in country i is given by: 
                                               
3 Several countries will not be required to reduce cotton applied tariffs in the Doha Round for one of the following 
three reasons: (i) they are exempt from tariff reductions given their status as least developed countries (LDCs), very 
recently acceded members (VRAMs) or small low-income recently acceded members (SLIRAMs); (ii) they have 
significant tariff overhang for cotton; or (iii) they are not members of the WTO. See Subsection 1.4.1 and Table 1.1 
for more detail. 
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 𝑈𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑗
𝑗
𝛾𝑖
𝑗
  (1.2) 
where:  jiu : Per unit value of subsidy j in country i, and 
j
i : Degree to which subsidy j provides a production incentive in country i 
relative to revenue from the market. 
Equation 1.1 may be expressed as: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 (
1
𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃 +
1
𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑇𝑖 +
1
𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑈𝑖) 
(1.3) 
where per unit producer gross receipts in country i are given by 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖. 
Defining 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 as the share of 𝑇𝑖 in 𝑅𝑖  and 𝛼𝑖
𝑈 as the share of 𝑈𝑖  in 𝑅𝑖, equation 1.3 may be 
rewritten as: 
 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 ((1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑈)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑈𝑑 ln 𝑈𝑖) 
(1.4) 
where 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 = (𝑇𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝑈𝑖)  
 𝛼𝑖
𝑈 = (𝑈𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝑈𝑖)  
Change in cotton demand in country i is given by: 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖𝑑 ln(𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖)  (1.5) 
where 
𝑇𝑖 = {
 0    if country 𝑖 is a net exporter of cotton
?̂?𝑖   if county 𝑖 is a net importer of cotton
 
 
  ?̂?𝑖: Specific applied tariff on cotton in country i, 
  𝜀𝑖: Price elasticity of demand for cotton in country i, and 
  𝑃: World price of cotton. 
Equation 1.5 may be expressed as: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 (
1
𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖
𝑑𝑃 +
1
𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖
𝑑𝑇𝑖) 
(1.6) 
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where per unit consumption expenditure in country i is given by 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖. 
Defining 𝛽𝑖
𝑇 as the share of 𝑇𝑖 in 𝐶𝑖, equation 1.6 may be rewritten as: 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 ((1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑇)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖) 
(1.7) 
where 𝛽𝑖
𝑇 = (𝑇𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑖⁄ )  
Change in world cotton supply is given by the sum of the changes in national supply in 
every in country i: 
𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷 = ∑ 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑖
𝜂𝑖 ((1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑈)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑈𝑑 ln 𝑈𝑖) 
(1.8) 
where i  is the share of country i in world cotton production and ∑ 𝜃𝑖 = 1𝑖 . 
Change in world cotton demand is given by the sum of the changes in national demand in 
every in country i: 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷 = ∑ 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝑖
((1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑇)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖) 
(1.9) 
where i  is the share of country i in world cotton consumption and ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 1𝑖 . 
World supply must equal world demand in equilibrium. Thus: 
 ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑖
𝜂𝑖 ((1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑈)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑈𝑑 ln 𝑈𝑖)
= ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝑖
((1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑇)𝑑 ln 𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖) 
(1.10) 
Solving for the change in world price yields: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑃 = ∑
𝜃𝑖𝜂𝑖
𝐴
𝑖
(𝛼𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑈𝑑 ln 𝑈𝑖) − ∑
𝜆𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝐴
𝑖
(𝛽𝑖
𝑇𝑑 ln 𝑇𝑖) 
(1.11) 
where 𝐴 = ∑ (𝜆𝑖𝜀𝑖(1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑇) − 𝜃𝑖𝜂𝑖(1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑈))
𝑖
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Equation 1.11 indicates the effect on the world price of changes in cotton subsidies and 
tariffs. Changes in domestic supply and demand in country i are obtained by substituting 𝑑 ln 𝑃 
back into equations 1.4 and 1.7. Changes in net exports are obtained by subtracting demand from 
supply. 
The model comprises 28 countries or groups of countries, including 12 net cotton exporters 
(Australia, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chad, India, Kazakhstan, Mali, Syria, Turkmenistan, US 
and Uzbekistan) and 16 net cotton importers (Bangladesh, China, Colombia, EU, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and 
a rest of the world (ROW) aggregate). The countries that are explicitly included in the model 
represent a very significant portion of world cotton markets. They accounted for 95 percent of 
world production, 94 percent of world consumption, 91 percent of world exports and 87 percent 
of world imports in 2004-2008. 
Simulations cover ten base years between 1998 and 2007, a period that not only provides 
a wide variance in prices and subsidy levels but also reflects recent trends in supply and demand 
forces. This analytical time period is longer and more current than the time periods evaluated in 
previous partial equilibrium models of world cotton markets. The wide range of cotton world 
prices allows the comparison of the effects of trade policy instruments in years of prevailing low 
and high prices. Since most previous models are based on pre-2001 data, the current model 
enriches the debate by incorporating data that reflect recent trends in cotton policies, prices, 
production, consumption and trade.4 
 
                                               
4 Poonyth et al. (2004) uses average production, consumption and trade data for 1996-2000 and subsidy data for 1997-
1999. Sumner (2003) uses actual data from marketing years 1999-2001 (figures for 2002-2007 are projections). 
Schmitz et al. (2007) uses data for crop years 1999-2000 to 2003-2004. In Alston et al. (2007), the baseline is defined 
using 2004-2005 data. 
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1.3. Data 
Production, consumption, import and export data were obtained from the International Cotton 
Advisory Council (ICAC), the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) and 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). World prices were obtained from ICAC. 
Data on domestic support and export subsidies were obtained from official government 
notifications submitted to the WTO Committee on Agriculture. Tariffs were obtained from the 
WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS) database, the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB) and 
official national-level sources. Price elasticities of supply and demand were obtained in Sumer 
(2003) and Poonyth et al. (2004). 
 
Production and Trade 
A lot has changed in world cotton markets in the last decade. While annual global cotton 
production was relatively stable at 20 million metric tons in 1998-2003, it soared to approximately 
26 million metric tons in 2004-2007, due in large part to remarkable output expansion in China, 
India and Brazil (Figure 1.4). Between 1998 and 2007, cotton production in these countries 
increased by 80 percent, 85 percent and 210 percent, respectively. As a result, the shares of 
individual countries in world cotton production have changed considerably over time. Figure 1.5 
compares the average shares of the ten largest cotton producers in 1995-1998 and 2004-2007. 
China, India and Brazil were the only countries that experienced an expansion in their participation 
in world cotton production. The combined share of these three emerging economies rose from 42 
percent in 1998 to 57 percent in 2007. Meanwhile, the share of all other developing countries 
declined from 35 percent to 25 percent, and that of developed countries from 23 percent to 18 
percent. 
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Figure 1.4: Composition of world cotton production, 1998-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Figure 1.5: Shares of world cotton production, by main producers, 1995-1998 and 2004-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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The composition of world cotton demand by individual countries has also changed 
remarkably (Figure 1.6). First and foremost, Chinese consumption almost tripled from 4 million 
metric tons in 1998 to 11 million tons in 2007. Second, developed country demand retracted from 
4 million metric tons to 1.7 million metric tons in the same period. Finally, while cotton 
consumption in other Asian developing countries increased by nearly 50 percent in this period, 
demand in non-Asian developing countries remained mostly unchanged. As a result of these 
changes in domestic demand, China’s share in world cotton consumption nearly doubled from 21 
percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 2007 (Figure 1.7). Other Asian developing countries with rising 
textiles and clothing sectors also increased their shares in world cotton demand, most notably 
Bangladesh, Vietnam and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the combined share of developed countries in 
world cotton consumption fell from 23 percent to only 6 percent. 
Changes in supply and demand forces around the globe have led to significant adjustments 
in trade patterns. The sharp fall in domestic consumption and the large levels of domestic and 
export subsidies in the US have allowed this country to significantly expand its exports (Figures 
1.8 and 1.9). In contrast, traditional exporters in Central Asia and Africa have lost market share. 
India and Brazil, which not long ago were net cotton importers, are now among the world’s largest 
exporters. Substantial changes have also occurred in the import side. While developed countries 
accounted for 30 percent of world cotton imports in 1998, their share fell to 7 percent in 2007. In 
contrast, Asian developing countries now account for more than 75 percent of world cotton imports 
(Figures 1.10 and 1.11). An accurate model of cotton trade must reflect trends in cotton production, 
consumption and trade by incorporating the most recent data available. 
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Figure 1.6: Composition of world cotton consumption, 1998-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Figure 1.7: Shares of world cotton consumption, by main consumers, 1995-1998 and 2004-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Figure 1.8: Composition of world cotton exports, 1998-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Figure 1.9: Shares of world cotton exports, by main exporters, 1995-1998 and 2004-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Figure 1.10: Composition of world cotton imports, 1998-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Figure 1.11: Shares of world cotton imports, by main importers, 1995-1998 and 2004-2007 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Tariffs 
MFN applied tariffs were collected for every country and year between 1998 and 2007. Compared 
to other agricultural commodities, cotton is subject to relatively low import tariffs. Countries that 
imported cotton in 2004-2008 are classified under six different categories in Table 1.1, according 
to their most recent applied tariff rate on uncarded cotton (HS 5201). Of the 94 countries listed in 
Table 1.1, only two – the US and China – would be required to change applied tariffs according to 
the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities.5 
Category I comprises countries that provide duty-free access to cotton imports at an MFN 
basis. This is the largest of the six groups in terms of both the number of countries (47) and their 
share of world cotton imports in 2004-2008 (63 percent). Notable importers in this group include 
Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand. All developed countries, except the US, 
are also in this group. Category II consists of 36 countries that apply tariffs that are larger than 
zero, but not larger than 10 percent, including India, most of South America, and a number of other 
developing countries and transition economies. Together, they account for 5.5 percent of world 
imports. Category III consists of countries that apply tariffs that are larger than 10 percent but not 
larger than 30 percent. The four countries in this category – Haiti, Iran, Nigeria and South Africa 
– account for 1.2 percent of world imports. Categories IV and V are each made of only one country, 
namely China and the US, both of which apply tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to cotton imports. The 
key distinction between these two categories is that while China is the world’s largest cotton 
importer, the US accounts for only 0.05 percent of world imports. Finally, Category VI includes 
five non-WTO members for which recent tariff rates are not available (Ethiopia, Iraq, North Korea, 
Somalia and Uzbekistan). Together they account for only 0.3 percent of world imports. 
                                               
5 For purposes of this chapter, the 27 member states of the European Union are counted as one country. 
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Table 1.1: MFN applied tariffs on cotton, by importing country category 
Category 
Applied MFN 
tariff on cotton (t) 
Importing countries 
Share of world 
cotton imports 
(2004-2008) 
I t = 0% 
 
Armenia Indonesia Norway 
63 percent 
Australia Israel Pakistan 
Bangladesh Japan Panama 
Belarus Jordan Philippines 
Canada Kazakhstan Russia 
Costa Rica Kenya Serbia 
Croatia Kyrgyzstan Singapore 
Dominican Rep. Lebanon South Korea 
Egypt Macau Sri Lanka 
El Salvador Macedonia Switzerland 
European Union Malaysia Taiwan 
Georgia Mauritius Thailand 
Guatemala Mexico Tunisia 
Honduras Moldova Turkey 
Hong Kong Myanmar Vietnam 
Iceland 
  
New Zealand 
 
 
II 0% < t  ≤ 10% 
 
Albania**** Chile* Morocco* 
5.5 percent 
Algeria # Colombia* Mozambique** 
Angola** Congo* Niger** 
Argentina* Congo, DR # Paraguay* 
Azerbaijan # Côte d'Ivoire* Peru* 
Bahrain* Cuba* Rwanda** 
Benin** Ecuador* Saudi Arabia*** 
Bolivia* Ghana* Senegal** 
Brazil* Guinea-Bissau** Togo** 
Burkina Faso** India* Ukraine*** 
Cambodia** Madagascar** Uruguay* 
Cameroon* 
 
Mali** 
 
Venezuela* 
 
III 10% < t ≤ 30% 
Haiti** Nigeria*  
1.2 percent 
Iran # South Africa*  
IV 
IQ: 0% ≤ t ≤ 3% 
United States   0.05 percent 
EQ: t ≤ 24% 
V 
IQ: t = 1% 
China   30 percent 
EQ: 3% ≤ t ≤ 40% 
VI tariff unavailable 
Ethiopia # North Korea # Uzbekistan # 
0.3 percent 
Iraq # Somalia # 
 
 
Note 1: Import tariffs for cotton, not carded or combed (HS 5201). 
Note 2: IQ and EQ stand for intra-quota tariff and extra-quota tariff, respectively. 
Note 3: Only countries that imported cotton in 2004-2008 are listed above. Countries are classified in categories according to 
their applied tariffs in the most recent year for which data are available (2008 or 2009 for most large countries). 
Note 4: Reasons why specific countries would not be required to change applied tariffs on cotton: 
* Country where tariff overhang is greater than required Doha Round tariff cut. 
** LDCs are exempt from tariff cuts in the Doha Round. 
*** VRAMs are exempt from tariff cuts in the Doha Round. 
**** SLIRAMs are exempt from tariff cuts in the Doha Round. 
# Country is not a WTO member. 
Source: Author. 
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Subsidies 
Cotton is a highly subsidized commodity in developed countries. Between 1998 and 2007, the US 
and the EU provided nearly 3 billion USD per year in support to domestic cotton producers, three-
quarters of which was provided by the US alone. Support varied significantly from year to year 
(Figure 1.12), due in large part to the counter-cyclical nature of certain US support programs. 
Cotton was among the most highly subsidized farm commodities in both sides of the Atlantic. 
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 present trade-distorting domestic support as a share of the production value 
for key agricultural products in the US and the EU. The average level of subsidization in the US 
cotton sector in 1998-2007 – 50 percent of the production value – was twice as high as in any other 
sector except rice. In years with lower world prices, US cotton subsidies were equivalent to 70-90 
percent of the value of production. In the EU, cotton subsidies were on average 67 percent as large 
as the value of production in 1998-2005, with a peak of 140 percent in 2003. Since 2006, 65 percent 
of EU cotton subsidies have given in the form of allegedly decoupled payments. 
 
Figure 1.12: Trade-distorting domestic support for cotton in the US and the EU, 1998-2007 
 
Source: Author.  Based on data from WTO notifications and USDA.  
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Figure 1.13: US trade-distorting support for cotton as a share of production value, 1998-2007 
 
Note: Trade-distorting support is defined as the sum of notified AMS or de minimis, Market Loss Assistance 
(MLA) payments, and Counter-cyclical Payments (CCP). 
Source: Author. Based on data from WTO notifications and USDA. 
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Figure 1.14: EU trade-distorting support for cotton as a share of production value, 1998-2005 
 
Note: Trade-distorting support is defined as the sum of notified AMS or de minimis, and Blue Box payments. 
Source: Author. Based on data from WTO notifications. 
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The model incorporates cotton subsidies as officially notified to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture. Table 1.2 lists the countries that have notified trade-distorting domestic support 
(AMS, De Minimis and Blue Box) for cotton in 1998-2007, along with corresponding annual 
subsidy levels expressed in millions of USD. The eight countries that notified cotton subsidies are 
classified into three groups: major subsidizers (US and EU), lesser subsidizers (Brazil, China, 
Colombia and Mexico) and past subsidizers (Israel and South Africa). The distinction between 
major and lesser subsidizers is based on the average per unit level of subsidization. Countries that 
have officially discontinued support for cotton are classified as past subsidizers. 
 
Table 1.2: Cotton trade-distorting domestic support, as notified to the WTO, 1998-2007 
  (Million USD) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Brazil 55 35 55 52 28 18 27 103 130 290 
China -754 345 423 216 324 500 475 433 469 459 
Colombia 1 2 1 3 9 0.1 11 7 6 8 
EU 804 664 729 513 690 864 896 924 357 372 
Israel 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 3 2 1 1 33 11 38 27 25 30 
South Africa 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
US 1,251 2,966 1,662 3,333 2,499 826 3,553 2,922 2,659 806 
US - Amber 935 2,353 1,050 2,810 1,187 435 2,238 1,621 1,365 208 
US - Blue 316 613 613 523 1,312 392 1,315 1,301 1,294 598 
Total 2,114 4,014 2,882 4,119 3,582 2,221 4,999 4,416 3,646 1,965 
Note 1: Figures in italics are estimates. 
Note 2: US Blue Box figures correspond to MLA in 1998-2001 and CCP in 2002-07. Although the US did not notify 
MLA and CCP as Blue Box payments, these types of payments are expected to be included in the New Blue Box. 
Note 3: Total does not include negative AMS for China in 1998. 
Source: Author. Based on data from WTO notifications. 
 
The latest year for which a domestic support notification is available varies from country 
to country: 2007 for the US; 2006 for Israel and South Africa; 2005 for the EU; 2004 for Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico; and 2001 for China. For the EU, estimates for 2006 and 2007 are calculated 
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based on observed production levels and payment rates established in the 2003 reform of the CAP. 
For Brazil, estimates for 2005, 2006 and 2007 are obtained from the shadow domestic support 
notification constructed by Nassar and Ures (2009). For Israel and South Africa, it is assumed that 
official cotton subsidies remain at zero in 2007. For China, Colombia and Mexico, the average 
notified amounts of the three most recent years are used. 
Table 1.3 lists the five countries that reserved the right in the Uruguay Round to subsidize 
cotton exports, along with the levels of export subsidies officially notified to the WTO. Four of the 
five countries have refrained from providing export subsidies to cotton in 1998-2007. The only 
exception is Israel, which provided 886,000 USD export subsidies in 2001. In addition, the WTO 
DSB has found that the US illegally subsidized cotton exports during the implementation period 
of the Uruguay Round by means of user marketing payments and export credit guarantees. 
 
Table 1.3: Cotton export subsidies, as notified to the WTO, 1998-2007 
  (Million USD) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0 0.886 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 0.886 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note: Figures in italics are estimates. 
Source: Author. Based on data from WTO notifications. 
 
Elasticities 
Price elasticities of supply and demand are drawn from the existing literature and are assumed to 
be constant over time. Because there are uncertainties with regard to any elasticity estimates 
utilized in empirical modelling, alternative simulations are run with the different sets of elasticities 
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reported in Sumner (2003)6 and Poonyth et al. (2004). These elasticities are summarized in Table 
1.4. The impact of the choice of elasticities on results is discussed in Subsection 1.5.4. 
 
Table 1.4: Price elasticities of supply and demand in selected countries, by source 
 
Country 
Price Elasticity of Supply (ε) Price Elasticity of Demand (η) 
Sumner (2003) Poonyth et al. (2004) Sumner (2003) Poonyth et al. (2004) 
Australia 0.30 0.80 -0.47 -0.60 
Bangladesh 1/ 0.30 1.20 -0.20 -0.60 
Benin 2/ 0.30 0.80 -0.25 -0.60 
Brazil 0.40 1.20 -0.31 -0.60 
Burkina Faso 2/ 0.30 0.80 -0.25 -0.60 
Chad 2/ 0.30 0.80 -0.25 -0.60 
China 0.14 1.20 -0.26 -1.00 
Colombia 3/ 0.30 0.80 -0.65 -1.30 
European Union 0.60 0.80 -0.16 -0.60 
Hong Kong 6/, 8/ 0.20 0.80 -0.46 -0.60 
India 0.13 1.20 -0.20 -0.80 
Indonesia 1/ 0.30 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Iran 4/ 0.30 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Japan 0.20 0.74 -0.33 -0.60 
Kazakhstan 5/, 7/ 0.30 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Mali 2/ 0.30 0.80 -0.25 -0.60 
Mexico 0.50 1.00 -0.14 -1.30 
Pakistan 0.30 1.20 -0.24 -1.00 
South Korea 0.20 0.80 -0.31 -0.60 
Syria 4/ 0.30 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Taiwan 0.20 0.80 -0.46 -0.60 
Thailand 1/ 0.30 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Turkey 0.30 1.20 -0.25 -0.60 
Turkmenistan 5/ 0.30 1.20 -0.20 -0.60 
United States 0.42 0.80 -0.20 -0.60 
Uzbekistan 0.30 0.80 -0.25 -0.60 
ROW 0.20 0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
Notes:  
1/ “Other Asia” in Sumner (2003).  
2/ “Africa” in Sumner (2003).  
3/ “Other Latin America” in Sumner (2003).  
4/ “Other Middle-East” in Sumner (2003).  
5/ “Uzbekistan” in Sumner (2003).  
6/ “Taiwan” in Sumner (2003).  
7/ “Uzbekistan” in Poonyth et al. (2004).  
8/ “Taiwan” in Poonyth et al. (2004). 
Sources: Sumner (2003) and Poonyth et al. (2004). 
 
                                               
6 The elasticities reported in Sumner (2003) are taken from the model reported in Babcock et al. (2002) and Fang and 
Babcock (2003). 
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1.4. Reform Scenarios 
In order to assess the likely implications of a multilateral trade deal for cotton, five scenarios are 
investigated in this chapter. The first two scenarios represent alternative reform packages in the 
context of the WTO Doha Round. The following three are benchmarks to which the potential 
outcomes of the Doha Round can be contrasted, namely the hypothetical complete implementation 
of DSB panel recommendations the in the US Upland Cotton dispute, the actual measures taken 
by the US in response to this dispute, and recent internal policy reforms in the US and EU. The 
key features of these scenarios are detailed below. 
 
1.4.1. Scenario A: December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities 
Scenario A is based on the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (WTO 2008a), presented by 
the chair of the Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture on 6 December 2008. The 
cotton-related provisions in this text are identical to those in the previous Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture (WTO 2008b), presented on 10 July 2008. Modalities texts are assessments drawn 
from WTO member countries’ positions and are intended to reflect possible areas of agreement 
among the membership. Although not binding, modalities texts provide a good indication of the 
direction in which the negotiating process is going. 
The December 2008 modalities draft contains provisions on each of the three pillars of the 
agricultural negotiations: domestic support, market access and export competition. The following 
subsections describe the key provisions from each of these pillars that are modelled in Scenario A. 
 
Domestic Support 
In terms of domestic support, five provisions in the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities are 
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especially important for cotton: (i) the reduction in the Final Bound Total AMS; (ii) the product-
specific AMS cap; (iii) the overall blue box cap; (iv) the product-specific blue box cap; and (iv) 
the reduction in the de minimis level of support. 
The Final Bound Total AMS is subject to a tiered formula of reduction: where current 
commitment is greater than USD 40 billion, the rate of reduction is 70 percent; where it is greater 
than USD 15 billion and less than or equal to USD 40 billion, the rate of reduction is 60 percent; 
and where it is less than or equal to USD 15 billion, the rate of reduction is 45 percent. For 
developing countries with Final Bound Total AMS levels above USD 100 million, the reduction 
rate is 30 percent. Developing countries with Final Bound Total AMS levels at or below USD 100 
million are not required to undertake a reduction. Although additional exemptions also apply to 
net food importing developing countries (NFIDC), very recently-acceded members (VRAM) and 
small low-income recently-acceded members with economies in transition (SLIRAM), they have 
no practical effect as not a single country in these groups has notified AMS support for cotton.7 
The reduction in the Final Bound Total AMS is important for the cotton sector for two 
reasons. First and foremost, the formula establishing the product-specific AMS cap for cotton 
depends directly on the size of the cut that a given country applies to its overall AMS commitment. 
Second, the reduction in the Final Bound Total AMS may impose additional indirect restrictions 
on product-specific AMS support if the new Final Bound Total AMS is inferior to the sum of all 
product-specific AMS caps to which a country may be entitled. 
Product-specific AMS caps for cotton are obtained by following a two-step process. First, 
                                               
7 There are only four NFIDCs with AMS commitments (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Venezuela), none of which have notified 
AMS support for cotton. There are only four VRAMs with AMS commitments (Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and Vietnam), 
none of which have notified AMS support for cotton. Finally, the only SLIRAM with an AMS commitment (Moldova) has not 
notified AMS support for cotton. 
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a base level of support is defined as the average cotton AMS notified in 1995-2000.8 Second, a 
stringent cut is applied to this base level. The relative size of the cut is determined by a formula 
that depends on the rate of reduction applied to the Final Bound Total AMS.9 According to this 
formula, countries that reduce their Final Bound Total AMS by 70 percent, 60 percent, 45 percent 
and 30 percent shall reduce their cotton AMS base levels by 84.3 percent, 82.2 percent, 85.7 
percent and 71.9 percent, respectively. The cotton AMS reduction formula has the incongruent 
outcome of demanding a slightly larger percentage cut from developed countries that have the 
lowest Final Bound Total AMS. However, this outcome has no practical effect, as none of the 
countries in this group (i.e., Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland10) 
notified AMS for cotton in 1995-2000. 
Caps are introduced on overall and product-specific expenditures in the new blue box. For 
developed countries, overall blue box expenditures are capped at 2.5 percent of the average total 
value of agricultural production in 1995-2000. For developing countries, overall blue box 
expenditures are capped at five percent of the average total value of agricultural production in 
either 1995-2000 or 1995-2004, whichever is higher. The overall blue box cap may impose 
                                               
8 In terms of establishing product-specific AMS caps for cotton, the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture do 
not provide special treatment for the US or developing countries. This is in contrast with the special provisions that apply to these 
countries in the case of product-specific AMS for all other agricultural products. For the US, the product-specific AMS limits for 
products other than cotton shall be the resultant of applying proportionately the average product-specific AMS in the 1995-2004 
period to the average product-specific total AMS support for the Uruguay Round implementation period (1995-2000) as notified 
to the Committee on Agriculture. Developing countries shall establish their product-specific AMS limits for products other than 
cotton by choosing one of the following methods, and scheduling all their product-specific AMS commitments in accordance with 
the method chosen: (a) the average product-specific AMS during the base period 1995-2000 or 1995-2004 as may be selected by 
the Member concerned, as notified to the Committee on Agriculture; (b) two times the Member's product-specific de minimis level 
provided for under Article 6.4 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture during the base periods referred to in sub-paragraph 
(a) above; or (c) 20 percent of the Annual Bound Total AMS in the relevant year during the Doha Round implementation period. 
9 Paragraph 54 of the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture establishes that WTO members with an AMS 
commitment shall reduce their base levels of AMS support for cotton according to the formula given by 𝑅𝑐 = 𝑅𝑔 +
(100−𝑅𝑔)∗100
3∗𝑅𝑔
, 
where  Rc is the specific reduction applicable to cotton (as a percentage) and Rg is the general reduction in AMS (as a percentage). 
Base levels of support shall be calculated as the arithmetic average of the amounts notified for cotton in 1995-2000. 
10 Switzerland notified AMS support for fiber crops in 1999-2006. The notifications do not specify the specific fiber crops that are 
supported. Since Switzerland did not produce cotton in this time period, it is assumed that the domestic support for fiber crops in 
Switzerland did not apply to cotton. 
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additional restrictions on product-specific spending in a given country only if it is inferior to the 
sum of the monetary value of product-specific blue box caps. 
Product-specific blue box caps for cotton are also established according to a two-step 
process: first, a base level is established; second, a cut is applied to this level. For all WTO 
members other than the US, base levels are defined as the average value of blue box support 
provided to cotton and notified in 1995-2000. For the US only, the base level is obtained by the 
multiplication of three factors: (120 percent)*(overall blue box cap)*(share of cotton in total 
legislated maximum permissible expenditure under the 2002 Farm Bill).11 The reduction rates 
applied to cotton blue box base levels are straightforward: 66.7 percent in the case of developed 
countries and 44.4 percent in the case of developing countries. 
De minimis support levels are reduced by 50 percent in developed countries and 33.3 
percent in developing countries with Final Bound Total AMS. Developing countries without a 
Final Bound Total AMS are not required to cut their de minimis levels. Exemptions also apply to 
NFIDCs, VRAMs, SLIRAMs and developing countries that allocate almost all their AMS support 
for subsistence and resource-poor producers. 
 
Market Access 
The key provisions for cotton in the market access pillar are: (i) the tiered formula for tariff 
reduction; (ii) the selection and treatment of sensitive products; (iii) the selection and treatment of 
special products; and (iv) the extension of duty- and quota-free access for cotton exports from 
LDCs. 
 
                                               
11 The December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities presents two options for the first factor in this multiplication: either 110 percent 
or 120 percent. The higher percentage is used in Scenario A because it is the less ambitious of the two. 
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The tiered formula for tariff reduction is implemented as described in Paragraphs 61 and 
63 of the modalities draft.12 Special and differential treatment is provided for developing countries 
in the form of lower reduction rates and higher thresholds in each tier. Tariff cuts for recently-
acceded members (RAMs) are moderated by eight percentage points. LDCs, VRAMs and 
SLIRAMs are exempt from tariff reductions. 
Of the 94 countries that imported cotton between 2004 and 2008, only the US and China 
will be required to change applied tariffs on cotton according to the December 2008 Revised Draft 
Modalities (see Table 1.1). Applied tariffs in the other 92 countries will not be affected by the Doha 
Round for one of six reasons: (i) cotton imports are already subject to duty free treatment (47 
countries); (ii) the tariff overhang is greater than the required tariff cut (20 countries); (iii) LDCs 
are exempt from tariff cuts (13 countries); (iv) VRAMs are exempt from tariff cuts (2 countries); 
(v) SLIRAMs are exempt from tariff cuts (1 country); and (vi) non-WTO countries are not subject 
to WTO rules (9 countries). 
Cotton is not selected as a sensitive product by any developed or developing country. 
Except for the US, all developed countries already provide duty-free access to cotton at a most-
favored nation (MFN) basis.13 For these countries, virtually all cotton tariff lines were bound at 
                                               
12 According to Paragraphs 61 and 63 of the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities, developed and developing countries shall 
reduce their final bound tariffs in accordance with the following tiered formulae (where t stands for the import tariff expressed in 
ad valorem equivalent terms): 
Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
Tier Cut  Tier Cut 
0 < t ≤ 20% 50%  0 < t ≤ 30% 33.3% 
20% < t ≤ 50% 57%  30% < t ≤ 80% 38% 
50% < t ≤ 75% 64%  80% < t ≤ 130% 42.7% 
t >75% 70%  t >130% 46.7% 
 
13 The following developed countries provide duty-free access to cotton imports at an MFN basis: Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. 
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zero during the Uruguay Round.14 Therefore, there is no rationale for choosing cotton as a sensitive 
product in these countries. Although the US has positive tariffs and four separate tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) for cotton, it is assumed that Washington will not select cotton as a sensitive product. This 
is due in part to the fact that existing US cotton TRQs are consistently under-filled, despite the 
relatively low levels of in-quota tariffs (between zero and 3 percent in ad valorem equivalent 
terms). Moreover, quota volume expansion would not be very significant since cotton consumption 
in the US has fallen by 70 percent in the last decade. Furthermore, given the limit in the number 
of tariff lines that may be selected as sensitive, other agricultural products are likely to take 
precedence over cotton in the US, including sugar, dairy and orange juice. Using a formula that 
takes into account (i) the importance of a good in domestic demand, (ii) the cut in prices implied 
by the tiered formula, and (iii) the extent to which treatment as a sensitive product reduces the size 
of a tariff cut, Blandford et al. (2008) conclude that cotton would not figure in the list of sensitive 
products of the US. In a study at the more detailed 8-digit level of the harmonized commodity 
description and coding system (HS), Ibañez, Rebizo and Tejeda (2008) also conclude that cotton 
is unlikely to be selected as a sensitive product in the US. 
Cotton is not selected as a special product by any developing country, except China. This 
assumption is derived from the fact that applied tariffs for cotton are already low in most 
developing countries. Of the top fifteen developing country importers of cotton, all but China 
currently provide duty-free MFN access to cotton. Sun (2008) and Tian (2009) identify cotton as 
one of the agricultural products that Chinese authorities are most likely to select for special 
treatment in the Doha Round. As a special product, cotton in China would be exempt from tariff 
reduction and quota expansion. Even if China were not to select cotton as a Special Product, the 
                                               
14 The only exceptions are the bound tariffs for cotton waste in Australia (2 percent) and Iceland (11 percent). Nonetheless, current 
applied tariffs for cotton waste are zero in both countries. 
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large tariff overhang would be enough to prevent any effective cut in the applied tariff. China has 
unilaterally expanded its cotton TRQ volume year after year in order to allow additional imports 
at the lower in-quota tariff rate. While the current bound tariff is set at 40 percent ad valorem, the 
applied tariff has seldom exceeded 10 percent in recent years.15 
Finally, developed countries are required to grant duty- and quota-free access to cotton 
exports from LDCs. In practice, this measure will have little impact on market access opportunities 
for LDCs. First, as most developed countries already provide duty- and quota-free access to cotton 
imports at an MFN basis, this provision will not represent any special concession to LDCs. Second, 
although Washington will be required to change its current import regime to accommodate this 
special cotton provision, US cotton import demand is expected to be trivial at best. The US is not 
an important importer or consumer of cotton. Rather, it is the world’s largest exporter, with an 
astounding market share of 40 percent in 2004-2007. In contrast, the US accounted for only 0.05 
percent of world cotton imports in the same period. This share is expected to decrease even further 
due to the dramatic contraction in US cotton consumption. The dwindling of the domestic textile 
industry has led to a decline of 70 percent in US cotton consumption in the last decade. Current 
US cotton TRQs are consistently under-filled in spite of zero or low in-quota tariffs. 
 
Export Competition 
Scenario A takes into account: (i) the complete elimination of export subsidies for cotton; and (ii) 
the elimination of the subsidy component of export financing support (export credits, export credit 
guarantees and insurance programs). 
                                               
15 If China were to apply the Doha Round tiered formula, it would have to cut its over-quota tariff by 30 percent (percentage cut 
applicable to second-tier bound tariffs from RAMs). The current bound tariff of 40 percent would be replaced by a new bound tariff 
of 28 percent, which is still substantially higher than applied levels. 
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1.4.2. Scenario B:  Cotton Treated as a Standard Product 
Scenario B is also based on the modalities draft, except that it ignores the special cotton provisions 
and instead subjects cotton to the general disciplines applicable to standard agricultural products. 
The specific differences between Scenario A and Scenario B are twofold. First, in Scenario B, 
cotton AMS and blue box caps are established by following only the first step of the two-step 
processes described in Scenario A. As a result, cotton AMS and blue box caps are identical to their 
respective base levels. In contrast, in Scenario A, cotton AMS and blue box caps result from the 
application of stringent cuts to base levels. 
Second, in establishing base levels for product-specific AMS, the US and developing 
countries are required under Scenario A to use the average AMS support notified in 1995-2000. In 
contrast, in Scenario B, the US and developing countries have access to the standard flexibilities 
contained in Paragraphs 23-25 and Paragraphs 27-28 of the draft modalities text.16 
In terms of domestic support, the general provisions of Scenario B are less ambitious than 
the special cotton provisions of Scenario A. In terms of market access and export competition, 
Scenario B is identical to Scenario A. As a result, Scenario B implies a lower overall degree of 
reform than Scenario A. 
Scenario B should be interpreted as a floor for cotton policy reform in the Doha Round. 
Any outcome of the negotiations for cotton must necessarily be more ambitious than Scenario B. 
In the Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture (WTO, 2004a), the WTO General 
Council recognized the vital importance of cotton for developing countries and established a 
                                               
16 For the US, the cotton AMS is the resultant of applying proportionately the average cotton AMS in 1995-2004 to the average 
product-specific total AMS support notified in 1995-2000. For developing countries, the cotton AMS caps is the highest of the 
following values: (i) the average notified cotton AMS during the base period 1995-2000 or 1995-2004, as may be selected by the 
country concerned; (ii) two times the country’s de minimis level during either 1995-2000 or 1995-2004, as may be selected by the 
country concerned; or (iii) 20 percent of the Annual Bound Total AMS in the relevant year during the Doha Round implementation 
period 
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mandate to address it “ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically, within the agriculture 
negotiations” in relation to all trade-distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of 
market access, domestic support and export competition. In the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration (WTO, 2005a), the WTO General Council reaffirmed its commitment to ensure having 
an explicit decision on cotton within the agriculture negotiations, including that trade distorting 
domestic subsidies for cotton must be reduced more ambitiously than under whatever general 
formula is agreed for other agricultural products. 
 
1.4.3. Scenario C: Hypothetical Full Implementation of DSB Recommendations in 
US Upland Cotton Dispute 
Scenario C models the hypothetical implementation by the US of the DSB recommendations in 
the US Upland Cotton dispute, namely (i) the withdrawal of prohibited subsidies and (ii) the 
removal of the adverse effects of subsidies found to cause serious prejudice (WTO, 2004b; WTO, 
2005b). 
Two variations of Scenario C are presented. In Scenario C1, the first recommendation is 
implemented by simulating the elimination of user marketing payments (Step 2), the Supplier 
Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP), the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM 103) 
and the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM 102). Since the DSB is silent regarding the exact 
steps the US must take to remove the adverse effects of subsidies found to cause serious prejudice, 
the second recommendation is implemented by limiting the combined annual value of marketing 
loan program payments (MLP), market loss assistance payments (MLA) and counter-cyclical 
payments (CCP) so that their negative impact on the world price of cotton is not greater than 2 
percent. Cabral et al. (2009) estimate this value to be USD 600 million. 
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Scenario C2 is identical to Scenario C1, except that MLP, MLA and CCP are limited so 
that their negative impact on the world price is not greater than 4 percent. Cabral et al. (2009) 
estimate this value to be USD 1,360 million. 
 
1.4.4. Scenario D: Actual Incomplete Implementation of DSB Recommendations in 
US Upland Cotton Dispute 
Scenario D models the insufficient measures actually taken by the US in response to the DSB 
recommendations in the US Upland Cotton dispute. Although the US has withdrawn part of its 
prohibited subsidies (Step 2 payments, SCGP and GSM 103), it has done nothing to remove the 
adverse effects of subsidies found to cause serious prejudice to other WTO members. 
In September 2006, the DSB agreed to Brazil's request for the establishment of a panel 
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) concerning the alleged 
failure of the US to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In June 2008, the 
DSB concluded that, notwithstanding changes in US agricultural programs, Washington had failed 
to bring its cotton subsidies into conformity with WTO obligations (Cross, 2009; WTO, 2007; 
WTO, 2008c). In August 2009, the DSB authorized Brazil to take countermeasures against the US, 
including cross-retaliation in intellectual property rights and services (WTO, 2009a; WTO, 2009b). 
 
1.4.5. Scenario E: Internal Policy Reforms in the US and EU 
Scenario E abstracts from multilateral negotiations and litigations and focuses on internal policy 
reforms in key subsidizing countries, namely the 2008 Farm Bill in the US and the 2003-2004 
CAP reform in the EU. 
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The following changes in US cotton subsidies brought about by the 2008 Farm Bill are 
incorporated in Scenario E: (i) payment acres for direct payments are reduced from 85 percent to 
83.3 percent of a farm’s base acreage for the covered commodity; (ii) the target price for counter-
cyclical payments is reduced from USD 0.724 per pound to USD 0.7125 per pound; (iii) storage 
payment rates are reduced by 10 percent; and (iv) Upland Cotton Economic Adjustment Assistance 
payments are introduced, providing USD 0.4 per pound to domestic users of cotton for all 
documented use of upland cotton regardless of its origin.17 
Scenario E also incorporates changes in EU cotton subsidies introduced by the 2003-2004 
reform of the CAP and subsequent amendments.18 The previous guaranteed minimum price system 
was replaced by a combination of coupled and allegedly decoupled payments. In the reformed 
support scheme, 65 percent of the subsidies provided in the 2000-2002 reference period are extend 
as decoupled aid. Another 35 percent are linked to cotton production in the form of area payments. 
Coupled payment rates and eligible areas vary according to the EU country contemplated: EUR 
805.6 per hectare for 250,000 eligible hectares in Greece; EUR 1,400 per hectare for 48,000 
eligible hectares in Spain; EUR 556 per hectare for 360 eligible hectares in Portugal; and EUR 
805.6 per hectare for 3,342 eligible hectares in Bulgaria. In addition, Spain has introduced a 
supplementary environmental area coupled payment at a rate of approximately EUR 350 per 
hectare (Arriaza and Gómez-Limón, 2007). 
                                               
17 Although the 2008 US Farm Bill provided further legal basis to the discontinuation of Step 2 payments and the SCGP and GSM 
103 export credit guarantee programs, these policy changes are not included in Scenario E. Instead they are taken into account in 
Scenario D, which considers the steps taken by Washington to comply with the DSB panel recommendations in the US Upland 
Cotton dispute. The Step 2 subsidy program was repealed by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which took effect on 1 August 
2006, almost two years before the 2008 Farm Bill. Furthermore, Scenario E does not take into account the establishment of the 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program given its novelty and the shortage of relevant data. Distance is lacking to properly 
assess this new instrument. 
18 In September 2006, the Court of Justice of the European Communities annulled the cotton support scheme of the 2003-2004 
CAP reform after a legal challenge made by the Spanish government. According to the Court judgment, the European Commission 
had failed to conduct a complete impact study before the policy initiation. As a result, the European Commission carried out an 
impact assessment study in 2007 and the European Council adopted a revised reform of the support scheme for cotton in 2008. 
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1.5. Results 
Simulation results indicate that the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities would have a 
significant positive impact on world cotton prices and contribute to the expansion of cotton 
production and exports in developing countries. The poor record of internal policy reforms in key 
subsidizing countries and the failure of the US to comply with DSB rulings and recommendations 
highlight the importance of multilateral trade negotiations in addressing the profound distortions 
that characterize the world cotton market. 
This section is divided into four subsections. Estimated impacts of alternative reform 
scenarios on cotton prices, production and trade are discussed in Subsections 1.5.1, 1.5.2 and 1.5.3, 
respectively. Because there are uncertainties with regard to any elasticity estimates utilized in 
empirical modelling, alternative simulations are run with a different set of supply and demand 
price elasticities. The results of this sensitivity analysis are described in Subsection 1.5.4. 
 
1.5.1. Impact on the World Price 
World price effects for each scenario and year are summarized in Figures 1.15 and 1.16. Average 
price increases are highest under the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities, followed by the 
scenarios in which Washington hypothetically implements the DSB recommendations in the US 
Upland Cotton dispute. Impacts from the measures actually taken by the US in response to the US 
Upland Cotton dispute or from recent internal policy reforms in the US and EU are negligible.  
The substantial variance in results on a year-by-year basis is due in large part to the counter-
cyclical nature of a considerable share of notified cotton subsidies. As depicted in Figure 1.17, 
world prices and total notified Amber Box support fluctuated significantly between 1998 and 2007. 
The data provide corroborating evidence of the counter-cyclical nature of cotton domestic support:  
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Figure 1.15: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on the cotton world price, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.15 (cont.): Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on the cotton world price,  
1998-2007 
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Figure 1.16: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on the cotton world price, 1998-2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.17: Cotton World Price and Amber Box Expenditures Notified to the WTO, 1998-2007 
 
 *  Notified amber box support includes estimates for Brazil, China and Mexico in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
** Cotton world price is given by the Cotlook A Index. 
Sources: ICAC and WTO. 
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while years with the highest world prices (i.e., 2003 and 2007) had the lowest levels of subsidies, 
years with the lowest prices (i.e., 1999, 2001 and 2004) had the highest levels of subsidies. The 
years with the lowest world prices are also those in which policy reforms would have had the most 
significant effect on world prices. Since WTO members are especially concerned about the adverse 
effects of subsidies during periods of low world prices, it is important to pay special attention to 
simulation results for years such as 1999, 2001 and 2004. 
 
Doha Round Scenarios 
The two Doha Round scenarios result in an increase in the world price of cotton. However, the 
magnitude of the price rise varies significantly across scenarios. As expected, world price impacts 
in Scenario A (December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities) are substantially greater than in Scenario 
B (cotton treated as a standard product). 
Had cotton subsidies and tariffs been reduced in 1998-2007 as described in Scenario A, the 
world price of cotton would have increased on average by 6 percent, with a range between 2 
percent and 10 percent. However, had cotton been treated as a standard product (Scenario B), the 
average world price increase would have been only 2.5 percent. The price effect in Scenario B is 
approximately two-fifths as large as in Scenario A. This difference is due mainly to the size of caps 
on US trade-distorting domestic support for cotton in each scenario: US$510 million in Scenario 
A (US$143 in AMS and US$367 in the blue box) versus US$2,240 million in Scenario B 
(US$1,140 million in AMS and US$1,100 million in the blue box). Since US trade-distorting 
support for cotton was on average US$2,248 million per year in 1998-2007, it comes as no surprise 
that cuts in US subsidies are not very significant in Scenario B. Discarding the special cotton 
provisions from the modalities text and treating cotton as a standard product would greatly reduce 
the potential of the Doha Round to deliver lower subsidy levels and higher world prices for cotton. 
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US Upland Cotton Dispute 
While the full implementation of the DSB recommendations in the US Upland Cotton dispute 
would have a small to moderate impact on the world price of cotton, the limited measures actually 
taken by the US in response to the dispute would have a negligible effect. 
On average, the insufficient reforms implemented by the US (Scenario D) would cause the 
world price of cotton to rise by only 0.7 percent in 1998-2005, with a range between 0.3 and 1.5 
percent. However, if the US hypothetically withdrew all prohibited subsidies and limited the 
combined annual value of MLP, MLA and CCP so that their negative impact on the world price 
was not greater than 2 percent (Scenario C1), the world price of cotton would rise on average by 
3.5 percent, with a range between 0.6 and 7 percent. If the combined value of MLP, MLA and CCP 
was instead limited so that their negative impact on the world price was not greater than 4 percent 
(Scenario C2), the world price would increase on average by 2.3 percent, with a range between 0.6 
and 5 percent. On average, the price increases resulting from Scenarios C1, C2 and D correspond 
to three-fifths, two-fifths and one-tenth, respectively, of the average price increase resulting from 
Scenario A. 
 
Domestic Reforms in the US and EU 
Had the 2008 US Farm Bill and the 2003-2004 EU CAP reform been simultaneously implemented 
in 1998-2007 (Scenario E), the world price of cotton would have increased on average by 0.8 
percent. This impact would be due almost exclusively to reductions in EU cotton subsidy levels. 
When the 2008 US Farm Bill is considered alone, no impact on the cotton world price is observed. 
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1.5.2. Impact on Production  
The reduction of cotton subsidies and tariffs as described in Scenarios A through E would lead to 
small reductions in the total volume of world cotton production in 1998-2007. Nonetheless, due to 
the accompanying rise in the world price of cotton, the value of production at a global level would 
increase. Figure 1.18 summarizes the estimated impacts of alternative policy reform scenarios on 
world prices, production and production value. Bars represent the average impact in the 1998-2007 
period; vertical lines indicate the range of results. Scenario A causes the greatest average increase 
in the world price of cotton (6 percent), the most pronounced decline in world production volume 
(1.3 percent), and the greatest increase in world production value (4.5 percent on average, 7 percent 
in years with peak subsidy levels). 
Production responses depend, among other things, on supply price elasticities. The higher 
the supply elasticity, the greater the production effect in a given country. When supply is highly 
elastic, production changes can be substantial even in the presence of small price changes. 
Conversely, when supply is highly inelastic, changes in production can be small despite large 
changes in prices. Thus, the choice of elasticities is an important one. All simulations reported in 
this subsection are based on the elasticities reported in Sumner (2003) and summarized in Table 
1.4. Ceteris paribus, production responses are highest in the EU, US and Brazil (0.6, 0.42 and 0.4, 
respectively), and lowest in India and China (0.13 and 0.14, respectively). In Australia, Central 
Asia, Pakistan, Turkey and West Africa, the supply elasticity is 0.3. 
Production effects vary significantly across countries and scenarios. While output 
decreases in countries that undertake reductions in applied subsidy and tariff levels, it increases 
elsewhere. Figures 1.19 and 1.20 summarize the impact of alternative scenarios on production 
quantities and values in specific countries and regions.
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Figure 1.18: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton world price, production and 
production value, average and range, 1998-2007
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Figure 1.19: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton production quantities,  
average and range, 1998-2007
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Figure 1.19 (cont.): Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton production quantities, 
average and range, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.20: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton production value, 
average change and range, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.20 (cont.): Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton production value, 
average and range, 1998-2007 
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The model adopted in this chapter assumes perfect price transmission from world to 
domestic markets and the full ability of producers to respond to price changes. In reality, price 
transmission in some developing countries may be hindered by government-controlled pricing 
systems, excessive transportation and transaction costs and overvalued exchange rates. Moreover, 
producers in these countries may be significantly constrained by lack of access to inputs such as 
credit, labor and water.19 Under these circumstances, simulation results overestimate potential 
impacts on production. 
In a detailed econometric study of the Indian cotton sector, Mittal and Reimer (2008) show 
that, despite extensive public regulation, Indian rural market prices of cotton closely follow world 
prices. They also find that Indian cotton farmers are surprisingly responsive to price changes in 
the medium to long run. In contrast, Goreux (2003) notes that cotton production in the CFA 
countries of West Africa is not very correlated to the world price and that transmission to domestic 
producer prices varies significantly from year to year. He also emphasizes the lack of reliable 
estimated elasticities of supply response to world prices for African countries. 
 
Doha Round Scenarios 
In Scenario A, US and EU cotton production would decline on average by 9 percent and 24 percent, 
respectively. In years with historically low world prices, the decline in US output would be larger 
than average (15 percent). In 2001 alone, US production would decline by 680 thousand metric 
tons, which was more than the combined production volume of the C-4 countries that year. In the 
EU, output decline would be less pronounced following the implementation of the 2003-2004 CAP 
reform (18 percent). The fall in US and EU production would be almost fully compensated by 
                                               
19 For example, cotton growers have repeatedly boycotted cotton markets in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali over the past decade because 
of high input prices (Bassett, 2008). 
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output expansion elsewhere. On average, production would be 2 percent higher in Australia, 
Brazil,20 the C-4 countries, Central Asia,21 Pakistan and Turkey, and 1 percent higher in China and 
India. In years with historically high subsidy levels, production in these two sets of countries would 
increase by 3-3.5 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. More importantly, production value 
(measured at the world price level in USD) would increase by 7-8 percent on average and 11-14 
percent in years of peak subsidy levels. 
The impact on production would be significantly smaller in Scenario B. On average, 
production volumes would decline by 4 percent in the US and remain unchanged in the EU. 
Average output expansion in the rest of the world would be limited: 0.8 percent in Australia, Brazil, 
the C-4 countries, Central Asia, Pakistan and Turkey, and 0.3 percent in China and India. 
Production value in these countries would rise by 3 percent. 
 
US Upland Cotton Dispute 
The hypothetical implementation of Scenario C1 in 1998-2007 would cause US production to fall 
by 7 percent on average, with a range between 1 and 13 percent. In response, production would 
increase by 1-1.3 percent in Australia, Brazil, the C-4 countries, Central Asia, EU, Pakistan and 
Turkey, and 0.5 percent in China and India. Production value in these countries would increase by 
4-4.5 percent. 
Production impacts in Scenario C2 are approximately two-thirds as high as in Scenario C1. 
Production in the US would decline by 4.3 percent on average, with a range between 1 and 9 
percent. Production would increase by 0.7-0.9 percent in Australia, Brazil, the C-4 countries, 
                                               
20 In Scenario A, cotton output in Brazil would increase by 1-4 percent in every single year in 1998-2006. However, Brazilian 
production would decline by 1.5 percent in 2007 since the country would be required to cut its applied level of subsidies. A similar 
pattern would be observed in Colombia and Mexico. 
21 “Central Asia” refers to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
 51 
 
Central Asia, EU, Pakistan and Turkey, and by 0.3 percent in China and India. Production value in 
these countries would increase by 3 percent. 
Scenario D would have negligible effects on production. US output would decline by 1 
percent on average and production elsewhere would remain virtually unchanged. 
 
Domestic Reforms in the US and EU 
The 2003-2004 reform of the CAP would reduce EU production by on average 20 percent between 
1998 and 2005. Production elsewhere would increase by only 0.1-0.3 percent. The 2008 US Farm 
Bill would have virtually no impact on production in the US and elsewhere. The combined impact 
of EU and US domestic reforms (Scenario E) coincides with the individual impact of the EU CAP 
reform. 
 
1.5.3. Impact on Trade 
Figures 1.21 and 1.22 summarize the impact of alternative policy reform scenarios on net trade 
volumes and values. Changes in exports and imports are large in Scenario A, moderate in Scenarios 
B and C, and small or negligible in Scenarios D and E (except for EU imports in Scenario E). 
Trade volumes exhibit a large variance in a year-to-year basis, significantly more so than 
production volumes. 
Among net exporters, export volumes generally retract in the main subsidizing country (the 
US) and increase elsewhere (Australia, Brazil, C-4 countries, Central Asia and India). Countries 
with larger textiles and apparel sectors (India and Brazil) experience relatively greater expansion 
in exports due to the contraction in domestic consumption caused by higher world prices. The 
simultaneous increase in export quantities and world prices leads to an unambiguous rise in the 
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value of exports for all net exporters except the US. For this country, the increase in the world 
price does not compensate for the retraction of export quantities in scenarios A through D. 
Among key net importers (Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey), import 
volumes decrease in every scenario analyzed due to increased domestic output and decreased 
domestic demand. Estimated import costs also fall in countries with large domestic cotton sectors 
(China, Pakistan and Turkey) since reductions in import quantities dominate world price increases. 
Nonetheless, import bills increase slightly in countries with small domestic cotton production 
volumes (Bangladesh and Indonesia). In the EU, import quantities and costs increase substantially 
in Scenarios A and E (scenarios in which EU subsidies are significantly reduced), decrease slightly 
in Scenarios B and C, and remain virtually unchanged in Scenario D. 
 
Doha Round Scenarios 
Had Scenario A been retroactively applied in 1998-2007, annual US export volumes would have 
declined by 16 percent on average, with a wide range between 2 percent and 34 percent. This fall 
in US exports would have been counterbalanced by increased exports from other cotton suppliers. 
Export volumes would have increased on average by 12-14 percent in Brazil and India and 2-2.5 
percent in Uzbekistan, the C-4 countries and Australia. Imports would have declined in the major 
Asian importing countries, especially in those with large domestic cotton sectors, including 
Pakistan (14 percent), China (12 percent decrease) and Turkey (8 percent). The decline in import 
volume would have been less pronounced in countries that rely almost exclusively on imported 
cotton, such as Bangladesh (1.3 percent) and Indonesia (1.2 percent). In the EU, import volumes 
would have been on average 30 percent higher than actual observed levels. Nonetheless, European 
import volumes would have continued on their downward trend year after year. 
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Figure 1.21: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton net trade volumes, average 
percentage change, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.21 (cont.): Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton net trade volumes, 
average percentage change, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.22: Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton net trade values, average 
percentage change, 1998-2007 
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Figure 1.22 (cont.): Estimated impact of alternative scenarios on cotton net trade values, 
average percentage change, 1998-2007 
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Trade flow effects in Scenario B would be approximately two-fifths as high as in Scenario 
A for all countries except the EU. While EU import volumes would increase on average by 30 
percent in Scenario A, they would decrease by 1.5 percent in Scenario B. This is because the EU 
would not be required to significantly alter applied subsidy levels in order to conform to the cotton 
product-specific caps established in Scenario B. 
 
US Upland Cotton Dispute 
The hypothetical full implementation of the DSB recommendations in Scenarios C1 and C2 would 
lead to trade flow effects that are three-fifths and two-fifths as high as in Scenario A, respectively. 
As in Scenario B, the only exception would concern EU imports, which would decrease by 2-2.5 
percent. 
In contrast, if the measures actually taken by the US in response to the DSB 
recommendations were retroactively applied in the 1998-2005 period (Scenario D), impacts on 
trade flows would be negligible. Exports would on average decline by 2.5 percent in the US and 
increase by 1.5 percent in Brazil and India and 0.25 percent in Uzbekistan, the C-4 countries and 
Australia. Imports would decline by 3 percent in Pakistan, 2 percent in China and 1 percent Turkey, 
and remain virtually unchanged in the EU, Bangladesh and Indonesia. 
 
Domestic Reforms in the US and EU 
Scenario E would lead to a large average increase in EU imports (25 percent) and a small increase 
in US exports (1 percent).  For the other key importing and exporting countries, results would be 
similar to Scenario D. Virtually all changes would be brought about by the 2003-2004 reform of 
the CAP. When considered alone, the 2008 US Farm Bill would have no impact on trade flows.  
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1.5.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
As reported in Goreux (2003) and Poonyth et al. (2004), estimates of price, production and trade 
impacts from cotton policy reforms are sensitive to the choice of price elasticities of supply and 
demand. Accordingly, this subsection analyzes the sensitivity of simulation results to changes in 
elasticity parameters. 
Price elasticities of supply and demand are drawn from the existing literature and are 
assumed to be constant over time. While results presented in Subsections 1.5.1, 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 are 
based on elasticities reported in Sumner (2003), results discussed below are based on elasticities 
reported in Poonyth et al. (2004), which are also summarized in Table 1.4. The two sets of 
elasticities differ considerably. Nearly all elasticities in Poonyth et al. are larger (in absolute value) 
than those in Sumner. The simple mean of the demand elasticities reported in the former is 2.5 
times larger (in absolute value) than in the latter (–0.67 in Poonyth et al. vs. –0.27 in Sumner). For 
supply elasticities, the difference in simple means is of three to one (0.90 in Poonyth et al. vs. 0.30 
in Sumner). In addition, the correlation between the two alternative sets of elasticities is low (0.25 
for demand elasticities and 0.04 for supply elasticities). Elasticity values for key countries differ 
significantly between the two sets. For example, supply elasticities for China and India, the world’s 
two largest cotton producers, are 0.14 and 0.13 according to Sumner, but 1.2 according to Poonyth 
et al. While Mexico has the lowest (in absolute terms) demand elasticity of any country according 
to Sumner (–0.14), it has the highest as per Poonyth et al. (–1.30). 
In general, when the elasticities reported in Sumner are replaced by the ones reported in 
Poonyth et al., the impact on world prices becomes weaker and the effect on quantities produced 
and traded becomes stronger. The sensitivity of price, production and trade impacts to the use of 
this different set of supply and demand elasticities is analyzed in more detail below.  
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World Price 
Table 1.5 compares world price effects estimated using the two alternative sets of elasticities. In 
every scenario and year, the estimated impact on the cotton world price is weaker when the 
elasticities from Poonyth et al. are used. While differences are small in absolute terms, they are 
significant in relative terms. 
With the elasticities reported in Poonyth et al., estimated world price increases in Scenario 
A are approximately one-half of those obtained with the elasticities reported in Sumner. In 
Scenarios B, C and D, they are roughly three-fifths as large. Finally, in Scenario E, they are only 
two-fifths as large. Although the magnitudes of the price rises vary with the different sets of 
elasticities, the year-by-year variation in results remains unchanged: the greatest impact occurs in 
years with the lowest world prices and the lowest impact occurs in years with the highest world 
prices. The relative differences between price impacts across scenarios also remain mostly 
unaffected. 
 
Production 
Table 1.6 summarizes average production impacts under the two alternative sets of elasticities. 
Given that supply elasticities in Poonyth et al. are higher than in Sumner, production effects are 
greater under the former. Differences in estimated production effects are especially pronounced 
for countries that are required to reduce applied subsidy levels. For example, while US and EU 
cotton outputs in Scenario A decline by 9 percent and 24 percent under Sumner’s elasticities, they 
retract by 19 percent and 33 percent when Poonyth et al.’s elasticities are used. Estimates based 
on Sumner and Poonyth et al. elasticities are within three percentage points in China and India, 
two percentage points in Pakistan and Turkey, and one percentage point in Australia, Brazil, the 
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C-4 countries and Central Asia. The greater the difference in supply elasticities for a given country, 
the larger the disparity in estimated production impacts. Differences are larger for China and India 
because their supply elasticities in Poonyth et al. are substantially greater than in Sumner. 
 
Table 1.5: Estimated impact on cotton world prices according to alternative sets of 
elasticities, by base year, 1998-2007 
 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average Highest 
Scenario A: December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities 
Sumner 
(2003) 
5.5% 9.0% 5.7% 10% 6.3% 3.0% 7.5% 6.2% 4.4% 2.0% 6.0% 10.0% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
2.9% 4.9% 3.0% 5.0% 3.2% 1.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.2% 0.9% 3.1% 5.0% 
Scenario B: Cotton Treated as a Standard Product 
Sumner 
(2003) 
1.8% 5.0% 1.6% 5.7% 1.7% 1.2% 3.7% 2.4% 1.3% 0.9% 2.5% 5.7% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
1.2% 3.0% 1.0% 3.2% 1.0% 0.7% 2.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.5% 1.4% 3.2% 
Scenario C1: Full Implementation of DSB Recommendations (2% Maximum Price Effect) 
Sumner 
(2003) 
2.2% 5.6% 2.6% 6.9% 3.7% 1.1% 4.9% 3.9% 3.1% 0.6% 3.5% 6.9% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
1.3% 3.3% 1.5% 3.8% 2.0% 0.7% 2.6% 2.1% 1.6% 0.3% 1.9% 3.8% 
Scenario C2: Full Implementation of DSB Recommendations (4% Maximum Price Effect) 
Sumner 
(2003) 
1.8% 3.9% 1.6% 5.0% 1.8% 1.1% 3.5% 2.4% 1.7% 0.6% 2.3% 5.0% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
1.2% 2.3% 1.0% 2.8% 1.0% 0.7% 1.9% 1.3% 0.9% 0.3% 1.3% 2.8% 
Scenario D: Incomplete Implementation of DSB Recommendations 
Sumner 
(2003) 
1.1% 1.5% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 1.5% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
0.7% 0.9% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 
Scenario E: Internal Policy Reforms in the US and EU 
Sumner 
(2003) 
1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 1.1% 
Poonyth et 
al. (2004) 
0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 
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Table 1.6: Estimated impact on cotton production volumes according to alternative sets of elasticities, by country or region,  
1998-2007 averages 
 
  
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario D Scenario E 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Australia 1.8% 2.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
Brazil 1.8% 2.2% 0.8% 1.0% 1.3% 2.2% 0.9% 1.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 
C-4 1.8% 2.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
Central Asia 1.8% 2.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
China 0.8% 3.5% 0.3% 1.7% 0.5% 2.2% 0.3% 1.5% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.4% 
EU -23.7% -32.6% 0.2% -0.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% -19.7% -26.6% 
India 0.8% 3.7% 0.3% 1.7% 0.4% 2.3% 0.3% 1.6% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.4% 
Pakistan 1.8% 3.7% 0.8% 1.7% 1.0% 2.3% 0.7% 1.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 
Turkey 1.8% 3.7% 0.8% 1.7% 1.0% 2.3% 0.7% 1.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 
US -8.8% -18.5% -4.5% -9.3% -6.7% -13.7% -4.3% -8.8% -1.2% -2.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
ROW 1.2% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
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The impact on the value of production depends on simultaneous changes in world prices 
and production quantities. Since in most countries price changes dominate changes in production 
volumes, estimated changes in production value are generally greater with the elasticities reported 
in Sumner (Table 1.7). Since changes in production quantity dominate price changes in countries 
that undertake reductions in applied subsidy levels, changes in production value are higher with 
the elasticities reported in Poonyth et al. For China and India, changes in production values are 
approximately the same with either set of elasticities. 
 
Trade 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 summarize average trade impacts estimated under the two alternative sets of 
elasticities. For most countries, changes in net trade volumes are less than one percentage point 
greater when simulations are run with the elasticities reported in Poonyth et al. The main 
exceptions are India, China and countries that undertake reductions in applied subsidy levels (the 
US in Scenarios A through D; the EU in Scenarios A and E). In India and China, changes in net 
trade flows are three times higher when Poonyth et al.’s elasticities are used. This wider disparity 
in results is due in part to the large difference between the supply elasticities reported in Sumner 
(0.13 for India and 0.14 for China) and Poonyth et al. (1.2 for both countries). China and India are 
the countries in which the difference between Sumner’s and Poonyth et al.’s elasticities is the 
greatest. 
In exporting countries other than the US, the expansion in net exports is due to the 
combined effect of increased production and reduced domestic consumption. Since supply and 
demand elasticities are larger in Poonyth et al., the rise in production and fall in domestic 
consumption are also larger under this choice of elasticities. In most key importing countries, the 
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Table 1.7: Estimated impact on cotton production values according to alternative sets of elasticities, by country or region,  
1998-2007 averages 
 
  
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario D Scenario E 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Australia 7.8% 5.6% 3.3% 2.6% 4.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 1.0% 0.6% 1.0% 0.5% 
Brazil 7.8% 5.3% 3.3% 2.5% 4.8% 4.3% 3.3% 4.2% 1.0% 0.7% 1.1% 0.6% 
C-4 7.8% 5.6% 3.3% 2.6% 4.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 1.0% 0.6% 1.0% 0.5% 
Central Asia 7.8% 5.6% 3.3% 2.6% 4.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 1.0% 0.6% 1.0% 0.5% 
China 6.7% 6.7% 2.9% 3.2% 3.9% 4.2% 2.7% 2.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 
EU -19.2% -30.6% 2.7% 1.3% 4.5% 2.7% 3.0% 1.9% 0.9% 0.5% -15.2% -21.0% 
India 6.7% 6.8% 2.9% 3.2% 3.9% 4.3% 2.7% 4.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 
Pakistan 7.8% 6.8% 3.3% 3.2% 4.5% 4.3% 3.1% 4.3% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 
Turkey 7.8% 6.8% 3.3% 3.2% 4.5% 4.3% 3.1% 4.3% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 
US -11.7% -23.1% -10.5% -15.8% -11.7% -19.5% -10.4% -15.4% -5.0% -4.7% 1.3% 0.7% 
ROW 7.2% 3.7% 3.1% 1.7% 4.2% 2.3% 2.8% 1.6% 0.9% 0.4% 1.0% 0.4% 
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Table 1.8: Estimated impact on cotton net trade volumes according to alternative sets of elasticities, by country,  
1998-2007 averages 
 
  
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario D Scenario E 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth 
et al. 
NET EXPORTERS 
Australia 1.8% 2.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
Benin 1.8% 2.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
Brazil 14.0% 15.3% 5.2% 5.5% 9.6% 13.1% 6.2% 8.6% 1.5% 2.2% 2.2% 2.0% 
Burkina Faso 1.8% 2.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
Chad 1.9% 2.7% 0.8% 1.3% 1.1% 1.7% 0.8% 1.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
India 12.1% 37.4% 4.7% 16.5% 6.3% 21.6% 4.7% 16.4% 1.7% 6.3% 2.3% 5.1% 
Kazakhstan 2.2% 3.0% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 1.9% 0.8% 1.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 
Mali 1.8% 2.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
Turkmenistan 3.8% 7.3% 1.6% 3.4% 2.2% 4.7% 1.5% 3.2% 0.4% 1.0% 0.5% 0.7% 
US -15.9% -34.2% -8.4% -17.5% -11.9% -24.6% -7.7% -16.2% -2.6% -5.5% 0.7% 0.6% 
Uzbekistan 2.6% 3.5% 1.1% 1.7% 1.5% 2.2% 1.0% 1.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 
NET IMPORTERS 
Bangladesh -1.3% -2.1% -0.6% -1.0% -0.8% -1.3% -0.5% -0.9% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
China -11.9% -32.6% -4.7% -14.5% -6.8% -20.0% -4.3% -13.3% -1.8% -5.7% -1.7% -3.4% 
Colombia -6.5% -5.0% -3.3% -4.0% -4.5% -5.3% -3.1% -3.7% -1.0% -1.3% -1.1% -0.8% 
EU 29.7% 39.6% -1.6% -2.4% -2.8% -4.1% -2.0% -2.9% -0.6% -0.9% 24.9% 33.5% 
Indonesia -1.2% -1.9% -0.5% -0.9% -0.7% -1.2% -0.5% -0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
Japan -1.9% -1.8% -0.8% -0.9% -1.1% -1.2% -0.8% -0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% 
Mexico -0.9% -3.9% -0.9% -3.0% -1.2% -4.0% -0.8% -2.8% -0.3% -1.0% -0.3% -0.6% 
Pakistan -13.8% -28.0% -4.6% -10.4% -8.0% -17.4% -4.8% -10.7% -1.4% -3.3% -1.9% -2.8% 
South Korea -1.8% -1.8% -0.8% -0.9% -1.1% -1.1% -0.7% -0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
Thailand -1.2% -1.8% -0.5% -0.8% -0.7% -1.2% -0.5% -0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
Turkey -8.0% -13.0% -3.3% -6.0% -4.4% -7.8% -3.1% -5.6% -1.2% -2.3% -1.2% -1.4% 
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Table 1.9: Estimated impact on cotton net trade values according to alternative sets of elasticities, by country,  
1998-2007 averages 
 
  
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario D Scenario E 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
Sumner 
Poonyth  
et al. 
NET EXPORTERS 
Australia 7.8% 5.6% 3.3% 2.6% 4.6% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 0.8% 0.7% 1.0% 0.5% 
Benin 7.8% 5.7% 3.3% 2.7% 4.6% 3.6% 3.1% 2.5% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 
Brazil 19.5% 18.1% 7.2% 6.6% 12.7% 14.8% 8.2% 9.7% 1.2% 1.5% 2.8% 2.2% 
Burkina Faso 7.8% 5.6% 3.3% 2.6% 4.6% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 0.8% 0.7% 1.0% 0.5% 
Chad 8.0% 5.8% 3.4% 2.7% 4.6% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.6% 
India 17.2% 40.6% 6.7% 17.7% 9.2% 23.4% 6.7% 17.6% 1.3% 3.9% 2.8% 5.3% 
Kazakhstan 8.2% 6.2% 3.5% 2.9% 4.8% 3.9% 3.2% 2.7% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.6% 
Mali 7.9% 5.7% 3.3% 2.7% 4.6% 3.6% 3.1% 2.5% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 
Turkmenistan 9.9% 10.7% 4.2% 4.9% 5.8% 6.7% 3.9% 4.6% 0.9% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 
US -11.1% -32.4% -6.1% -16.4% -8.9% -23.3% -5.6% -15.1% -1.5% -4.0% 1.5% 0.9% 
Uzbekistan 8.6% 6.7% 3.7% 3.1% 5.0% 4.2% 3.4% 2.9% 0.9% 0.8% 1.2% 0.6% 
NET IMPORTERS 
Bangladesh 5.0% 0.9% 1.9% 0.4% 2.6% 0.6% 1.8% 0.4% 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 
China -7.2% -30.9% -2.7% -13.5% -3.9% -18.8% -2.4% -12.3% -0.8% -4.0% -1.0% -3.1% 
Colombia -1.0% -2.2% -0.9% -2.7% -1.3% -3.5% -0.9% -2.5% -0.2% -0.7% -0.3% -0.5% 
EU 38.3% 44.4% 1.3% -0.7% 0.9% -2.0% 0.6% -1.4% 0.2% -0.4% 26.2% 34.0% 
Indonesia 5.1% 1.1% 2.0% 0.5% 2.7% 0.7% 1.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 
Japan 3.8% 1.2% 1.7% 0.6% 2.3% 0.7% 1.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 
Mexico 5.0% -1.0% 1.6% -1.6% 2.2% -2.1% 1.5% -1.5% 0.4% -0.4% 0.5% -0.3% 
Pakistan -10.1% -26.6% -3.2% -9.7% -5.8% -16.6% -3.4% -10.0% -0.6% -1.8% -1.4% -2.6% 
South Korea 4.0% 1.2% 1.7% 0.6% 2.3% 0.8% 1.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 
Thailand 4.6% 1.2% 2.0% 0.6% 2.7% 0.7% 1.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 
Turkey -3.4% -10.4% -0.9% -4.7% -1.2% -6.1% -0.8% -4.3% -0.4% -1.5% -0.4% -1.1% 
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fall in net imports is explained by the combined effect of expanded domestic output and retracted 
domestic consumption. The rise in production and fall in domestic consumption are greater when 
elasticities are larger (i.e., in Poonyth et al.). In countries with small domestic cotton production 
(e.g., Bangladesh and Indonesia), the difference between the results obtained with the two sets of 
elasticities is very small. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
The WTO Doha Round could have a significant positive impact on world cotton prices and 
contribute to the expansion of cotton production and exports in developing countries. However, 
the likelihood of such an outcome is highly dependent on the depth of the subsidy reductions 
adopted by WTO members. The poor record of internal policy reforms in key subsidizing countries 
and the failure of the US to comply with DSB recommendations in the US Upland Cotton dispute 
highlight the importance of multilateral trade negotiations in addressing the profound distortions 
that characterize the world cotton market. 
This chapter demonstrates that ambitious cotton-specific provisions are imperative in order 
to achieve meaningful reforms in the Doha Round. It validates the mandate given by the WTO 
membership in the 2004 Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture and reaffirmed in 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration to address cotton “ambitiously, expeditiously, and 
specifically within the agriculture negotiations.”  
A partial equilibrium model was utilized to estimate the price, production and trade effects 
of reforming cotton subsidies and tariffs under alternative policy scenarios. The quantitative 
estimates derived from the model suggest that effects are substantial under the special cotton 
provisions of the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities and would deliver significant gains for 
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developing countries. In contrast, most benefits would be dissipated if cotton were treated under 
the general provisions applicable to other agricultural products. In the absence of a multilateral 
trade deal on cotton, the impact of domestic policy reforms in the US and EU would be negligible. 
This chapter estimates that the special cotton provisions of the December 2008 modalities 
draft (Scenario A) would increase the world price of cotton by as much as 10 percent and 
production volumes in Brazil, Central Asia and West Africa by as much as 3-3.5 percent. As a 
result, production values in these developing countries and regions would increase by as much as 
13 percent when measured at world price levels. Cotton production would decline by as much as 
15 percent in the US and 30 percent in the EU due to significant reductions in applied subsidy 
levels. 
Since the counter-cyclical nature of cotton subsidies generates significant variance in 
simulation results in a year-by-year basis, it is also informative to look at average effects. Had 
Scenario A been retroactively applied in the 1998-2007 period, the cotton world price would have 
increased by 6 percent on average. Production quantities in Brazil, Central Asia and West Africa 
would have increased by 2 percent and production value by 8 percent. Had cotton been treated as 
a standard product (Scenarios B), the world price would have increased on average by only 2.5 
percent, production in the same group of developing countries would have increased by 0.8 percent 
and production value by 3 percent. 
If the measures taken by Washington in response to the US Upland Cotton dispute were 
applied retroactively to 1998-2007 (Scenario D), the world price would have increased on average 
by less than one percent and production would have remained virtually unchanged across the 
globe. A similar pattern would have been observed had the 2003-2004 EU CAP reform and the 
2008 US Farm Bill applied to 1998-2007 (Scenario E), except that EU production would have 
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declined. The 2008 US Farm Bill alone would have had no impact on prices or quantities.  
Four main factors distance Scenario A from the full liberalization of cotton markets. First, 
the elimination of tariffs and subsidies in this scenario applies only to WTO member countries. 
Policies in non-WTO members are assumed to remain unchanged. Non-WTO members are 
significant players in international cotton markets. They accounted for 20 percent of world cotton 
exports in 2004-2008. Some of the world’s top cotton exporters are not members of the WTO, 
including Uzbekistan (world’s second largest exporter), Turkmenistan (eight), Kazakhstan (ninth), 
Tajikistan (tenth) and Syria (twelfth). The current literature has not clarified whether the cotton 
sectors in some of these countries are actually taxed or subsidized (Rudenko et al., 2009; Rudenko 
and Lamers, 2006; EJF, 2005; Guadagni et al., 2005). 
Second, Scenario A does not contemplate reductions in payments that are claimed to be 
decoupled from production, such as Direct Payments in the US and Single Farm Payments (SFP) 
in the EU. Third, it allows WTO members to continue to provide some degree of trade distorting 
subsidies, namely the amounts implied by de minimis levels and AMS and blue box product-
specific caps.  
Finally, Scenario A is concerned with the degree of reform that could be achieved through 
multilateral trade negotiations. Therefore, only subsidies that are officially notified22 by WTO 
members are taken into account. The Doha Round per se is assumed to have no impact on cotton 
subsidies that are currently not reported by member countries. Whether or not these subsidies will 
be notified in the future will depend on WTO member countries filing complaints within the scope 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism or the extended monitoring and surveillance structure 
                                               
22 Although the US did not notify market loss assistance payments (MLA) and counter-cyclical payments (CCP) as blue box 
payments, they are taken into consideration in the analysis since payments of this type are highly likely to be included in the new 
blue box in the Doha Round. Furthermore, AMS estimates are used for recent years for which domestic support notifications are 
not yet available, including Brazil (2005-2007), China (2005-2007), EU (2007), Israel (2007), Mexico (2005-2007) and South 
Africa (2007). 
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of the Committee on Agriculture that may emerge from a trade deal in the Doha Round. 
The International Cotton Advisory Council (ICAC) and other sources report governmental 
subsidies to the cotton sector that are significantly higher than the values that are officially notified 
by WTO members. 23  For example, while the Turkish government declares that no domestic 
support was provided to its cotton sector between 1998 and 2001, the ICAC reports that Turkish 
cotton subsidies were in the order of USD 220 million in 1998-1999, USD 287 million in 1999-
2000 and USD 106 million in 2000-2001 (ICAC, 2002). While Turkey has not submitted any 
domestic support notifications since 2001, the ICAC reports that the country has continued to 
subsidize domestic cotton production. A multilateral trade deal in the context of the Doha Round 
will not by itself force Turkey to notify alleged cotton subsidies. Therefore, for purposes of 
calculating the potential impacts of the Doha Round, un-notified subsidies are not taken into 
account. 
The magnitude of estimated policy reform effects is fairly sensitive to the choice of supply 
and demand elasticities. Impacts on the cotton world price are higher when the elasticities reported 
in Sumner (2003) are selected. On the other hand, impacts on quantities produced and traded are 
greater with the significantly higher elasticities reported in Poonyth et al. (2004). One feature that 
is common across all scenarios and does not depend on the choice of elasticities is that estimated 
impacts are almost exclusively explained by reductions in subsidies. 
There are two reasons why market access has a marginal role at best. First, the cotton sector 
already enjoys exceptionally low levels of applied tariffs.24 Second, only two WTO members (the 
                                               
23A number of WTO members that have not notified domestic support for cotton have allegedly subsidised domestic production, 
including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, India, Mali, Pakistan and Turkey (ICAC, 2008; Pan et al., 2009a). ICAC subsidy estimates 
for the three largest cotton subsidizers – the US, China and the EU – are also substantially higher than officially notified figures. 
24 Of the 153 members of the WTO, 84 currently apply duty-free access to cotton imports, 62 apply tariffs between 0 and 10 
percent, and only seven apply tariffs between 10 percent and 33 percent. Of the seven countries with tariffs above 10 percent, only 
Nigeria has a significantly large domestic market. The other countries are Djibouti, Gambia, Haiti, Maldives, Solomon Islands and 
Tonga. 
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US and Oman) will have to reduce current applied tariffs as a result of the negotiations. All other 
countries either: (i) already provide duty-free access to imports at an MFN basis, (ii) enjoy 
significant tariff overhang, or (iii) qualify for tariff-cut exemptions due to their status as LDCs, 
very recently-acceded members or small low-income recently-acceded members. 
The extension by developed countries of duty-free access for cotton exports from LDCs 
will have little if any impact on market access opportunities for LDCs. First, all developed 
countries apart from the US already provide duty-free access to cotton imports at an MFN basis. 
Second, as US cotton consumption has plummeted in recent years, the country’s share of world 
cotton imports has collapsed to only 0.05 percent. Moreover, US cotton quotas are consistently 
under-filled despite the low level of in-quota tariffs (between zero and 3 percent). 
In contrast, developing countries account for nearly 95 percent of world cotton imports. Of 
the top fifteen developing country importers, all but China currently provide duty-free MFN access 
to cotton. The Doha Round will not significantly alter market access conditions in China since 
Beijing is likely to exempt cotton from tariff reduction and quota expansion by selecting it as a 
Special Product. Even if China were not to select cotton as a Special Product, the large tariff 
overhang would be enough to prevent any effective cut in the applied tariff. 
When it comes to cotton, subsidies should be the heart and soul of the negotiations. There 
is an urgent need to rebalance existing trade rules that permit developed countries to highly 
subsidize domestic production, depress world prices, push farmers elsewhere out of production 
and impair prospects for economic advancement in the developing world. The adoption of 
ambitious domestic support reforms for cotton in the Doha Round would be a significant step 
towards the establishment of a fair and market-oriented trading system. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH AGRICULTURAL EXPORT TAXES 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The surge in world commodity prices in 2007-2008 heightened the interest in agricultural export 
taxes as a source of government revenue and protective shield against rising food prices and 
inflation.  While export taxes may help achieve these and other policy objectives in the short run, 
theoretical and empirical evidence has shown that such measures are self-defeating in the long 
term and usually cause more harm than good.  This paper reviews current and past export taxes in 
over 60 countries and provides a detailed analysis of their application and economic impacts in 
three selected countries (Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand). 
Broadly speaking, the taxation of agricultural exports can occur through the application of 
various direct policy instruments, including explicit export taxes, export quotas, export bans, 
export licensing requirements and commodity marketing boards.  Indirect measures that affect the 
prevailing exchange rate and the level of protection afforded to non-agriculture may further tax 
agricultural exports (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés, 1991). 
Despite the indisputable importance of each of the aforementioned policy instruments, the 
current paper is concerned primarily with explicit export taxes on agricultural products.  Therefore, 
except as otherwise indicated, the term “export tax” will be used in reference to explicit export 
taxes.  Nonetheless, to the extent that some implicit export taxes are related to explicit export taxes 
and have similar effects, the analysis may be extended to such measures. 
Agricultural products covered in this paper mostly follow the product coverage of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, as specified in its Annex 1.  Therefore, the analysis 
comprises export taxes on both primary and agro-industrial products, but does not include 
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experiences with the taxation of fishery and forestry products.  Whereas several countries apply 
export taxes to fishery and forestry products, the taxation of such natural resource products require 
an analysis distinct from those of agricultural products and more in line with the treatment of taxes 
on mineral products (Tanzi, 1990; Devarajan et al., 1996; Gaffney, 1967; Corden and Neary, 1982; 
Goode, 1984; Neary, 1986). 
The chapter is organized in four sections in addition to this introduction.  Section 2.2 
examines the global experience with agricultural export taxes.  It investigates the objectives, 
product coverage, structure and level of agricultural export taxes applied by over 60 countries, as 
well as the allocation of funds collected from export taxes and the incentives for smuggling.  The 
effectiveness of export taxes in meeting policy goals and their economic effects are discussed for 
some illustrative countries. 
Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 analyze in more detail the experiences of Argentina, Indonesia 
and Thailand – three countries that have had very distinctive trajectories in terms agricultural 
export taxation.  Each of the three sections (i) analyzes the evolution and objectives of agricultural 
export taxes in the particular country, (ii) describes the their coverage, structure and level, (iii) 
provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical evidence on their short-run and long-run 
impacts, and (iv) evaluates their effectiveness in meeting policy goals. 
Section 2.3 examines Argentina, a country that makes intensive and widespread use of 
export taxes.  The country taxes exports of all agricultural and non-agricultural products, applies 
some of the highest export tax rates in the world, and is among the most dependent on export tax 
revenues.  Policy objectives have been numerous and not always clearly defined.  Agricultural 
export taxation has a long history and continues to be a divisive issue in Argentinean society.  
Section 2.4 analyzes Indonesia’s agricultural export taxes.  In contrast with Argentina, Indonesia 
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taxes exports of only two agricultural product categories and derives a miniscule share of total 
government revenue from such taxes.  Section 2.5 examines Thailand’s experience with 
agricultural export taxes.  Thailand provides an interesting example of a country that heavily taxed 
agricultural exports in its early development stage and later reduced the level of taxation as it 
achieved successful industrialization.  Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes the main findings and 
discusses their implications. 
 
2.2. Global Experience with Agricultural Export Taxes 
2.2.1. Objectives 
Countries have used agricultural export taxes to achieve a number of different objectives: to 
generate public sector revenue; to curb domestic prices and inflation; to promote higher value-
added activities; to improve the terms of trade; to distribute income; to stabilize commodity prices; 
among others.  More recently, export taxes have also been used to combat smuggling.  This section 
examines the incidence and relative importance of the aforementioned goals.  Two preemptive 
remarks are necessary.  First, a country may use export taxes to attain various goals simultaneously.  
Second, the declared policy objectives of an export tax may not genuinely reflect a government’s 
underlying goals. 
 
Revenue Generation 
The need for revenue rather than any policy of state was historically the prime reason for imposing 
export taxes (Condliffe, 1950).  Such taxes have at times accounted for a significant share of public 
sector revenue in some developing countries, though their relative importance has fallen since the 
1990s.  The advantage associated with the ease of administration of export taxes is possibly the 
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main reason for their use by developing countries with low efficiency of tax administration 
(Gómez-Sabaini, 1990).  While land taxes or taxes on the net income of the agricultural sector are 
in theory more efficient and equitable than export taxes, they are also more difficult and costly to 
administer. 
As late as the 1930s, export taxes did not occupy an important place in the fiscal structure 
of most countries, the main exceptions being in Latin America, where they accounted for 16-19 
percent of total tax receipts of the central governments of Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico in 1939 
(Reubens, 1956).  The use of export taxes intensified during the Second World War and the 
materials boom that accompanied the Korean War, reaching peaks of 30-50 percent of total tax 
revenue in a few countries in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.  The relative importance of 
export taxes declined in the period following the Korean War, but reached new peaks of 40-70 
percent in the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. 
Table 2.1 lists the highest share that export taxes attained in central government revenue 
between 1972 and 2006 for 91 developing and transition economies.  In twenty of these countries, 
export duties accounted for more than 20 percent of total central government revenue in at least 
one year between 1972 and 2006.  In addition, export taxes represented between 10 and 20 percent 
of central government revenue in twenty-six countries; between 5 and 10 percent in fifteen 
countries; and between 1 and 5 percent in thirty countries in at least one year in the same period.  
More strikingly, export taxes accounted for 46 percent of Guyana’s central government revenue 
in 1975, 48 percent of Ghana’s in 1979, and 67 percent of Uganda’s in 1986.  In many countries, 
export taxes have been collected primarily or exclusively on agricultural products.  The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Russia, where forestry products and minerals account for 
the bulk of export tax revenue, are key exceptions. 
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Table 2.1: Share of export taxes in central government revenue, highest annual value attained, 
select periods between 1972 and 2006 
 
More than 20% Between 10% and 20% Between 5% and 10% Between 1% and 5% 
Uganda 67% Costa Rica 19% Suriname 9% Tunisia 4% 
Ghana 48% Argentina 19% Philippines 9% Malawi 4% 
Guyana 46% Mauritius 18% Gabon 8% Benin 4% 
Congo, D.R. 40% Sierra Leone 18% Cambodia 8% Syria 4% 
El Salvador 39% Ecuador 17% Mexico 8% Kazakhstan 4% 
Sri Lanka 39% Zimbabwe 17% Maldives 7% Bangladesh 4% 
Guinea 39% Grenada 17% Indonesia 7% Egypt 4% 
Rwanda 36% Vanuatu 16% Barbados 7% Somalia 4% 
Burundi 35% Azerbaijan 16% Togo 6% Belize 3% 
Comoros 34% Peru 16% Senegal 6% Kenya 3% 
Swaziland 34% Tanzania 16% Sudan 6% Panama 3% 
Solomon Islands 31% Pakistan 15% Nepal 5% Lesotho 3% 
Guinea-Bissau 28% Nicaragua 14% Bolivia 5% St. Lucia 3% 
Guatemala 26% Haiti 14% Burkina Faso 5% Bahamas 3% 
Russia 24% Gambia 14% Niger 5% Namibia 3% 
Ethiopia 24% Zambia 14%   Morocco 3% 
Dominican R. 22% Cameroon 14%   Romania 3% 
Côte d'Ivoire 21% Thailand 12%   Brazil 3% 
Honduras 20% Mali 12%   Congo, R. 3% 
Malaysia 20% Belarus 12%   Fiji 2% 
  Tajikistan 11%   Poland 2% 
  Colombia 11%   St. Vincent & Gren. 2% 
  Madagascar 10%   St. Kitts & Nevis 2% 
  Central African R. 10%   India 2% 
  Papua New Guinea 10%   Paraguay 2% 
  Uruguay 10%   Dominica 2% 
      Mongolia 2% 
      Jamaica % 
      Botswana 1% 
            Bhutan 1% 
 
Note: Periods vary by country according to data availability. 
Source: Author.  Based on data from IMF. 
 
The average share of export taxes on government revenue in 1972-1978 was 6.4 percent 
for least developed countries, 3.6 percent for middle-income countries, and 0.2 percent for 
developed countries (Kostecki and Seck, 1982).  The 1986 World Development Report (World 
Bank, 1986) still identified revenue generation as the single most important reason for taxing 
exports.  Nonetheless, the relative importance of export duties as a source of government revenue 
declined significantly ever since.  Their average share in central government revenue for a sample 
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of 63 developing countries for which data are available fell from 4 percent in 1980-1989 to 1.4 
percent in 1990-1999 and 0.7 percent in 2000-2006.  Figure 2.1 plots annual shares of export taxes 
in central government revenue for a subgroup of 30 developing countries where export taxes 
accounted for more than 2 percent of central government revenue in at least one year in 1972-
2006.  Until the 1980s, shares ranged from zero to almost 40 percent, with the majority being 
between 0 and 20 percent.  After 1990, the shares of almost every country in the sample were 
consistently below 5 percent.  The only outliers were Côte d’Ivoire, which had shares between 10 
and 20 percent; Argentina, which had shares close to zero in 1991-2001 and between 10 and 20 
percent in 2002-2006; and Burundi and Papua New Guinea, which had shares mostly between 0 
and 10 percent. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the decline in the relative importance of export taxes in countries 
where they used to account for a substantial share of central government revenue, as well as in 
countries where their contribution to public finances has been traditionally more modest.  In the 
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Mauritius, the share of export taxes in central government 
revenue declined from peaks of 15-20 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to virtually 0 percent since 
the late 1990s.  In Thailand, Indonesia and India the decline was from peaks of 12 percent, 7 
percent and 2 percent, respectively, to nearly zero in 2000-2006. 
The loss of revenue from a reduction in export taxes has been a concern for trade policy 
reform in many developing countries. For example, the removal or reduction of explicit export 
taxes has proved problematic in Tanzania in 1981-1983, Uruguay in 1984-1986 and Argentina in 
1987-1988.  In Argentina, the failure to implement a new land tax measure, which was expected 
to compensate for the decline in revenue, was followed by the re-imposition of export duties 
(Thomas and Nash, 1991).  Tax reform strategies that reduce trade taxes without adversely 
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affecting either government revenue or consumer welfare have been proposed by Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1974), Heady and Mitra (1987), Diewert et al. (1989), Michael et al. (1993), Chambers 
(1994), Falvey (1994), Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), Abe (1995), Anderson (1996) and Emran 
(2005), among others.  The prevailing consensus among policy advisors favors a reduction in 
export taxes and import tariffs with revenue-neutral or revenue-increasing reform of consumption 
taxes. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.: Share of export taxes in central government revenue, 30 selected countries,  
1972-2006 
 
Notes: Countries were selected based on two criteria: (i) data availability and (ii) export tax revenue represented 
over 2 percent of central government revenue in at least one year in 1972-2006.  Thirty countries were selected, 
including twelve in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay), seven in Asia-Pacific (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Thailand, seven in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius and Zambia) and four in Northern Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Morocco, Syria 
and Tunisia). 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on data from IMF. 
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Figure 2.2: Share of export taxes in central government revenue, 6 selected countries,  
1972-2006 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on data from IMF. 
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Despite the trend of overall decline in the relative importance of export taxes as a source 
of government revenue in the developing world, political and economic crises have led some 
countries to reinstate or raise export taxes for revenue purposes.  In Côte d’Ivoire the 1999 coup 
d’état and continuing civil conflict have hampered the economy and divided the country, with the 
northern provinces still held by rebel troops as of 2007. According to Abbott (2007), the increased 
need for tax revenue has resulted in the resumption of export taxes on cocoa and coffee, crops that 
are grown primarily in the south.  Among countries for which data are available, Côte d’Ivoire is 
currently the most dependent on agricultural export tax revenues.  Not less than 18 percent of 
central government revenue in 2004-2006 came from export duties. 
In Argentina, export duties were reintroduced during the 2002 financial crisis to counter 
the sharp fall in tax revenue and control domestic prices.  Since then, export taxes have become a 
key source of public revenue. “Between 2002 and 2005, revenue collected from these duties 
averaged nearly 2.2 percent of GDP, the highest level recorded in the historical series that began 
in 1932.  During that period, income from export duties represented 9.2 percent of exports and 9.9 
percent of total public revenue.  In 2005, it accounted for 62 percent of the primary surplus” (WTO 
Secretariat, 2007a).  Revenue from agricultural export taxes, in particular, accounted for 1.3 
percent of GDP in 2002-2005.  Section 2.3 analyzes agricultural export taxation in Argentina in 
more detail. 
 
Domestic Price Control 
The upsurge in international food prices in 2007-2008 has put in evidence the use of export taxes 
as a tool to control domestic prices.  At least nine countries, including large producers such as 
Argentina, China, Indonesia, Russia and Vietnam, have recently imposed or raised taxes on 
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agricultural exports to address concerns over inflation fueled by rising food prices.  In addition, 
not less than twenty-one countries, including Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan and Pakistan, 
have imposed outright bans on exports of certain, several or all agricultural products.  Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 summarize countries and agricultural commodities affected by recent export taxes and 
bans imposed on grounds of domestic price stabilization.  As of August 2008, declining prices had 
led Cambodia, Russia and Vietnam to eliminate their measures. 
 
Table 2.2: Export taxes imposed/increased with the goal of curbing prices, 2007-2008 
 
Country Products Affected Export Tax Rate 
Argentina Soybeans; sunflower seeds; wheat; corn 
Sliding-scale taxes could exceed 50%; 
processed products had lower taxes (*) 
Belarus 
Wheat and meslin 40% 
Wheat flour and products; rye flour 25% 
China 
Wheat; rye; barley; oats; buckwheat 20% 
Rice flour; corn flour; soybean flour 10% 
Rice; corn; sorghum; millet; soybeans 5% 
Croatia Wheat; corn n.a. 
India 
Basmati rice 8,000 INR per t 
Crude palm oil 10% to 25% 
Indonesia 
Palm oil derivatives 9% to 13% 
Biodiesel 8% to 11% 
Kyrgyzstan Wheat; wheat flour; vegetable oils n.a. 
Russia 
Wheat and meslin 40% (**) 
Barley 30% (**) 
Vietnam Rice 0.6 to 2.9 million VND per t (***) 
 
Notes:   (*)  Replaced by flat tax rates in July 2008.  
 (**)  Lifted in July 2008.  
(***)  Lifted in August 2008. 
Source: Author. 
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Table 2.3: Export bans imposed with the goal of curbing prices, 2007-2008 
Country Products Affected 
Argentina Beef (*); wheat (*) 
Bangladesh Rice 
Bolivia Wheat; wheat flour; corn; rice; sugar; oilseeds; vegetable oils; meats 
Cambodia Rice (*) 
Ecuador Rice 
Egypt Rice 
Guinea All agricultural products 
India Non-basmati rice; wheat; corn 
Kazakhstan Wheat 
Kenya Sugar 
Liberia All agricultural products 
Madagascar Rice 
Malawi Corn; corn products 
Nepal Rice; wheat; corn 
Pakistan Wheat 
Serbia Wheat; corn 
Syria Wheat; wheat flour; pasta 
Tanzania Corn 
Uzbekistan All agricultural products 
Venezuela Cereal flour; vegetable oils; dairy products; meats 
Vietnam Rice (*) 
 
Note: (*) Export ban lifted in or prior to July 2008. 
Source: Author. 
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The imposition of export restrictions as a reaction to rising inflation or perceived shortages 
of certain commodities is not a new phenomenon.  It has occurred in different intensities at several 
occasions.  For example, with the objective of curbing domestic prices, some countries resorted to 
export taxes and bans on a considerable scale in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, such action led to 
competitive beggar-thy-neighbor behavior whereby different exporters applied similar policies to 
other commodities in short supply.  As a result, expected benefits failed to materialize (GATT 
Secretariat, 1989). 
Indonesia introduced taxes on palm oil exports in 1978 in order to ensure the domestic 
availability of cooking oil – an essential household item – at affordable prices.  Export taxes were 
reintroduced on the same grounds in 1994 and in 1998 (following an export ban in 1997).  Violent 
social unrest during the 1997 Asian financial crisis demonstrated the high political sensitivity of 
prices of essential goods in Indonesia.  In 2007-2008, export tax rates have again risen in response 
to the surge in international food prices.  Section 2.4 analyzes Indonesia’s experience with export 
taxes in more detail. 
Argentina reinstated export taxes in 2002 to both raise government revenue and cushion 
the effect of exchange rate devaluation on domestic prices of household necessities (WTO, 2007).  
In 2007-2008, Argentina raised export tax rates in an attempt to shield the internal market from 
rising world prices.  While export taxes have ensured the existence of a wedge between domestic 
and world prices, they have not prevented significant and recurrent domestic price increases.  
Despite the extensive use of both export taxes and export bans, the inflation rate in Argentina has 
been higher than in neighboring countries that have not adopted such policies. 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao has reiterated repeatedly that the primary task for the country 
in 2008 is to curb inflation and maintain food prices at a reasonable level (Xu, 2008).  With a view 
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to achieving these goals, China removed the value-added tax (VAT) rebate on exports of 84 
agricultural tariff lines – including wheat, rice, corn, other cereals, soybeans, and their derived 
flour byproducts – in December 2007 (WTO, 2008a).  In June 2008, the elimination of the VAT 
rebate on exports was extended to some vegetable oils.  Government concerns that the 
development of export oriented ethanol plants could lead to domestic grain shortages had 
previously led to the elimination of the VAT rebate on ethanol exports in January 2007.  Prior to 
the elimination of the VAT, most of the aforementioned products were entitled to a 13 percent 
rebate upon export.  To further discourage exports, the government introduced interim export taxes 
on grains and flour products in January 2008.  These provisional export taxes range from 5 percent 
to 25 percent and are effective January 1 through December 31, 2008.  The elimination of the VAT 
rebate and the interim export taxes impose a combined burden of between 18 and 38 percent on 
exports of grains and flours. 
Despite these restrictions on exports, China’s consumer price index (CPI) for the first 
quarter of 2008 grew 8 percent, compared with 2.7 percent in the first quarter of 2007, and well 
above the government’s target of 4.8 percent. Food prices, which account for about one-third of 
China’s CPI, rose 21 percent in the first quarter of 2008 compared to a year ago.  In February 2008, 
China’s inflation rose to 8.7 percent, its biggest jump in 12 years (Foreign Agricultural Service, 
2008).  Such price increases are attributed not only to inflationary pressures resulting from global 
commodity price rises, but also to domestic factors such as rising incomes and consumption, 
urbanization of prime arable land and supply shortfalls due to animal diseases and winter 
snowstorms. 
Russia’s annual inflation rate of 12 percent in 2007 far exceeded the official target of 8 
percent, fueled in great part by the growth in commodity prices.  In September 2007, food prices 
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increased by as much as 30 percent for nine out of every ten food products (Svec, Maksimenko 
and Vassilieva, 2007).  In response to rising global grain prices and inflationary pressures, the 
Russian government introduced export tariffs of 30 percent (but not less than 70 Euros per metric 
ton) on barley and 10 percent (but not less than 22 Euros per metric ton) on wheat and meslin in 
November 2007.  In January 2008, the export tariff on wheat and meslin was raised to 40 percent 
ad valorem (but not less than 105 Euros per metric ton), a prohibitive level designed to shut off 
wheat exports (Vassilieva and Mustard, 2007; Vassilieva, 2007).  Grain prices began to fall in mid 
April 2008 (Vassilieva, 2008).  Given increased stocks, falling prices and the good crop outlooks, 
export taxes on wheat and barley exports were removed in July 2008. 
Russia’s wheat and barley export duties were designed to cover exports from the territories 
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all of which signed an agreement in October 2007 to form a 
customs union by 2011.  The implementation of such taxes required export policy coordination 
among these countries, which proved problematic.  By shipping wheat to Belarus or Kazakhstan, 
which could be done duty-free under terms of the common customs union, traders could 
conceivably circumvent the export tariff and then re-export the wheat to an onward destination.  
To preclude circumvention of the export tax, Russia imposed a ban on exports of wheat and meslin 
to Belarus and Kazakhstan in March 2008 (Mustard, 2008).  The need for such ban was short-
lived, as Russia’s neighbors ultimately imposed their own restrictions on wheat exports.  Due to 
rising inflation and grain shortages resulting from higher than usual exports, Kazakhstan banned 
wheat exports in April 2008.  In June 2008, Belarus adopted an export tax of 40 percent on wheat 
and meslin.  Two other former Soviet republics have also restricted agricultural exports: 
Uzbekistan banned exports of all agricultural products and Kyrgyzstan imposed export taxes on 
wheat, wheat flour and vegetable oils in June 2008. 
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It is worth noting that export restrictions may actually contribute to inflationary pressures.  
When used continuously or improperly, export taxes, quotas or bans can have disincentive effects 
on production, thus increasing the price of goods as the supply declines.  Argentina’s bans, quotas 
and taxes on exports of beef in 2006-2008 provide a good example of measures that, though 
designed to curtail domestic prices, promote the opposite in the long term.  With the objective of 
containing the transmission of high international prices to the domestic market, a beef export ban 
was introduced in March 2006 and replaced by export quotas in May 2006.  In addition, the 
government has applied a tax of 15 percent on exports of beef and beef preparations.  While these 
measures resulted in the immediate fall of domestic beef prices, they have also restrained 
investment, led to the slaughtering of young animals and breeding cows at unprecedented high 
rates, and encouraged market exit (Heft, 2006; Lojo, 2008).  Falling local beef prices and high 
international grain prices have already caused many Argentine landowners to convert their cattle 
pastures into soybean fields.  The measures were not as effective in reducing domestic prices 
because export beef represents less than a third of output and because the beef cuts consumed 
domestically are different from the cuts that are exported (Castro and Díaz Frers, 2008).  
Meanwhile, continuous wage rises have increased domestic demand, precipitated shortages and 
led to the development of a parallel market for beef, where prices are substantially higher than the 
official prices controlled by the government (Nogués et al., 2007). 
 
Protection of Domestic Processing Industries 
One of the key reasons for the imposition of export taxes on agricultural products is the promotion 
of domestic downstream processing industries (OECD, 2005).  Since such taxes tend to lower the 
domestic prices of primary products that are used as inputs by the agro-industry and manufacturing 
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sectors, they encourage local processing and raise the value-added content of exports.  Some 
countries have raised this argument for export taxes in conjunction with infant industry or broader 
import-substitution industrialization policies.  Others have justified the adoption of export taxes in 
order to counter the existence of tariff escalation among importing countries. 
Agricultural export taxes that have been imposed on grounds of promoting domestic value-
added activities have typically focused on three classes of commodities: (i) tropical products, such 
as cocoa, coffee and cashew nuts; (ii) oil-bearing crops, such as soybeans, sunflower seeds and 
palm; and (iii) and animal products, such as hides, skins and wool.  While the protection of local 
processing industries is in some cases the sole or primary reason for the imposition of export taxes; 
in other cases, it is only one of several declared goals and as such may be overshadowed by more 
pressing needs. 
Table 2.4 presents a non-exhaustive list of countries and sectors in which agricultural 
export taxes are imposed with the official declared goal of promoting domestic processing.  This 
objective is particularly prevalent for raw hides and skins, as not less than eighteen countries across 
Africa, Asia and Latin America tax such exports primarily or exclusively to promote domestic 
processing.  For oil-bearing crops and tropical products, other reasons for taxing exports – such as 
revenue generation and food price stabilization – are also important. 
Some of the world’s largest producers of oil-bearing crops – such as Argentina, Indonesia 
and Malaysia – apply higher export taxes to unprocessed raw materials in order to promote 
domestic vegetable oils and associated industries. Argentina has been particularly successful in 
attracting investment to its soybean processing industry in part due to the competitive advantage 
derived from differential export taxes, which decrease the domestic price of soybeans and increase 
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the profitability of local processors.  As a result, the country has become the world’s number one 
exporter of soybean oil and meal. 
 
Table 2.4: Export taxes imposed with the goal of promoting domestic processing 
 
Tropical Products Oil-bearing Crops Animal Products 
Cocoa Soybeans Raw hides and skins 
Côte d’Ivoire Argentina Argentina 
Ghana Paraguay Brazil 
Nigeria  Egypt 
  India 
  Indonesia 
  Kenya 
  Mongolia 
  Pakistan 
  Paraguay 
  Saudi Arabia 
  Sri Lanka 
  Tanzania 
  Thailand 
  Turkey 
  Uganda 
  Ukraine 
  Uruguay 
  Vietnam 
   
Cashew nuts Sunflower seed Raw cashmere 
Mozambique Argentina Mongolia 
Sri Lanka Russia  
Tanzania Ukraine  
Vietnam   
   
Coffee Palm kernel Raw wool 
Argentina Indonesia Argentina 
Côte d’Ivoire Malaysia Mongolia 
   
 
Notes: This is an illustrative list, not an exhaustive list.  It reflects declared policy goals. 
Source: Author.  Based on WTO Trade Policy Review reports (various countries, various years). 
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria also tax exports of cocoa beans to encourage the local 
cocoa butter and paste industries.  However, unlike Argentina, they have failed to significantly 
develop local processing industries and remain exporters of predominantly unprocessed cocoa 
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beans.  Figure 2.3 depicts the average shares of processed and unprocessed exports in the total 
value of soy and cocoa exports by key exporting countries in 2001-2005.  While soybean oil and 
meal accounted for over three-quarters of total Argentinean soy exports in this period, processed 
cocoa products represented only 19 percent of cocoa exports in Côte d’Ivoire and less than 10 
percent in Ghana and Nigeria. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Shares of processed and unprocessed exports in the total value of soy and cocoa 
exports, by main exporters, 2001-2005 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
Golub and Finger (1979) use a fixed-coefficient, partial-equilibrium model to analyze the 
economic effects of developing countries’ differential export taxes and developed countries’ tariff 
escalation.  They find that the elimination of export taxes alone would retard developing countries’ 
processing of seven out of eight commodities examined.  Repeal of export taxes has the expected 
result of increasing developing country raw material production and lowering developed country 
raw material production, but in most cases it also leads to a fall in developing country foreign 
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exchange receipts.  On the other hand, if both developing country export taxes and developed 
country import tariffs were simultaneously eliminated, developing country processing of six out 
of eight commodities would increase, while developed country processing of five out of eight 
commodities would decline.  “Processing in the developing countries would increase by more than 
8 percent – a substantially larger percentage increase than the less than 1 percent decline in the 
developed countries.  More important, liberalization increases total world final consumption and, 
hence, the size of the processing pie” (Golub and Finger, 1979). 
The criticism often raised against the infant industry argument for protection also apply to 
export taxes that are designed to promote domestic processing industries, as they may ultimately 
promote the development of inefficient industries that remain perpetually dependent on 
government support (Baldwin, 1969; Krueger, 1984).  Mongolia’s experience in the cashmere 
sector illustrates how protective measures can be counterproductive.  With the goal of building a 
domestic cashmere processing industry, the government imposed a ban on exports of raw cashmere 
in 1994 and then replaced it by an export tax in 1997. These measures encouraged widespread 
smuggling, reduced the availability of raw cashmere for processing, and did not increase value 
added.  While the tax encouraged foreign processors to locate processing facilities in Mongolia, 
few of them produced quality products.  Most established primary processing facilities in 
Mongolia only to partially dehair cashmere and circumvent export restrictions.  This added little 
value to the product, as it had to be dehaired again by purchasers abroad.  “The final goods 
manufacturing industry did not grow over time with the export ban or tax. The tax did not fulfill 
government expectations of increasing the production of high value added products in the sector. 
The value added component from raw greasy cashmere to dehaired cashmere is marginal” 
(Songwe, 2003).  Exports of raw cashmere dropped, exports of semi-processed goods increased, 
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and exports of garments increased only slightly.  “In 2001 exports of garments accounted for 17 
percent of cashmere exports, only marginally above 15.2 percent in 1993. Overall the tax has 
depressed cashmere exports, as increases in garment industry exports could not offset decrease in 
raw and dehaired material exports” (Songwe, 2003). 
 
Terms of Trade Improvement 
The possession of market power by an exporting country with competitive producers provides a 
strong analytical case for an export tax (Devarajan et al., 1996).  By levying an optimal export tax 
on a product for which the demand abroad is inelastic, a country with market power can improve 
its terms of trade and raise total national welfare (Corden, 1974).  Thus, market power in a given 
commodity is a necessary condition that must be met by a country that wishes to accrue terms of 
trade improvements from the application of export taxes.  This is a position enjoyed by only certain 
developing countries in a limited number of agricultural commodities. 
Countries that individually do not possess market power have signed international 
commodity agreements – such as International Coffee Agreement and the International Cocoa 
Agreement – with the intention of coordinating their policies and jointly achieving the desired 
market power.  These groups of country have adopted export taxes and export quotas to limit 
supply and achieve higher prices.  However, controls of this nature have rarely been operative in 
the long term. “Either new producers have emerged which have not participated in the policies 
designed to maximize prices through restrictions on sales, or substitutes for the product have been 
developed in such a way as to reduce the inelasticity of demand for it (GATT Secretariat, 1989). 
In the nineteenth century, Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) used export taxes to take 
advantage of its monopolist position in world cinnamon and quinine trade (Reubens, 1956).  After 
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the Second World War, several developing countries that had, or thought they had, monopoly 
positions in their major export commodities adopted export taxes and related supply-limiting and 
price-increasing devices to improve their gains from trade.  As a result, a number of countries that 
had acquired leading positions in international markets prior to the adoption of export taxes saw 
their market positions dwindle, including Uganda in the cotton market and Pakistan in the jute 
market (Lewis, 1967).  In order to determine the true degree of market power, the ability of 
consumers and existing and potential suppliers to respond to price changes must be carefully 
considered.  When the elasticity of excess-demand facing individual producing countries is large, 
market shares overestimate true market power. 
A number of developing countries that have taxed exports with the goal of improving their 
terms of trade saw their market shares usurped by other countries with more favorable policies 
towards producers (World Bank, 1986).  Ghana, which accounted for 40 percent of world cocoa 
exports in 1961-1963, had its market share drop to 18 percent after 20 years of heavy export 
taxation.  Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire, which was more producer-friendly at the time, expanded its 
market share from 9 percent to 29 percent.  Ghanaian producer prices dropped significantly below 
those of competing West African countries in this period.  While prices in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Togo were at almost the same level in 1965, by 1980 the ratio of the Ghana price to the Côte 
d’Ivoire price had reached 0.18, and the ratio of the Ghana price to the Togo price was 0.23 (Table 
2.5). 
Sri Lanka also lost a substantial part of its market share to other countries that have applied 
lower taxes to tea export.  Average tax rates on Sri Lankan tea exports exceed 50 percent in 1970s 
and 35 percent in the 1980s.  Meanwhile, tax rates were more moderate in Kenya (Table 2.6).  
While Sri Lanka’s share of the world tea market dropped from 33 percent in 1961-1963 to 19 
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percent in 1980-1982, that of Kenya increased from 2.6 percent to over 9 percent.  Other countries 
that taxed agricultural exports between the 1960s and 1980s to take advantage of a perceived 
monopoly power include Egypt (cotton), Nigeria (cocoa and palm oil) and Zaire, currently known 
as the Democratic Republic of Congo (palm oil).  All three lost significant portions of their export 
market shares (World Bank, 1986). 
 
Table 2.5: Relative price incentives for cocoa farmers in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo, 
1965-1982 
 
Year 
Ratio of  
Ghana price to 
Côte d’Ivoire price 
Ratio of  
Ghana price to  
Togo price 
1965 0.97 0.97 
1970 0.60 0.56 
1975 0.48 0.74 
1980 0.18 0.23 
1981 0.26 0.36 
1982 0.30 0.40 
 
Source: World Bank (1986). 
 
 
Table 2.6: Export tax rates on tea, Kenya and Sri Lanka, 1985 
 
FOB price 
(US$ per kg) 
____________Kenya____________ __________Sri Lanka__________ 
Average 
tax rate 
Marginal 
tax rate 
Average 
tax rate 
Marginal 
tax rate 
1.20 0.0% 0% 22.4% 0% 
1.80 2.8% 10% 14.9% 0% 
2.40 2.6% 15% 27.7% 50% 
3.00 8.2% 20% 32.2% 50% 
3.60 10.7% 25% 35.2% 50% 
4.20 13.1% 30% 37.3% 50% 
4.80 14.9% 25% 38.9% 50% 
 
Source: World Bank (1986). 
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While export taxes on commodities in which a country enjoys market power may be 
justified on efficiency grounds, the benefits derived from improved terms of trade and higher 
national welfare could be outweighed by negative distributional effects.  Such concerns have led 
Thailand to refrain from reintroducing an export tax on rice, despite its privileged market power 
position as the world’s leading exporter with a current market share of over a quarter of all rice 
traded globally.  Section 2.5 examines Thailand’s experience with export taxes in more detail. 
 
Income Distribution 
Governments may use agricultural export taxes to redistribute wealth, whether or not income 
distribution is a declared policy objective.  Although export taxes necessarily reduce aggregate 
national welfare in countries that do not enjoy sufficient market power, they do affect the 
distribution of wealth among different groups in a country.  As a result of agricultural export taxes, 
income is generally transferred from producers to consumers, from rural areas to urban areas, and 
from land and low-skilled labor to capital and high-skilled labor.  While such taxes may in 
principle address income inequality, experience shows that more often than not they have led to 
transfers from the most vulnerable social groups to the more sophisticated ones.  Preexisting social 
and economic conditions significantly affect the distributional outcome of agricultural export taxes 
in different countries.   
In Thailand, the rice export taxes that were in place until 1986 hurt the lowest income 
quintile groups the most, both in rural and urban areas.  Since even the poorest Thai farmers derive 
a substantial proportion of their income from land ownership, they were affected by the negative 
impact of export taxes on the returns to land.  Both the rural and the urban poor also suffered from 
the negative impact of agricultural export taxes on the returns to unskilled labor.  On the other 
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hand, the urban rich gained from the rise in the returns to skilled labor and mobile forms of capital 
and from the curbing of income taxation that was made possible by increased revenue collection 
from the rice export tax (see Section 2.5). 
More recently, the Argentine government has justified high export tax rates on agricultural 
products in part as a measure to redistribute income from rural producers to urban consumers.  
Nonetheless, it has been shown that the majority of the income transfers derived from agricultural 
export taxes in Argentina favor rich urban consumers and processors of raw materials.  In addition, 
studies have concluded that the elimination of agricultural export taxes would have virtually no 
impact on the Gini coefficients for household per capita income and labor income (see Section 
2.3). 
 
Combat Smuggling 
Although export taxes typically encourage smuggling (see Subsection 2.2.4), more recently they 
have been applied to combat smuggling.  The leading examples are Brazil’s and Canada’s export 
taxes on cigarettes. 
Brazilian cigarette exports increased 8000-fold between 1988 and 1998, from 11 metric 
tons to 87,000 metric tons.  In 1998, over half of Brazil’s total domestic production was exported, 
the principal destination being Paraguay, a neighboring country of only four million inhabitants.  
In the same period, per capita consumption of cigarettes decreased 63 percent in Brazil (from 1,913 
to 714 cigarettes per person) and increased 16-fold in Paraguay (from 678 to 10,929 cigarettes per 
person). 25   These trends coincided with local evidence that large volumes of cigarettes 
manufactured in Brazil for export to Paraguay were smuggled back and consumed tax-free in 
                                               
25 In comparison, estimated per capita cigarette consumption in 1998 was 1,748 cigarettes per person in the United 
Kingdom, 2,255 in the United States, and 2,403 in Japan. 
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Brazil.  Similar trends, but in a smaller scale, were also observed in Brazil’s cigarette trade with 
Bolivia and Uruguay.  Brazil’s Federal Tax Bureau estimated that annual consumption of 
contraband cigarettes in Brazil reached a peak of 58 billion and captured 37 percent of the domestic 
cigarette market in 1998 (Shaffey et al., 2002). 
To combat widespread cigarette smuggling into Brazil, a tax of 150 percent on exports of 
cigarettes to countries in South and Central America was introduced by the Brazilian government 
in 1999.  After the passage of the export tax, Brazil’s official cigarette exports fell 89 percent and 
estimated per capita consumption in Brazil and Paraguay returned to 1990 levels.  In 2006, 21 
billion cigarettes were smuggled into Brazil, which represented 20 percent of domestic 
consumption.  Although the export tax has helped to halve the level of smuggling by making it 
harder for Brazilian-made cigarettes to be channeled into neighboring countries, it has not 
prevented smugglers from finding alternative ways to bring contraband cigarettes into the country. 
Canada experienced similar cigarette smuggling problems along its border with the United 
States.  In the 1990s, contraband tobacco seizures reached epidemic proportions, primarily because 
legitimate industry was exporting its products to the United States, which were then being 
smuggled back into Canada and sold on the black market.  Total cigarette exports to the United 
States increased from 1.2 billion cigarettes in 1989 to 18.6 billion in 1993, despite the absence of 
any added American demand for Canadian brands. Given that more than 90 percent of the 
contraband consisted of products originally manufactured in Canada, export taxes were introduced 
in a few occasions in the 1990s and then repealed due to pressures from the tobacco industry. In 
2008, exports of tobacco products over 1.5 percent of a manufacturer’s production were subject to 
taxes totaling C$22 per carton of cigarettes, C$16 per 200 tobacco sticks and C$12 per 200 grams 
of fine-cut tobacco. 
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Other Objectives 
Export taxes have been applied to achieve a myriad of other policy objectives, including price or 
income stabilization, quality control, environmental protection, and the provision of services to 
agricultural producers or exporters. 
Developing countries have used export taxes with the objective of reducing price and 
income fluctuations for agricultural producers.  In low-income rural areas where the capital market 
is highly imperfect and the management of consumption risk is costly, the short-run variability in 
the price of export commodities can be a threat to income and food security.  While domestic 
prices of agricultural products were more stable than border prices in a number of developing 
countries that taxed exports between the 1960s and the 1980s (Schiff and Valdés, 1992), in other 
countries government intervention instead accentuated the transmission of world price fluctuations 
to domestic producers.  Bautista (1996) shows that taxes on exports of coconut products in the 
Philippines led not only to a lower average producer price level for copra in 1960-1982 (13 percent 
lower than the border price), but also to higher price instability (9 percent higher than for the border 
price).  The negative impact of export taxes on producer income was even more notable: the 
income level of copra producers was 16 percent lower and 33 percent more unstable than without 
the export taxes. 
Export taxes have also been employed to provide incentives for improvements in the 
quality of products exported (Reubens, 1956).  For many years, Colombia imposed an additional 
tax on coffee exports that was equivalent to 6 percent of the export volume and had to be paid in 
kind, in low quality coffee beans (Junguito and Pizano, 1997).  The fact that the payment was made 
in low quality beans effectively reduced the amount of such beans that was eventually exported.  
The tax contributed to the strengthening of the international reputation of Colombian coffee, as it 
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created additional disincentives for the export of low quality coffee beans.  More generally, the 
choice by some countries of specific tax rates over ad valorem rates has also been justified on 
grounds of promotion of exports of higher quality products. 
Countries have also imposed export taxes to promote environmental protection.  Some of 
these taxes are applied to agricultural products.  Angola’s taxes on exports of furs and skins (20 
percent ad valorem) and unworked ivory (10 percent ad valorem) are applied for purposes of 
protection of the local fauna.  Iceland applies a specific export tax of 500 Icelandic Crowns per 
unit of horse exported with the goal of protecting the species. 
Export taxes that are applied in order to obtain funds to finance the provision of services 
to producers or exporters are addressed in Subsection 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.2. Structure, Coverage and Level 
At least 60 countries apply taxes to agricultural exports.26  The product coverage of such taxes 
varies from country to country, ranging from a single product to all agricultural products.  
Examples of countries that tax a single agricultural product include Botswana (beef), Ghana 
(cocoa) and Mali (cotton).  Only a few countries impose export taxes on all agricultural products, 
including Argentina, Niger and Togo.  Gambia applies export taxes to all products except 
groundnuts, its most important agricultural export commodity.  Most other countries apply export 
taxes to only a handful of agricultural product categories. 
The importance of covered products varies significantly across countries.  In one extreme 
are countries such as Argentina (all products), Côte d’Ivoire (cocoa and coffee) and Ghana (cocoa), 
where covered products account for a large share of agricultural GDP and exports.  In the other 
                                               
26 In addition, at least 57 other countries claim not to apply export taxes on agricultural products. 
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extreme are Brazil (cigarettes and hides and skins) and Thailand (hides and skins), where covered 
products account for a miniscule portion of total agricultural exports. 
Some agricultural products stand out for the fact that they are subject to export taxation in 
a large number of countries, most notably raw hides and skins, coffee, vegetable oils, cocoa and 
livestock.  Exports of raw hides and skins are taxed by at least 23 countries across Africa, Asia 
and Latin America.  As seen in Subsection 2.2.1, such products are taxed primarily to protect 
domestic downstream processors.  Coffee exports are taxed by at least 14 countries in Africa and 
Latin America. 27   A number of other countries – including Brazil, Burundi, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya and Tanzania – also used to tax coffee 
exports.  Vegetable oil exports are taxed by at least 12 countries, and cocoa and livestock exports 
by at least 11 countries each.  Table 2.7 provides illustrative lists of countries that tax exports of 
the aforementioned products.  Other agricultural products whose exports are taxed by at least five 
countries include: wheat (Argentina, Belarus, Burundi, China, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia); sugar 
(Argentina, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Mozambique, Pakistan, Togo); cashew nuts (Gambia, 
Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Vietnam); and rice (Argentina, China, Guyana, India, 
Vietnam). 
Until the 1960s, most export taxes were specific in form, a fact that reflected preferences 
for a simple, definite tax and minimum paperwork and investigation.  However, due to the dangers 
of over- or under-taxation associated with specific rates and export price fluctuations, ad valorem taxes 
have gained significant ground and are now the most common form of export tax.  Belize, 
Cameroon, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Guyana, Iceland, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sri Lanka, Suriname, 
                                               
27 Some of these countries use the terms “cess,” “fee” or “financial tax” to describe taxes on exports. 
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Turkey and Vietnam use specific taxes or a combination of specific and ad valorem taxes.  Most 
other countries use ad valorem taxes only.  The successful use of ad valorem duties depends on 
the capacity of customs administrations to value exports correctly.  To address export price 
underreporting, governments have established official values or tax reference prices, sometimes 
without a formal link to prevailing world market prices.  “Such a practice is generally undesirable, 
however, because failure to adjust the official prices, or their manipulation, introduces an arbitrary 
element into the determination of effective duty rates” (Goode, 1984).  Both Argentina and 
Indonesia currently apply official reference prices to exports subject to taxation. 
  
Table 2.7: Countries that tax exports of select agricultural products, 1998-2008 
 
Raw hides & skins Coffee Vegetable oils Cocoa Livestock 
Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina 
Brazil Cameroon China Benin Belize 
Burundi Colombia Gambia Cameroon Burkina Faso 
Chad Costa Rica Indonesia Côte d'Ivoire Cambodia 
Egypt Côte d'Ivoire Malaysia Gambia Central African R. 
Gambia Ecuador Nepal Ghana Chad 
India Gambia Niger Niger Gambia 
Indonesia Guatemala Russia Nigeria Malaysia 
Kenya Guinea Solomon Islands Sierra Leone Niger 
Mongolia Niger Sri Lanka Solomon Islands St. Kitts & Nevis 
Niger Rwanda Togo Togo Togo 
Pakistan Sierra Leone Ukraine   
Paraguay Togo    
Saudi Arabia Uganda    
Sri Lanka     
Tanzania     
Thailand     
Togo     
Turkey     
Uganda     
Ukraine     
Uruguay     
Vietnam         
 
Note: This is not an exhaustive list. 
Source: Author. 
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Although most countries apply flat-rate export taxes (either ad valorem or specific), some 
apply graduated or sliding-scale taxes that depend on prevailing world prices.  Such taxes were 
first popularized after the Korean War.  In simple graduated tax structures, the duty might be fixed 
at a bottom rate of x cents per kilogram plus y percent of the amount by which the price exceeds z 
cents per kilogram.  More elaborate bracket or slab rates may be applied, by which successive 
price tiers are subject to increasing levels of taxation.  Early examples of graduated duties included 
India’s tax on tea exports, Costa Rica’s tax on coffee exports, and Sri Lanka’s tax on exports of 
coconuts and derived products.  Sliding-scale export taxes are currently applied by Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and were applied until recently by Argentina and Vietnam. 
In Malaysia, export duties are based on the cost-plus concept: duties are only imposed on 
the excess over a threshold price that reflects the cost of production.  As prevailing prices increase, 
so do the tax rates.  Vietnam’s recently abolished export tax on rice also varied with prevailing 
prices: VND500,000 (US$30) per ton when prices were between US$600-$700 per ton; 
VND600,000 (US$35.89) per ton when prices were between US$700-$800 per ton, and as much 
as VND2.9 million (US$173) when prices were above US$1,300 per ton.  Argentina’s sliding-
scale export taxes for soybeans, sunflower seeds, wheat and maize were applied from April to June 
2008, when they reverted to the preexisting flat rate export taxes.  Argentina’s and Indonesia’s 
sliding-scale taxes are analyzed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. 
Export tax levels not only vary significantly across countries and products, but also tend to 
be volatile over time.  Taxation levels have higher during periods of high commodity prices (such 
as the Korean War commodity boom and the 2007-2008 world food price crisis) and following 
significant exchange rate devaluations (such as the ones experienced by Argentina in 1955, 1967 
and 2002).  Currently, some of the highest ad valorem export tax rates include Ukraine’s tax on 
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livestock (50 percent), Belarus’ tax on wheat (40 percent), Kenya’s tax on raw hides and skins (40 
percent), and Argentina’s taxes on soybeans (35 percent), sunflower seeds (32 percent), wheat (28 
percent) and maize (25 percent).  Some of the lowest current ad valorem rates are levied on coffee 
exports, including those applied by Guatemala (1 percent), Costa Rica (1.5 percent), Ecuador (2 
percent) and Sierra Leone (2.5 percent). 
 
2.2.3. Use of Export Tax Revenue 
The revenue collected from the taxation of agricultural exports finds different uses across countries 
and commodities.  It can be allocated to the general government budget or earmarked for specific 
ends that may or not be circumscribed to the taxed sectors. 
In some countries, export tax revenue has been channeled to commodity institutes or 
marketing boards.  This has included institutions in the following sectors and countries: cocoa in 
Ghana; cocoa and coffee in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire; coffee in Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador; meat and wool in Uruguay; rice in Guyana and Suriname; and coconuts in Sri Lanka.  
While some of these institutions have used export taxes to offer valuable services to producers, 
others have become bureaucratic cash-cows characterized by patronage and inefficiency. 
Colombia’s National Federation of Coffee Growers, well known for its successful Juan Valdez 
branding campaign, has been among the most effective.  This non-profit business association has 
used export tax revenue from the National Coffee Fund to finance agricultural extension services, 
research and development, promotion and advertising, and guaranteed purchasing of the producer's 
crop.  On the other end of the spectrum are the African commodity boards, most of which are 
“weak institutions, almost invariably inefficient in their operations, usually politicized, and 
frequently ineffectual in achieving their objectives” (Rimmer, 1986).  One example of a highly 
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politicized institution with a bloated labor force is Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board, which in the 
early 1980s had about 100,000 employees (Devarajan et al., 1996). 
In some countries and sectors, export tax revenues have been allocated to specific uses 
within the taxed sector, including the replanting of rubber trees in Malaysia and the financing of 
healthcare for tea workers in Sri Lanka.  In other countries, revenues have been directed outside 
the taxed sectors.  In Paraguay, the resources generated by the tax on soybeans exports from the 
2003-2004 harvest were earmarked “for rural poverty eradication projects and the enhancement of 
family farm productivity, as well as for the financing of other social, environmental, health or 
education projects” (WTO, 2005a).  In Benin, the proceeds from the tax of 0.85 percent on all 
exports are applied towards a general road works fund.  In Argentina, the government announced 
in the midst of the 2008 general rural strikes that the additional revenue from increased export tax 
rates on cereals and soybeans were to be used to fund social programs, including increases in 
seniors’ pensions and financial assistance to the poor.  Nevertheless, substantial parts of the tax 
collections were ultimately used to cover subsidies to food and energy consumption. 
Another application of export tax revenues is the payment of dues to international 
commodity organizations.  Part of the revenues collected from Guinea’s export tax on coffee are 
used to pay the country’s contributions to the Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO).  
Similarly, part of the revenues collected from Cameroon’s export taxes on cocoa and coffee are 
used to pay dues to international organizations monitoring international agreements on cocoa and 
coffee, the International Coffee Organization (ICO) and International Cocoa Organization (ICCO).  
Finally, Chad applies a Community Preferential Tax (TPC) of 0.5 percent ad valorem on all exports 
on behalf the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC). 
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2.2.4. Smuggling 
Excessive taxation of exports creates incentives for smuggling when prevailing prices in 
neighboring countries are significantly higher than distorted domestic prices.  This is especially 
true when: (i) the commodity has a high unit value; (ii) countries share long unpatrolled borders; 
(iii) customs administrations are inefficient or corrupt; and (iv) transportation and other logistics-
related costs are low. 
The Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire border has been particularly porous to contraband.  According to 
the African Development Bank (2006), high export taxes in Côte d’Ivoire explain the smuggling 
of a large part of Ivorian production to neighboring Ghana, which gives planters higher prices.  
Smuggled Ivorian cocoa has been flowing into Ghana since at least 2003, when Ghanaian prices 
were roughly double those paid in Côte d’Ivoire.  In 2004, widespread smuggling was estimated 
to be in the region of 100,000-120,000 tons.  An additional 10,000-20,000 tons were also reported 
to have been smuggled out of Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia and Guinea.  Total cocoa smuggling out 
of Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 was estimated at 9-10 percent of the domestic output.  In 2008, cocoa and 
coffee contraband also intensified along Côte d’Ivoire’s rebel-controlled northern borders.  
Exporters estimate that around 70,000-80,000 tons of cocoa were smuggled into Burkina Faso and 
Togo during the October-March main crop season (Aboa, 2008). 
Contraband cocoa along the Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire border has not always flowed eastwards, 
from Côte d’Ivoire into Ghana.  In 2001-2002, the low prices that the Ghana Cocoa Board 
(Cocobod) paid growers led to an increase in smuggling, with many farmers selling their beans to 
traders in Côte d’Ivoire, where prices were higher.  Total cocoa smuggling out of Ghana in 2002 
was estimated at 65,000 tons, or approximately 14 percent of total domestic output.  To stem the 
tide of smuggling to Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana raised its farm gate price for cocoa bean in March 2002.  
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In response to better producer prices and a national pesticide spraying campaign, Ghanaian cocoa 
output increased from 340,000 tons in 2002 to 497,000 tons in 2003 and 737,000 tons in 2004.  
The increase price created incentives to production and led to outstanding output growth rates of 
48 percent in 2003 and 46 percent in 2004.  In 2008, cocoa smuggling was reported to occur from 
Ghana to Togo, where prices were 50 percent higher. 
Export taxes have also created incentives for the smuggling of beans out of Chad (USITC, 
2003), coffee out of the Central African Republic (George and Lizon, 2007) and Honduras 
(Luxner, 2001), rubber out of Cambodia (Far East and Australasia, 2002), and raw cashmere out 
of Mongolia (Songwe, 2003).  Rubber contraband between Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1990s 
led Cambodia to drop is 10 percent export tax in 1997.  In Mongolia, it has been estimated that 
about 560 tons of raw cashmere – 20 percent of domestic production – were smuggled across the 
Chinese border in 2001 as a result of the export tax and poor customs administration (Songwe, 
2003).  The share of smuggled raw cashmere in total production is estimated to have reached a 
high of 42 percent in 1998 and a low of 10 percent in 2000. 
Finally, higher export taxes in Argentina in 2007-2008 have led to the development of 
small-scale smuggling along Argentina’s borders with Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Bolivia’s 
bans on exports of flours, vegetable oils and other food products have also bolstered small-scale 
smuggling along its border’s with Chile and Peru. 
 
2.3. Argentina 
Export taxes on agricultural products were at the very center of the four-month conflict between 
the federal government and the farming sector in Argentina in 2008.  President Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner’s March 2008 decision to replace the existing flat rate taxes on oilseed and cereal 
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exports with a system of progressive levies met fierce resistance from agricultural organizations 
in the form of nationwide protests, lockouts, roadblocks and interruption of exports.  The new 
sliding taxes immediately raised levies on exports of soybeans, the country’s foremost crop, from 
35 percent to over 44 percent, with higher taxation levels reached subsequently due to rising world 
prices.  After much social unrest and political turmoil, the government abolished the progressive 
tax system on July 18 and reinstated the preexisting flat rate taxes on exports.  In the meantime, 
the industrial and transportation sectors incurred losses estimated at US$4.2 billion and the 
president’s approval rate dropped from 58 percent to 23 percent. 
Despite their pivotal role in the 2008 nationwide protests, export taxes are far from being 
a novelty in Argentina.  The country has a long history of taxing agricultural exports, either directly 
or through unfavorable foreign exchange regulations.  This section analyzes Argentina’s past and 
current experiences with agricultural export taxation.  It provides an overview of the evolution of 
such taxes and examines their impact on the performance of the sector and the economy at large. 
 
2.3.1. Evolution of Agricultural Export Taxation 
Explicit taxes have been applied to Argentina’s agricultural exports in roughly three main periods 
of its modern history: (i) from the mid-nineteenth century to 1905; (ii) from 1955 to 1991; and (iii) 
from 2002 to the present.  In addition, implicit export taxes in the form of sector-specific 
discriminatory foreign exchange regulations and overvalued exchange rates were also a general 
rule from the 1930s onwards. 
Export taxes were a key component of Argentina’s fiscal and trade regimes in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  In contrast with the constitution of the United States of America, 
which expressly prohibited the taxation of exports, the 1853 Argentine constitution provided that 
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central government expenditures were to be financed in part by export taxes.  While the first 
constitutional reform of 1860 established that export taxes would be eliminated in 1866, the 
eruption of the Triple Alliance War (1864-1870) against Paraguay led the second constitutional 
reform of 1866 to indefinitely extend the central government’s prerogative to tax exports.  This 
language survives in the current version of the constitution, last reformed in 1994. 
Export taxes were applied almost uninterruptedly between 1862 and 1905, with a single 
incidental interlude between 1888 and 1890.  At the time, agriculture accounted for the vast 
majority of exports.  Wool alone represented over 50 percent of national exports in 1880, followed 
by hides and skins, dry meats, and fats and tallow (Alemann, 1989).  Export taxes were applied 
primarily for fiscal reasons.  They were second only to import tariffs as a source of funds to the 
national treasury.  Nonetheless, their share in total government revenue gradually declined from 
29 percent in 1865 to 2.8 percent in 1887 (see Figure 2.4).  Export taxes regained importance after 
Argentina’s first great debt crisis in 1890, but were ultimately discarded in 1905. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Export taxes as a share of central government revenue, Argentina, 1864-1887 
 
Source: Cortés Conde (1989). 
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The apogee of Argentinean agricultural crops in the first decades of the twentieth century 
coincided with a break in export taxes, except for the period between 1918 and 1923.  Despite the 
incidence of export taxes during significant parts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Argentina was tightly integrated into the world economy.  The country exploited its competitive 
advantage in agriculture and commanded significant shares of world trade and finance.  The period 
between 1860 and 1929 was characterized by rapid growth in agricultural production and exports, 
stimulated in part by the expansion of cultivated land, reductions in transportation costs for 
agricultural products, and large increases in international demand for the country’s main 
commodities. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s induced a substantial rupture with the agro-exporter 
model that had until then prevailed.  Starting in 1929, the economy turned inward and became less 
and less integrated with world markets.  The worsening of agriculture’s external terms of trade and 
the increase in import tariffs on manufactured goods, along with a multiple exchange rate system 
that discriminated against exports, reduced the rural sector’s internal advantage and improved the 
conditions for the growth of industrial production.  While explicit exports taxes were not applied 
between 1930 and 1955, unfavorable exchange rate regimes constituted an implicit tax on 
agricultural exports 
The average difference between the commercial and financial exchange rates was 15 
percent in 1930-1945 and 55 percent in 1946-1960 (Figure 2.5).  In addition, commercial exchange 
rates were at times further differentiated between export and import rates.  Multiple exchange rate 
regimes were a de facto agricultural export tax since agriculture accounted for over 90 percent of 
total exports well into the 1960s (Figure 2.6). 
 
 113 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Difference between commercial and financial exchange rates, Argentina,  
1930-1988 
 
Note: A unified official exchange market has prevailed since 1990. 
Source: Author.  Based on Fundación Norte y Sur (2005). 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Sectoral composition of exports, ten-year averages, Argentina, 1871-2004 
 
Source: Author.  Based on Fundación Norte y Sur (2005) and World Bank Development Indicators. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
19
30
19
33
19
36
19
39
19
42
19
45
19
48
19
51
19
54
19
57
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
8
7
0
-7
9
1
8
8
0
-8
9
1
8
9
0
-9
9
1
9
0
0
-0
9
1
9
1
0
-1
9
1
9
2
0
-2
9
1
9
3
0
-3
9
1
9
4
0
-4
9
1
9
5
0
-5
9
1
9
6
0
-6
9
1
9
7
0
-7
9
1
9
8
0
-8
9
1
9
9
0
-9
9
2
0
0
0
-0
4
Agriculture Non-agriculture
 114 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, government interventions have led to substantial 
price discrimination against the country’s main agricultural products (Sturzenegger, 1991).  During 
the first (1946-1952) and second (1952-1955) administrations of Juan Domingo Perón, taxation of 
agricultural exports occurred implicitly via foreign exchange manipulations by the Argentine 
Institute for the Promotion of Exchanges (IAPI). As part of the import-substitution 
industrialization strategy, the IAPI absorbed a substantial portion of agricultural export revenues, 
which were redistributed by the state in the form of massive public works and subsidized credit to 
the industrial sector.  While the IAPI at first benefited from the escalation in international grain 
demand and high prices in the aftermath of the war, it ultimately stifled production and exports 
and attracted stern opposition from the agricultural sector (Cufré, 2007). 
The military junta that overthrew Perón abolished the IAPI and reinstituted explicit export 
taxes after a major devaluation of the peso in 1955.  The taxes were designed to improve the 
government’s fiscal position and to curtail spiraling domestic food prices.  The same justification 
would later be given for the reintroduction of export taxes in other instances of devaluation, most 
notably in 1967 and 2002.  After the 1955 junta, several military and civilian governments made 
recurrent use of export taxes.  Export taxation was renewed or incremented in 1958, 1959, 1965, 
1967, 1971, 1972, 1974 and 1975 (Rapoport, 2008; Economic Research Service, 1986).  Several 
types of export taxes, including flat rate and progressive levies, were imposed at differing levels 
to an ever-increasing list of commodities.  Following a strong improvement in international 
agricultural terms of trade in 1973 and 1974, taxation levels on agricultural exports were raised 
significantly during the third administration of Perón (1973-1974) and that of his wife Isabel Perón 
(1974-1976).  From an ad valorem rate of 10 percent in 1965, export taxes on wheat and corn rose 
intermittently to 50 percent in 1975.  Export taxes on soybeans were first instituted 1974 at 46 
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percent and reached 53 percent in 1975 (Economic Research Service, 1986).  Multiple exchange 
rate regimes and official agricultural prices were also adopted.  Furthermore, high import tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions pushed up the relative prices of importable products and caused a real 
appreciation of the currency, which resulted in additional discrimination against traditional 
agricultural exports (Sturzenegger, 1991). 
Export taxes were virtually cut to zero in 1977 by Argentina’s last military government, 
only to be revived in 1981 and boosted in 1982 during the Falklands/Malvinas War.  Taxation of 
agricultural exports survived the transition to civilian rule in 1983 and was bolstered by President 
Raúl Alfonsín after devaluations in 1984 and 1985.  Export taxes were mostly eliminated in 1991, 
as part of President Carlos Menem’s neoliberal reforms.28  The period between 1991 and 2001 
constituted a rare exception in recent Argentine history to the general rule of discrimination against 
agricultural exports. 
Export taxes were most recently reintroduced in April 2002, in the context of the greatest 
economic crisis in Argentina’s history.  The measure, which was supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), was aimed at financing the budget deficit and a new subsidies program for 
the unemployed.  Almost all agricultural and non-agricultural products were subject to the new 
export tax. Nonetheless, tax rates on the main agricultural commodities were significantly higher 
than those for most nonagricultural products (see Subsection 2.3.2). 
Export tax rates for certain agricultural products were increased in July 2005, November 
2005, and November 2007.  In addition, reimbursement of domestic taxes on agricultural exports 
was eliminated for most products in November 2005.  Moreover, export bans for beef and wheat 
                                               
28 Export taxes remained for a limited number of products, including raw hides and skins and unprocessed oilseeds 
(soybeans, flaxseed, rapeseed, cottonseed and peanuts).  The export tax on unprocessed oilseeds corresponded to 3.5 
percent of the f.o.b. price.  In 1998, the tax on raw hides and skins was 5 percent for intra-Mercosur exports and 10 
percent for extra-Mercosur exports. 
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were also applied in 2006.  With the goal of controlling inflation, the government also signed 
agreements with the dairy, beef, leather, poultry and vegetable oil sectors designed at reducing or 
stabilizing prices at the consumer level, for periods of generally 90 days. 
In March 2008, the government instituted a new progressive export tax on oilseeds and 
grains.  The level of taxation changed according to the prevailing world price.  As a result, taxation 
levels for soybeans increased significantly.  Due to the substantial social unrest and political 
turmoil, the government finally removed the progressive taxes and reinstituted the preexisting flat 
rate taxes on exports in July 2008. 
 
2.3.2. Coverage, Structure and Level 
Export taxes have been traditionally targeted at the most competitive agricultural products of the 
Pampas region, the fertile lowland plains that cover the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre 
Ríos, La Pampa, Santa Fe and the southeast of San Luis.  Until the 1970s, the key Pampean 
products were cereals (wheat, corn and sorghum) and livestock.  In the 1970s, oilseeds (soybeans 
and sunflower seed) were added to the list of key commodities.  Special products from other 
regions (tobacco and sugarcane from the Northwest; tea and mate from the Northeast; fruit from 
the Cuyo region) were generally spared from heavy export taxation.  Between 1991 and 2001, 
taxes were applied only to exports of unprocessed oilseeds and raw hides and skins.  In 2002, 
export taxes were reinstated for all products, agricultural or otherwise, albeit at different levels 
In terms of their structure, export taxes in Argentina have been applied in general through 
flat duty rates on freight on board (FOB) export values.  Nonetheless, at times the government has 
imposed progressive tax systems, in which export tax rates increased with the prevailing world 
price.  This occurred, for example, in 1972, when floating export taxes were limited by a ceiling 
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of 15 percent of the export value, and between March and July 2008, when progressive export 
taxes could reach over 50 percent of external reference prices. 
Export tax levels can be quantified either explicitly or implicitly.  The explicit export tax 
level corresponds to the official export duty rate.  It may be obtained directly from laws or 
regulations, or can be calculated as the ratio of fiscal revenue from exports over the value of 
exports.  The Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) is often used as an implicit measure of the export 
taxation level.  It corresponds to the ratio of the prevailing domestic price relative to the appropriate 
adjusted border price in the absence of intervention.  A negative NPR signals that exports are being 
taxed; a positive NPR, that they are being subsidized.  While export taxes have generally explained 
most of the observed price wedge in Argentina, domestic market structures may also influence the 
results.  Therefore, since not all of the price wedge observed is necessarily due to export taxes, the 
NPR may overestimate the actual level of export taxation. 
Export tax levels in Argentina have varied significantly across products and over time.  
Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech (1989) find that the aggregate explicit export tax was either null 
or corresponded to less than 2.5 percent of the value of total exports between 1915 and 1955 
(Figure 2.7).  Taxation was higher and more volatile in 1955-1984, ranging from 2.5 to 15 percent 
of the value of total exports.  Explicit export taxes on individual Pampean products were generally 
much higher, at times upwards of 50 percent. 
Sturzenegger, Otrera and Mosquera (1990) find that the aggregate explicit export tax on 
agriculture and agro-industry fluctuated between an average of 8 percent in 1976-1980 and an 
average of 18 percent in 1971-1975 (Table 2.8).  The highest annual aggregate export tax level on 
agriculture occurred in 1973: 23 percent of the aggregate export value (Sturzenegger, 1991).  They 
also found that agriculture and agro-industry were further taxed through high import tariffs on the 
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manufacturing sector unrelated to agriculture.  As a result, the anti-export bias (ATB) in Argentina 
reached approximately 55 percent in 1961-1980 and 45 percent in 1981-1985. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Aggregate explicit export taxation levels, Argentina, 1913-1984 
 
Note: Line represents (1 – tx), where tx is the proportion of taxes collected on exports over the value of exports. 
Source: Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech (1989). 
 
 
Table 2.8: Aggregate explicit export tax on agriculture, implicit import tariff on 
manufactures and anti-trade bias, Argentina, 1961-1985 
 
Period tX tM Anti-trade bias 
1961-1965 12% 60% 56% 
1966-1970 13% 61% 55% 
1971-1975 18% 51% 55% 
1976-1980 8% 64% 56% 
1981-1985 13% 95% 45% 
 
Notes: tX: export tax on agriculture; tM: import tariff on non-agriculture. 
Source:  Sturzenegger, Otrera and Mosquera (1990). 
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Taxation levels are substantially higher for key agricultural commodities.  Sturzenegger et 
al. (1990) estimate NPRs for six key exportables (wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, sunflower 
seeds and beef) in 1960-1985.  These products were discriminated against through both export 
taxes and an overvalued exchange rate.  Tables 2.9 and 2.10 summarize direct nominal protection 
rates (NPRD) and total nominal protection rates (NPRT), respectively.  While the NPRD reflects 
the impact of direct interventions in the form of taxes on agricultural exports, the NPRT also 
incorporates indirect effects through exchange rate overvaluation and artificially high 
nonagricultural prices. 
 
Table 2.9: Direct nominal protection rates (NPRD), Argentina, 1961-1985 (percent) 
 
Period Wheat Corn Sorghum Soybeans* 
Sunflower 
seeds* 
Beef 
1961-1965 -15.8 -4.3 -12.6 - - -31.8 
1966-1970 -15.2 -12.1 -19.3 - - -24.4 
1971-1975 -45.8 -28.8 -29.5 - - -23.9 
1976-1980 -19.0 -18.9 -14.4 -12.5 -25.6 -2.7 
1981-1985 -20.2 -21.5 -25.4 -22.3 -24.5 -22.5 
 
* The year of 1976 is not included in the 1976-1980 averages for soybeans and sunflower seeds. 
Source:  Sturzenegger et al. (1990). 
 
 
Table 2.10: Total nominal protection rates (NPRT), Argentina, 1961-1985 (percent) 
 
Period Wheat Corn Sorghum Soybeans* 
Sunflower 
seeds* 
Beef 
1961-1965 -35.0 -26.3 -33.5 - - -46.7 
1966-1970 -35.7 -36.5 -41.7 - - -44.3 
1971-1975 -51.7 -35.7 -36.5 - - -31.8 
1976-1980 -39.4 -42.3 -39.6 -39.1 -47.6 -25.5 
1981-1985 -47.7 -48.4 -51.4 -48.0 -49.7 -47.1 
 
* The year of 1976 is not included in the 1976-1980 averages for soybeans and sunflower seeds. 
Source: Sturzenegger et al. (1990). 
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Direct nominal (dis)protection on the six key commodities was generally higher than the 
average explicit export tax on agriculture and agro-industry.  While the latter was 18 percent in 
1971-1975, direct taxes on wheat, sorghum, corn and beef were respectively 46 percent, 30 
percent, 29 percent and 24 percent in the same period.  By and large, agricultural export taxes were 
high when the prevailing real rate of exchange or the international prices of the six products were 
high.  Therefore, variations in direct nominal protection tended to compensate for variations in the 
real exchange rate or international prices.  Short-run (annual) variations in export taxes in 1960-
1985 are given by the coefficients of variation of 0.31 for wheat, 0.25 for corn, and 0.20 for both 
sorghum and beef.  Significant negative long-run trends are observed for corn (-1.8 percent per 
annum), wheat (-1.4 percent per annum), and sorghum (-1.2 percent per annum), while no 
particular trend is identified for beef (Sturzenegger, 1991). 
When indirect effects are considered, taxation of agricultural exports increases 
significantly to about 40 to 50 percent on average in 1960-1985.  These results coincide with 
Cavallo’s (1985) estimate of an average annual rate of export taxation of approximately 44 percent 
in 1960-1983.  While export taxes substantially reduced producer prices for each of the six 
commodities, industrial protection policies and the overvaluation of the real exchange rate taxed 
agriculture even more than direct interventions.  Due to the negative correlation between direct 
and indirect protection, the NPRT exhibits less volatility than the NPRD.  Nonetheless, a general 
pattern of increased taxation is observed for grains and a decreasing pattern for beef (until 1976-
1980).  By 1981-1985, total nominal taxation for each of the six agricultural commodities was 
either close to or above 50 percent. 
Valdés and Schaeffer (1995) computed NPRs for the 1986-1993 period.  They find that 
implicit export taxation reaches a peak in 1989-1990 (66 percent for soybeans, 56 percent for 
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sunflower seeds), declines substantially in 1991-1992, and becomes negative for some products in 
1993 (Table 2.11).  Since the computed NPRs are almost identical to the explicit export taxes 
(Table 2.12), Valdés and Schaeffer conclude that other factors, such as market structure, do not 
contribute significantly to the wedge between domestic and border prices. 
 
Table 2.11: Nominal protection rate (NPR), key agricultural products, Argentina, 1986-1993 
(percent) 
 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Beef -4.6 -7.5 -7.5 -6.3 -21.7 -18.7 -4.5 -1.5 3.5 
Cotton -6.9 -2.8 0.0 0.0 -20.6 -19.0 -4.0 0.0 0.0 
Corn -35.0 -31.0 -23.1 -2.2 -30.3 -30.2 -6.5 -2.1 3.5 
Sorghum -37.4 -33.5 -25.7 -2.8 -31.0 -24.1 -8.6 -2.5 4.5 
Soybeans -36.3 -32.6 -18.6 -17.6 -38.3 -36.1 -12.4 -8.6 -3.8 
Sunflower seed -37.3 -30.6 -19.6 -14.0 -38.6 -38.5 -13.3 -9.4 -4.3 
Wheat -24.2 -20.9 -8.0 -1.8 -26.0 -30.0 -6.3 -1.9 3.2 
Weighted average -19.5 -15.3 -10.5 -8.2 -25.0 -25.3 -7.2 -3.4 1.4 
 
Source: Valdés and Schaeffer (1995). 
 
Table 2.12:  Nominal protection rate (NPR) and explicit export taxes/subsidies, 
key agricultural products, Argentina, 1992 and 1993 (percent) 
 
Product 
__________1992__________ __________1993__________ 
NPR Export Tax NPR Export Tax 
Beef -1.5 1.5 3.5 -3.5 
Cotton 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Corn -2.1 1.5 3.5 -2.5 
Sorghum -2.5 1.5 4.5 -2.5 
Soybeans -8.6 7.5 -3.8 3.5 
Sunflower seed -9.4 7.5 -4.3 3.5 
Wheat -1.9 1.5 3.2 -2.5 
 
Source: Valdés and Schaeffer (1995). 
 
Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008) compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for 
farmers in the 1960-2005 period.  Since their measure includes an adjustment for direct 
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interventions on inputs, it is closer to effective assistance measures.  The authors conclude that the 
economy’s most efficient and competitive tradable sectors were strongly discouraged through 
direct export taxation.  Included in their estimates are “ the support provided to grain input use, 
although it adds very little because the gain from seed input assistance was largely offset by 
taxation via higher-than-free-market prices for fertilizers and pesticides.” The long-run trend 
shows a reduction in the aggregate (simple average) NRA at the farm level until 2001, followed 
by a significant increase well into 2005.  In the short- or medium-run, the NRAs were more 
volatile, which was due especially to fluctuations in the real exchange rate.  Figure 2.8 depicts the 
NRA at the farm level and trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filer. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: NRA at the farm level and trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, Argentina, 
1960-2005 
 
Source: Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008). 
 
Table 2.13 summarizes explicit export tax rates on both agricultural and non-agricultural 
products as of August 2008.  There were fifteen duty rates, ranging from zero to 45 percent of the 
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FOB value.  The highest rates are for petroleum products and metal waste and scraps, followed by 
oilseeds and their products, cereals and their products, and beef and raw hides and skins. 
 
Table 2.13: Explicit export tax rates, Argentina, August 2008 
 
RATE PRODUCTS AFFECTED  
0% Works of art 
5% 
All other products not specified elsewhere in this table, including: Meat other than beef; Some types of fish; 
Dairy products; Eggs; Some types of beans; Oranges, mandarins, grapefruit, limes and lemons; Dried grapes; 
Processed fruit; Roasted Coffee; Tea, mate and spices; Brown and milled rice; Rolled or flaked grains; 
Safflower; Lac, guns and resins; Peanut, olive, palm, coconut, rapeseed, colza, mustard, castor and sesame oil; 
Glycerol; Beeswax; Fruit and vegetable preparations; Beverages, spirits and vinegar; Cigars and cigarettes; 
Some types of wood; Most manufactured products 
10% 
Live animals;  Some types of fish; Honey; Feathers for stuffing; Unworked corals; Live plants, bulbs, roots, 
cut flowers and ornamental foliage; Some types of beans (lima beans, cowpeas, kidney beans, red beans, pinto 
beans); Nuts; Most types of fresh fruit (bananas, plantains, dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, 
mangoes, mangosteens, grapes, melons, apples, pears, quinces, apricots, cherries, peaches, nectarines, plums, 
sloes, berries, kiwifruit); Unroasted coffee; Paddy and broken rice; Grain sorghum; Buckwheat, millet, canary 
seed and wild rice; Malt; Shelled peanuts in packages; Rapeseed; Sunflower seeds in packages; Mustard seed; 
Palm kernels and nuts; Hop cones; Hay, alfalfa, clover and other fodder; Unmanufactured tobacco; Not humid 
raw hides and skins; Some types of wood; Silkworm cocoons; Unprocessed wool, cotton, true hemp and jute; 
Salt; sulfur; earths and stone; plastering materials and cement; Most ores; Natural rubber 
13.5% Cotton seed 
15% Beef; Preparations and preserves of bovine meat; Humid raw hides and skins; Tanned or crust hides and skins 
18% Wheat flour; Mixes and dough for preparations of bakers’ wares 
20% 
Rye; Barley; Oats; Cereal flours other than of wheat; Cereal groats, meal and pellets; Germ of cereals; Potato 
flour; Meals  and flours of oilseeds other than soybeans; Safflower, cotton seed, linseed and corn oil; 
Margarine; Vegetable waxes; Recovered (waste and scrap) paper and paperboard 
23.5% Unshelled peanuts; Shelled peanuts in bulk; Flaxseed 
25% Corn 
28% Wheat 
30% Sunflower oil; Sunflower oilcake 
32% Sunflower seeds in bulk; Soybean meal, flour and oilcake; Soybean oil; Mixtures containing soybean oil 
35% Soybeans 
40% (*) 
Ferrous waste and scrap; Remelting scrap ingots of iron or steel; Waste and scrap of tin, tantalum, bismuth, 
beryllium, chromium, thallium, hafnium, niobium and germanium 
45% (*) 
Petroleum oils; Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; Petroleum jelly, paraffin wax and other 
mineral waxes 
 
(*) Minimum export tax rate. Actual rate varies according to external reference price and may reach 100 percent.  
Source: Author. 
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Figure 2.9 provides monthly explicit export tax levels for three products in unprocessed 
soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil in the period between January 1987 and August 2008.  
Export taxes on unprocessed soybeans reached peaks of over 40 percent in both 1989-1990 and 
2008, and were at their lowest (3.5 percent) in 1991-2001.  Export taxes on soybean meal and oil 
were consistently lower than the tax on the raw material.  This differential export taxes system has 
the goal of encouraging exports of products with higher value-added.  The negative taxes on 
soybean meal and oil in 1991-2001 imply that exports of these products were in fact subsidized in 
this period. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Monthly explicit export taxes, soybean complex, Argentina, Jan. 1987 to Aug. 2008 
Source: Author.  Based on data from the Cámara de la Industria Aceitera de la República Argentina (CIARA). 
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2.3.3. Economic Impacts 
Mundlak et al. (1989) argue that Argentina could have attained a growth trajectory in 1930-1985 
similar to that of Australia or Canada had it followed policies that allowed producers to fully 
benefit from the country’s comparative advantage in agriculture.  Instead, the country heavily 
taxed agriculture, either directly through export taxes or indirectly through the protection of 
nonagriculture and the overvaluation of the exchange rate.  The outcome is now well known: 
Argentina’s remarkable growth in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was 
followed by dismal economic performance between 1930 and 1990.  This section analyzes the 
influence of export taxes on the performance of the agricultural sector and the economy at large. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Argentine policymakers believed that agricultural output did not 
respond significantly to price changes.  They argued that taxing agriculture to promote import-
substitution industrialization would not result in big losses in farm output (World Bank, 1986).  
Nevertheless, they were ultimately proved wrong, as several studies have shown that agricultural 
supply response is strong in Argentina (Reca, 1974; Gluck, 1979; Ferrer, 1980; Cavallo, 1985; 
Sturzenegger et al., 1990; Herrou 2001). 
Sturzenegger et al. (1990) report that Argentina’s agricultural output was adversely 
affected by export taxes in 1960-1985.  They use comparative-dynamics analysis to simulate what 
would have happened to agricultural output in the absence of export taxes.  They find moderate 
short-run effects and substantial cumulative effects.  Once long-run effects are taken into account, 
the removal of export taxes increases output on average by 49 percent for sunflower seeds, 31 
percent for wheat, 26 percent for beef, 24.5 percent for sorghum, 13 percent for corn, and 9.5 
percent for soybeans. 
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In a study of supply response in Argentina between 1916 and 1984, Mundlak et al. (1989) 
find that it takes time for agriculture to respond in full to price changes.  In three years, output 
increases by 30 percent of the price change; in 15 years, by 70 percent; and in 20 years, by 99 
percent.  The response results mainly from capital accumulation and from an increase in 
productivity.  The same study finds that sectoral prices affect productivity of resources: “[t]he 
scope of producers’ decisions is not limited to properly locating themselves on a given production 
function, but it is much broader in scope in that it also requires a decision on what production 
functions or techniques producers should employ.”  The study indicates that because of a lack of 
incentives, Argentine farmers failed to implement new technology, which caused it to fall behind 
countries such as the United States. 
Figure 2.10 compares crop yields in Argentina and the United States between 1913 and 
1984.  Until the 1930s, crop yields in the two countries were at similar levels, and usually higher 
in Argentina.  Nevertheless, yields in Argentina were consistently and increasingly below U.S. 
levels after the 1930s.  While Argentina’s Divisia yield index for 14 crops was one-third higher 
than that of the United States in 1935, it was 15 percent lower by 1945.  The difference between 
the Argentine and the U.S. indices increased to 40 percent in 1945 and 60 percent in 1980.  While 
several factors may explain this relative loss of productivity, agricultural export taxes can be listed 
as one of them. 
A detailed depiction of annual yields for six key agricultural products in Argentina and the 
United States in 1961-2007 is provided in Figure 2.11.  Argentina’s cereal yields were significantly 
below those of the United States in 1961-1991: maize, sorghum and wheat yields corresponded on 
average to 47 percent, 70 percent and 76 percent of the respective yields in the United States.  
Substantial relative improvements occurred since the 1990s, such that maize, sorghum and wheat 
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yields in 2000-2007 corresponded on average to 70 percent, 130 percent and 90 percent of the 
respective yields in the United States.  For soybeans and sunflower seeds, Argentine yields have 
been close to or higher than United States yields since the 1980s.  Such improvements in 
Argentina’s crop yields seem to reflect movements in relative incentives for agriculture since the 
1960s.  Anderson and Valdés (2008) identify a steady improvement in the relative rate of assistance 
(RRA) to agriculture from -49 percent in 1965-1969 to -13 percent in 1995-1999, followed by a 
decline to -20 percent in 2000-2004.  Table 2.14 shows a strong positive correlation between crop 
yields and the aggregate RRA to agriculture between 1961 and 2007. This relationship exists for 
yields measured in absolute terms (column A1), as well as for yields as a share of prevailing yields 
in the United States (column B1).  Nonetheless, the correlation between improved yields and 
reduced disprotection is substantially weaker when product-specific nominal rates of assistance 
(NRA) are considered (columns A2 and B2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Crop yields, Argentina and the United States, 1913-1984 
Note:This figure is based on a Divisia index of yields for 14 crops in Argentina and the United States (1913 = 100). 
Source:Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech (1989). 
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Figure 2.11: Annual yields for six key agricultural products, Argentina and the US, 1961-2007 
 
Note: Right axes indicate yield in kg per hectare, except for cattle meat, which is in kg per animal. 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Table 2.14: Coefficient of correlation between yields and rates of assistance, Argentina,  
1961-2004 
 
Product 
______Correlation with yields______ _Correlation with share of US yields_ 
(A1) 
Aggregate 
RRA 
(A2) 
Product-specific 
NRA 
(B1) 
Aggregate 
RRA 
(B2) 
Product-specific 
NRA 
Wheat 0.96 0.85 0.97 0.88 
Maize 0.87 0.34 0.86 0.31 
Sorghum 0.88 n.a. 0.74 n.a. 
Soybeans 0.75 -0.01 0.59 -0.39 
Sunflower seed 0.93 0.23 0.82 0.18 
Cattle meat 0.49 0.58 -0.94 -0.95 
 
Notes: RRA: Aggregate relative rate of assistance to agriculture. 
NRA: Product-specific nominal rate of assistance. 
Source:  Author.  Based on Anderson and Valdés (2008) and Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008). 
 
Argentina’s lack of investment in the agricultural sector is reflected in its poor performance 
in agricultural input use.  The country’s agricultural tractor fleet expanded at a very slow pace 
between 1961 and 2003.  The number of tractors in use remained nearly unchanged during the 
1970s, which implies that investment in new tractors was not beyond the depreciation rate.  After 
a short-lived expansion in 1981, the number of tractors in use declined for five consecutive years.  
Following moderate growth in 1986-1988, Argentina’s tractor fleet increased at an annual average 
rate of less than 1 percent in 1989-2003. 
The rate of adoption of agricultural tractors in Argentina in the second half of the twentieth 
century was particularly slow when compared to the rest of Latin America.  Although it had by far 
the largest the region in the early 1960s, it fell behind its regional counterparts in the following 
three decades.  In 1961, the Argentinean tractor fleet was 70 percent larger than the Brazilian fleet 
and 120 percent larger than the Mexican fleet.  At the time, the three countries had comparable 
amounts of arable land (22-26 million hectares in 1960-1964).  By 1991, the number of tractors in 
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use in Argentina was 62 percent smaller than in Brazil and 13 percent smaller than in Mexico 
(Figure 2.12).  While Argentina’s loss of regional leadership partly reflects the rapid expansion of 
arable land in Brazil, it is largely explained by Brazil’s and Mexico’s higher density of tractors per 
hectare of arable land since the 1980s. 
In terms of tractors per hectare of arable land, Argentina lags behind its competitors in both 
North and South America (Figure 2.13).  In 2001-2003, Chile, Uruguay and the United States each 
had approximately 2.5 times more tractors per hectare of arable land than Argentina.  Brazil, 
Mexico and Ecuador, all of which had only a fraction of Argentina’s number of tractors per hectare 
of arable land in 1961-1963, experienced significant expansion in the subsequent decades.  By 
2001-2003, Brazil and Mexico had, respectively, 30 percent and 20 percent more tractors per 
hectare of arable land than Argentina.  Ecuador, a country with a substantially lower level of socio-
economic development, had the same number of tractors per hectare of arable land as Argentina 
in 2001-2003. 
While agricultural export taxes may have contributed to Argentina’s slow rate of adoption 
of tractors in 1961-1991, the elimination of such taxes in the 1990s did not coincide with a rapid 
expansion in the tractor fleet.  Between 1991 and 2001, the number of tractors in use per 1,000 
hectares in Argentina increased only slightly from 104 to 107. Moreover, the share of obsolete 
tractors (i.e., machines in use for more than 15 years) increased from 55 percent in 1988 to 73 
percent in 2002 (Dolcet and Leone, 2005). 
In the three decades that preceded the elimination of Argentina’s agricultural export taxes 
in 1991, the country had the lowest grain output growth rate among all countries in South America.  
While Argentina’s average grain output increased by 45 percent between 1961-1965 and 1987-
1991, Chile’s and Peru’s expanded by 90 percent, and Brazil’s and Colombia’s by over 150 percent  
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Figure 2.12: Number of agricultural tractors in use, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 1961-2003 
 
Source: Author.  Based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Number of tractors per 1000 hectares of arable land, select countries, 
1961-1963 to 2001-2003 
 
Source: Author.  Based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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(Figure 2.14).  Argentina’s growth record in this period was also inferior to that of other key grain 
producers, including Australia, Canada, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and the United States.  
Argentina’s grain output also grew at a slower rate than that of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Argentina also recorded the second lowest growth rate in cattle meat production among all 
South American countries in 1961-1991.  While Argentina’s average cattle meat output increased 
by 22 percent from 1961-1965 to 1987-1991, Chile’s expanded by 45 percent, Peru’s by 60 
percent, Colombia’s by 80 percent and Brazil’s by almost 200 percent.  As in the case of grains, 
Argentina’s output growth in the cattle meat sector was inferior to that of key producers in other 
regions of the world, as well as to that of Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.15). 
Argentina’s poor performance in terms of grain and cattle meat output growth coincides 
with high levels of taxation of agriculture in 1961-1991.  While other South American countries 
also taxed agriculture, taxation levels were generally lower than in Argentina.  Schiff and Valdés 
(1992) report the following NPRD for agriculture in 1960-1984: 10.1 percent in Brazil, -1.2 percent 
in Chile, -4.8 percent in Colombia and -17.8 in Argentina.  Valdés (1995) reports the following 
NPR for agriculture in 1985-1990: 22.1 in Chile, 8.9 in Colombia, 1.7 in Brazil, -5.4 in Uruguay, 
-13.5 in Paraguay, -17.2 in Ecuador and -17.3 in Argentina. 
In the longer period between 1961-1965 and 2003-2007, Argentina comes in second to last 
among South American countries in terms of grain output growth and last in terms of cattle meat 
output growth (Figures 2.16 and 2.17).Argentina is also outperformed by other developing 
countries and regions, including China, Mexico, India and Sub-Saharan Africa.  When compared 
to the developed world, Argentina’s growth pattern in grains is superior to that of Western Europe, 
the United States and Canada, but inferior to that of Australia.  In cattle meat, Argentina is 
outperformed by every developed country or region in the sample except Western Europe. 
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Figure 2.14: Growth in grain output in South America and select reference countries and regions, 
1961-1965 to 1987-1991 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Growth in cattle meat output in South America and select reference countries and 
regions, 1961-1965 to 1987-1991 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Figure 2.16: Growth in grain output in South America and select reference countries and regions, 
1961-1965 to 2003-2007 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Growth in cattle meat output in South America and select reference countries and 
regions, 1961-1965 to 2003-2007 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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Despite the imposition of taxes on agricultural exports in 2002-2008, Argentina’s 
agricultural sector experienced remarkable growth in this period.  This was a substantial departure 
from the several decades of relative slow growth prior to the 1990s. Nonetheless, most of this 
growth was linked to very favorable prices in the international market for some of Argentina’s key 
commodities, soybeans in special.  The margin for soybeans was so attractive, that soybeans 
remained profitable despite the incidence of export taxes.  Since soybean margins were on average 
superior to that of other key grains (corn, wheat, sunflower seeds), soybean planted area and 
production increased substantially.  In contrast, sectors like livestock and dairy became less 
profitable.  Government intervention in the form of export bans and quotas on beef exacerbated 
problems in the sector and provided ranchers with additional reasons to switch into grains (see 
Subsection 2.2.1). 
Increased investment and intensification of input use characterized the period between 
2004 and 2006.  Fertilizer use increased significantly, from 1.72 million tons in 1999-2000 to 2.57 
million tons in 2004-2005.  Nonetheless, the nutrient balance continued to be negative.  The rate 
of reposition of nutrients extracted from the soil was below 25 percent, while the average 
application level per hectare was still below that of other countries.  In 2005-2006, Cargill 
inaugurated a superphosphates plant in Puerto General San Martín, which was to generate 
investments of US$100 until 2010.  Profertil, Bunge and Petrobras also announced significant 
investments in fertilizer plants. 
Investment in agricultural machinery also increased.  Sales reached US$940 million in 
2004, compared to US$497 in 2000 and US$340 in 2002.  In the case of harvesters, a growing 
trend in favor of equipment of larger size and more advanced technology was observed in 2004-
2005.  This was expected to result in greater efficiency and fewer losses during harvests.  Other 
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signs of increased agricultural input use included high growth rates in sales of herbicides, 
fungicides and insecticides, as well as of precision tools, especially yield monitors and satellite 
equipment. 
Nevertheless, successive increases in export tax rates and the imposition of export bans, 
export quotas and price caps have led to the flight of capital away from Argentina’s agricultural 
sector.  A comparative study of Argentina and Uruguay found that government involvement 
represents a significant risk to FDI in beef systems in Argentina, but that this is much less of a 
problem in neighboring Uruguay, where government policy is designed to promote beef exports 
(Thor et al., 2007).  In 2008, tiny Uruguay was expected to export 50 percent more beef than 
Argentina (Wasilevsky, 2008). 
In the soybean sector, Argentina became an important source of FDI.  Increases in soybean 
export taxes in Argentina made Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil more attractive to Argentine 
investment.  Small and large Argentine agricultural groups have invested in the three neighboring 
countries, including Grobocapatel, MNU, Cresud and El Tejar.  Uruguay’s soybean planted area 
was estimated to expand by 25 percent in 2008-2009 due among other things to increased interest 
of Argentine producers in expanding production in the neighboring country (Wilder, 2008a).  
Whereas the domestic price producers receive for their product in Argentina is substantially below 
the world price, Uruguayan prices reflect international prices.  Taxation of the soybean sector in 
Uruguay is 2.5 times lower than in Argentina.  This differential spurred investment in Uruguay, 
with foreign investment in Uruguayan land multiplying 16-fold in 2001-2008.  In 2008, more than 
half of Uruguay’s soybean production was carried out by Argentines.  Increasing interest in 
biofuels may lead to increased demand for soybean oil and cause Argentina to source soybeans 
from Uruguay to fulfill their crushing demands.  In Paraguay, soybean planted area was expected 
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to rise by more than 5 percent to 2.75 million hectares in 2008, due to high international prices and  
increased investment from abroad, particularly Argentina (Wilder, 2008b). 
Despite other shortcomings, Argentina’s differential export taxes in the soybean sector 
have succeeded in promoting a strong downstream processing industry.  Such objective was so 
central for Argentinean policymakers that the export taxes on soybeans were one of a handful of 
export taxes that were not eliminated in the early 1990s.  The country has become the world’s 
number one exporter of soybean oil and oilcake, in part due to a wave of investments in the 
processing industry of over US$8 billion, directed at increasing processing capacity and improving 
port logistics.  Investors have included Bunge (US$300 million), Cargill (US$160 million), AGD 
(US$139 million), Molinos Río de la Plata (US$80 million), Dreyfus (US$65 million), Vincentín 
(US$40 million), Noble (US$25 million), ACA (US$9  million) and AFA (US$8 million). 
Two recent studies have estimated the socioeconomic effects of Argentina’s post-2002 
export taxes and have arrived at largely different results.  Both Nogués et al. (2007)29 and Cicowiez 
et al. (2008)30 use a combination of general equilibrium models and micro-simulations to estimate 
the impact of the elimination of export taxes on GDP, employment, poverty, extreme poverty, 
inequality and government revenue.  Results are compared below: 
(i) GDP: Nogués et al. find that GDP grows by between 2.8 and 6 percent due to increased 
agricultural production and exports.  In contrast, Cicowiez et al. find that GDP falls by 
between 0.9 and 1.7 percent due to the expansion of primary sectors that are less labor 
intensive and more outward oriented than other sectors, a fact that negatively affects 
domestic downstream industries. 
                                               
29 Nogués et al. (2007) use the World Bank’s GTAP-Agr model and follow Anderson and Valenzuela (2007). 
30 Cicowiez et al. (2008) use a global economy-wide CGE model and a national CGE model. The CGE model follows 
Lofgren et al. (2002), McDonald (2005) and Lofgren and Díaz-Bonilla (2007).  
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(ii) Unemployment: Nogués et al. present data only for the primary and agro-industrial 
sectors, where skilled labor expends by 7.1 percent and unskilled labor and 6.5 percent.  
Cicowiez et al. finds that unemployment increases (from 12.3 percent to 13.4 - 14.7 
percent) given that expanding sectors (cereals and oilseeds) are less labor intensive, 
even when compared to other agricultural sectors from which they would be capturing 
land (livestock, dairy and agro-industrial products). 
(iii) Poverty Headcount: Nogués et al. find that the poverty headcount increases in the short 
run (from 24.6 percent to 27.2 percent), but falls in the medium run (to between 22.5 
and 23.7 percent, depending on the wage-price elasticity).  This is due to the interaction 
of two forces: a negative effect through the higher cost of the consumption basket, and 
a positive effect through higher wages.  In the long run, the wage effect dominates the 
consumption basket effect.  In contrast, Cicowiez et al. find that the poverty headcount 
necessarily increases from 34.21 percent to 36.12 – 36.96 percent.  The authors do not 
use the same baseline. 
(iv) Extreme Poverty Headcount: Nogués et al. find that the extreme poverty headcount 
increases in the short (from 7.3 percent to 9.1 percent), and either remains unchanged 
in the long run (when wage-price elasticity is unitary) or increases (to 7.8 percent, when 
wage-price elasticity is 0.7).  Cicowiez et al. find that the extreme poverty headcount 
necessarily increases from 12.65 percent to 13.56 – 14.39 percent.  The authors do not 
use the same baseline. 
(v) Inequality: Cicowiez et al. find that the Gini coefficient increases slightly for 
household per capita income (from 0.499 to 0.500) and remains unchanged for labor 
income (0.472). 
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(vi) Government Revenue: Nogués et al. find that total government revenue falls by 2.2 
billion pesos.  The fall of 8.6 billion pesos in export tax revenue is mostly compensated 
by increases in revenue from taxes on profits, rural land taxes, and the elimination of 
consumption subsidies on exportable goods.  The impact would be different across 
different levels of the government:  the central government would lose almost 5 billion 
and the provinces would gain about 2.8 billion pesos in revenue. 
 
2.3.4. Effectiveness in Meeting Policy Objectives 
The Argentine government has sought to achieve four main objectives through the taxation of 
agricultural export: (i) collection of government revenue; (ii) income distribution; (iii) domestic 
price control; and (iv) protection of domestic industries.  At different points in time, each of these 
objectives has had a greater or lesser weight. 
The primary goal of export taxes in the nineteenth century and early decades of the 
twentieth century was to raise government revenue.  Export and import taxes financed the bulk of 
government expenditures until more sophisticated forms of taxation were developed.  During 
recurring instances of economic crisis, such as in 1981 and 2002, the collection of much needed 
government revenue was one of the main objectives for the reintroduction of export taxes.  This 
objective has generally been met with success in the short run, especially during periods of high 
international commodity prices.  Nonetheless, lower economic growth rates in the long run imply 
lower tax revenues.  Moreover, due to fluctuations in export volumes and values, governments at 
times have had to raise the level of taxation significantly in order to collect the necessary revenue.  
This can be particularly strenuous when tax proceeds are used to finance recurring budget 
expenditures.  Public spending has continued to climb, funneling cash out for subsidies, 
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infrastructure projects and a 27 percent hike in the minimum wage.  At the same time, government 
revenue was expected to fall due to the slowing economy and a decline in commodity prices.  The 
cut in electricity subsidies in July 2008 was an initial attempt to curb public spending. 
At the outset of major devaluations in 1955, 1967 and 2002, export taxes were seen as a 
tool to fight inflation.  Their effectiveness in meeting this objective has been mixed.  While export 
taxes have kept domestic prices at levels significantly below world prices, they have not prevented 
price increases and inflationary pressures.  Argentina’s galloping annual inflation, which was 
officially reported at 9.1 percent in July 2008, was widely estimated by independent sources to be 
closer to 25 percent.  Export taxes promote the goal of income distribution through their effect on 
lower domestic food prices for the poor.   Nonetheless, they also generate results that contradict 
this goal.  First, since lower food prices generate benefits to all consumers, both rich and poor, it 
has been argued that most benefits have accrued to upper and middle class consumers.  Second, 
while lower food prices generally benefit urban consumers, it can have a negative impact on the 
rural poor, who may derive their income from agriculture or related activities.  Since income levels 
are lower in rural areas, export taxes may further debilitate the situation of the poorest.  There are 
certainly more efficient ways to help the poor and promote income distribution. 
Finally, agricultural export taxes have been used to support the domestic industry.  While 
export taxes have generated enormous income transfers from agriculture and into industry, and 
have helped establish and consolidate certain industrial sectors, this has been done at a very high 
cost.  Long-run growth was significantly penalized by short-run gains of the industrial sector.  
Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech (1989) show that the elimination of agricultural export taxes and 
other price interventions would have had a positive impact on non-agriculture in the long run 
(Figure 2.18). 
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Figure 2.18: Response of nonagricultural output (excluding government) to changes in trade and 
macroeconomic policies, Argentina, 1969-1984 
 
Simulation scenario: Open economy, no export taxes, uniform and constant tariff on imports of 10 percent, no 
quantitative restrictions and exchange controls.  In addition, monetary policy is designed so that the growth of money 
supply in excess of nominal devaluation, foreign inflation, and real growth is stabilized at the average level actually 
observed during the period 1934-1984; sharp increases in public expenditure that are not sustainable in the longer run 
are avoided; fiscal deficit financed by borrowing is adjusted accordingly. 
Source: Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech (1989). 
 
2.4. Indonesia 
2.4.1. Evolution of Agricultural Export Taxation 
Palm oil is both an important export commodity and a primary source for domestic cooking oil in 
Indonesia.  Since the availability of essential food items at affordable prices is a key element in 
the government’s policy of maintaining economic and political stability, the palm oil industry is 
subject to heavy intervention.  The government intervenes through both production investment 
policies and a variety of policy measures to guarantee an adequate domestic supply, including 
export taxes, export restrictions and a domestic allocation price. 
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Prior to 1978, there was no tax or other restriction on the export of palm oil.  During this 
period, palm oil exports were extremely large, ranging from 73 percent to 94 percent of production.  
In 1978, the government imposed export taxes and domestic allocation prices in order to ensure 
the availability of cooking oil at affordable prices.  As a result, palm oil exports dropped 
significantly from 82 percent of production in 1978 to 55 percent in 1979 (Figure 2.19).  
Indonesia’s share of world palm oil exports dropped from an average of 20 percent in 1961-1978 
to 12 percent in 1978 and an all-time low of 5.7 percent in 1984 (Figure 2.20). 
In June 1991, the government lifted all palm oil trade restrictions.  As a result, the domestic 
price of cooking oil and Indonesia’s share of world palm oil exports increased considerably.  
Concerned with the increase in the price of cooking oil, the government imposed export taxes on 
palm oil products in September 1994.  As price pressures eased, the government reduced and 
simplified these taxes in June 1997.  Nonetheless, a monetary crisis and the drastic depreciation of 
the rupiah in late 1997 led the government to impose increasingly strict export restraints, 
culminating in the indefinite ban of crude palm oil (CPO), olein, stearin, and crude palm kernel oil 
(CPKO) exports in early 1998.  In a letter of intent signed to the IMF in 1998, the government 
committed itself to phase out export taxes and remove all other types of export restrictions.  In 
March 1998, it replaced the ban on exports of palm oil products by ad valorem export taxes. 
In 2001, the export tax on CPO was cut from 10 percent to 3 percent, and the tax rates on 
CPO by-products (including olein) were cut from 6-8 percent to 1 percent (WTO, 2005b).  The 
lower export tax rates coincided with a significant growth in international demand for palm oil.  
Indonesian palm oil output and exports significantly expanded after the 1998 ban.  As of 2005, 
approximately 75 percent of total production was exported and Indonesia’s share of world palm 
oil exports had reached 40 percent. 
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Figure 2.19: Exports as a share of total palm oil production, Indonesia, 1961-2005 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.20: Indonesia’s share in world exports of palm oil, 1961-2005 
 
Source: Author.  Based on FAO (2010). 
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More recently, the escalation in international food prices and a renewed concern that 
domestic shortages of cooking oil may fuel inflation have led to increases in the export tax of CPO 
and its derivatives.  In February 2008, the government introduced a new progressive tax regulation 
that was still in force as of July 2008. 
 
2.4.2. Coverage, Structure and Level 
Palm oil products are not the only commodities affected by export taxes in Indonesia.  Prior to the 
1997-1998 crisis, about 80 tariff lines – most of which forestry, mining and metal products – were 
also subject to export taxation.  By April 1998, the list was reduced to 51 tariff lines, 10 of which 
were agricultural tariff lines and covered only two product categories: palm oil and coconuts (and 
their derived products).  Between 1999 and February 2001, the coverage of export taxes was 
further reduced to four product categories (palm oil, rattan, wood, minerals, and sand), of which 
only palm oil is an agricultural product. 
The export tax on palm oil and derived products, as applied between 1994 and 1997, was 
modeled after a Malaysian policy intended to tax windfall profits during boom periods.  “A 
domestic target price was specified in dollars per metric ton, and was treated as a base price for 
the purpose of the export tax calculations.  Only if the FOB price of the product rose above the 
base price was a tax collected in a given month.  The tax rate was then determined by a schedule 
of tax rates that depended on the realized FOB price” (Marks, Larson and Pomeroy, 1998).  There 
were separate domestic target prices and tax schedules for (i) CPO, (ii) refined, bleached and 
deodorized palm oil RBD PO), (iii) crude olein (CRD olein), and (iv) refined, bleached and 
deodorized olein (RBD olein).  
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The first two columns in Table 2.15 show the average ad valorem equivalent of the export 
tax for each of the four product categories in two different periods, September 1994-December 
1995 and January 1996-June 1997. Average taxation levels in the second period were 
approximately half of those in the first period.  Since international prices declined significantly 
after January 1996, so did the level of taxation, which was dependent on prevailing international 
prices.  The average tax on crude palm oil in the first period was lower than the average tax on 
refined products, which is not the case when the goal of the export tax is to creative incentives for 
further domestic processing. 
 
Table 2.15: Average ad valorem equivalent of export taxes on palm oil products, Indonesia, 
September 1994-December 1995, January 1996-June 1997 and July 1997 
 
Product 
September 1994-
December 1995 
January 1996-
June 1997 
July 1997 
Crude palm oil 11.4% 6.4% 5% 
RBD palm oil 12.1% 6.3% 4% 
Crude olein 15.1% 7.7% 4% 
RBD olein 14.5% 6.7% 2% 
 
Source: Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998). 
 
In July 1997, reduced price pressures in the world market led the government to simplify 
and reduce export taxes.  New ad valorem rates were set at 5 percent for CPO, 4 percent for RBD 
palm oil and crude olein, and 2 percent for RBD olein, as indicated in the third column of Table 
2.15.  The new tax structured clearly favored additional domestic processing.  Nonetheless, the 
new ad valorem rates had a short life span.  With the arrival of the Asian crisis in late 1997, palm 
oil exports were first subject to quotas in November and December 1997 and then banned in late 
December 1997. 
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In April 1998, the export ban was replaced by ad valorem export taxes on ten products 
(Table 2.16).  “Concerns about smuggling of olein disguised as stearine, palm kernel oil, and even 
crude and refined coconut oil led to the imposition of sizable export taxes on these products as 
well.  The taxes on coconut oil effectively caused major commercial production of crude and 
refined coconut oil to shut down, as it became more profitable to export copra and desiccated 
coconuts than to produce oil” (Marks, Larson and Pomeroy, 1998). 
 
Table 2.16: Export taxes on palm oil and coconut oil products, Indonesia, April 1998 
 
HS Code Product Description Tax Rate 
1511.10 Crude palm oil (CPO) 40% 
1511.90 Refined bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD PO) 35% 
1513.11 Crude coconut oil (CCO) 20% 
1513.19 Refined bleached deodorized coconut oil (RBD CO) 15% 
1513.21 Crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) 35% 
1513.29 Refined bleached deodorized palm kernel oil (RBD PKO) 30% 
3823.11 Crude stearin (CRD stearin) 35% 
3823.11 Refined bleached deodorized stearin (RBD stearin) 30% 
3823.12 Crude olein (CRD olein) 40% 
3823.12 Refined bleached deodorized oelin (RBD olein) 35% 
 
Source: WTO (1998). 
 
Export taxes on palm oil have gone through significant changes since April 1998.  By 2001, 
they had dropped to 3 percent for CPO and 1 percent for RBD olein.  With the most recent 
escalation in world food prices, CPO export taxes have once again been raised.  In September 
2007, the tax rate was raised from 6.5 percent to 7.5 percent.  In November 2007, the tax was again 
raised to 10 percent.  In February 2008, a new progressive rate system was introduced for CPO 
and its derivative products (Table 2.17).  As a result, CPO exports have been taxed at the following 
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rates in 2008: 10 percent in January, February and March; 20 percent in April; 15 percent in May 
and June; 20 percent in July, and 15 percent in August (Bloomberg, 2008; Reuters, 2008). 
 
Table 2.17: Export taxes on palm oil and coconut oil products, Indonesia, April 1998 
 
Product Rotterdam Reference Price Tax Rate 
CPO 
Below US$1,100 per ton 10% 
Between US$1,100 and US$1,200 per ton 15% 
Between US$1,200 and US$1,300 per ton 20% 
Above US$1,300 per ton 25% 
Derivative 
Products 
Below US$1,100 per ton 9% 
Above US$1,100 per ton 13% 
Biofuels 
Below US$1,100 per ton 8% 
Above US$1,100 per ton 11% 
 
Source: Author. 
 
2.4.3. Economic Impacts 
Hasan, Reed and Marchant (2001) use times series analysis to evaluate the dynamic effects 
of export taxes on the performance of the Indonesia palm oil industry.  The vector autoregressive 
results show that exports fell dramatically with the imposition of the tax.  The study also shows 
that the imposition of an export tax has long-lasting, negative effects on the competitiveness of the 
Indonesian palm oil industry.  The variance decomposition reveals that more than 83 percent of 
the variation in the forecast error of the net export shares is explained by its own shock, and 8.6 
percent and 8.4 percent are explained by the export tax and relative export prices, respectively. 
Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998) estimate the economic effects of the palm oil export 
tax applied between 1994 and 1997.  They find that Indonesian export taxes:  
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(i) Reduced the domestic price of palm cooking oil relative to the levels it otherwise 
would have attained, so that there were some consumer benefits;  
(ii) Lowered the profits earned by CPO producers, although by all accounts the sector 
remained highly profitable;  
(iii) Lowered the prices of the primary product for CPO refiners, but these lower prices 
were not passed along to consumers or users of cooking oil and the products into 
which CPO is refined.  However, CPO refiners suffered losses due to the export tax 
on RBD olein.  Overall, export taxes slightly lowered the profits earned by CPO 
refiners; 
(iv) Lowered government net revenues, through their effects on state-owned oil palm 
estates; 
(v) Harmed the coconut cooking oil industry within Indonesia, since increased 
competition from low-priced palm cooking oil put downward pressure on coconut 
oil prices; 
(vi) Transferred income from Sumatra and Kalimantan (where most oil palm plantations 
are located) to Java (where most consumers are located); 
(vii) Achieved only modest price stabilization, especially considering the cost of reduced 
economic efficiency.  While consumers did not benefit from the tax on CPO, they 
did benefit from the tax on RBD olein. 
Table 2.18 summarizes the estimated effects of export taxes on different sectors of society 
for calendar year 1995, as reported by Marks et al. (1998).  The authors also examine the efficiency 
effects and aspects of the export taxation. 
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Table 2.18: Impact of palm oil export taxes on different sectors of society, Indonesia, 1995 
 
 
Impact 
(US$ million) 
Non-state-owned oil palm estates -195.2 
Loss to smallholder oil palm estates due to lower CPO prices -68.2 
Loss to private oil palm estates due to lower CPO prices -127.0 
  
Government -18.1 
Tax revenues from palm oil and olein export taxes 91.8 
Crude and RBD palm oil 75.9 
Crude and RBD olein 15.9 
Loss to state-owned oil palm estates due to lower CPO prices -109.9 
  
Palm oil refiners -2.5 
Gain to palm oil refiners due to lower CPO prices 238.3 
Loss to palm oil refiners due to lower RBD olein prices -240.8 
  
Palm oil and olein importers -4.6 
Loss to CPO importers 0.0 
Loss to RBD olein importers -4.6 
  
Palm cooking oil consumers and distributors 220.5 
Gain to distributors 102.0 
Gain to final consumers 118.5 
 
Source: Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998). 
 
2.4.4. Effectiveness in Achieving Policy Objectives 
The key objectives of Indonesia’s export taxes on palm oil products were to stabilize domestic 
prices of cooking oil and control inflation.  The price of palm cooking oil in Indonesia increased 
significantly after the elimination of foreign trade restrictions in 1991.  Between August 1993 and 
August 1994, the retail price increased 47.5 percent, compared with an inflation rate of 8.5 percent 
in the same period.  This motivated the government to reinstitute export taxes in 1994.  Figure 2.21 
shows that prices eased from 1995 through mid-1997, which seems to suggest that export taxes 
delivered on the goal of stabilizing prices.  However, Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998) argue 
that ex-factory prices came down in 1995-1996 largely due of lower world prices.  Thus, export 
taxes can take only part of the credit for the stabilization of palm oil prices in Indonesia. 
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Figure 2.21: Prices of palm cooking oil in the Jakarta area, Rupiah per kg, 1985-1997 
 
Source: Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998). 
 
Cooking oil constitutes only 1.4 percent of the basket of goods in the Indonesian consumer 
price index (CPI).  About 77 percent of the local cooking oil market is supplied by palm cooking 
oil, 17 percent by coconut oil, and 6 percent by palm kernel oil, soybean oil, peanut oil and small 
amounts of other imported vegetable oils.  For the 20 percent poorest rural households, cooking 
oil represents 4 percent of total expenditures.  Therefore, palm oil has a weight of only 1.1 percent 
on the Indonesian CPI, and of 3.1 percent on the expenditures of Indonesia’s poorest social stratum.  
Thus, the stabilization of palm oil prices can have at best a moderate impact on controlling 
inflation.  Nonetheless, the government considers cooking oil as one of nine essential commodities.  
Popular riots in early 1998 in response to increases in prices and shortages of cooking oil and other 
commodities reflected its political sensitivity. 
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2.5. Thailand 
Thailand constitutes an interesting example of a country that heavily taxed agricultural exports in 
its early development stage and later reduced the level of taxation as it achieved successful 
industrialization (Choeun et al., 2006).  While agricultural export taxes were a central element in 
Thailand’s trade, fiscal and development policies in 1950-1985, they are nearly non-existent today.  
Agricultural export taxes affected 60 percent of total merchandise exports in 1951; 15 percent in 
1980; and less than 0.1 percent in 2006.  In addition, they accounted for close to 20 percent of 
central government revenue in the 1950s; 6 percent in 1980; and less than 0.1 percent in 2006.  
This section focuses on Thailand’s experience with the taxation of exports of rice, the country’s 
staple food and most important crop, as well as its principal export item until the 1980s. 
 
2.5.1. Evolution of Agricultural Export Taxation 
In its modern form, the taxation of rice exports began in period immediately after World War II.  
In response to an Allied demand that Thailand pay its war indemnity in rice, the Thai government 
instituted a rice export monopoly (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng, 1991).  After the original reason 
for its establishment no longer applied, the government monopoly over rice exports was retained 
primarily for the convenience in revenue collection.  The Ministry of Commerce “bought” milled 
rice from the mills at a price substantially below the international market price and then “sold” it 
to shippers at higher rates.  “All this was merely a paper transaction, since the shippers got their 
rice directly from the mills and were often themselves the millers” (Ayal, 1965).  Between 1947 
and 1954, the government also administered a multiple exchange rate system under which all 
foreign-exchange proceeds from rice exports had to be surrendered to the Bank of Thailand at 
some two-thirds of the market rate. 
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In 1954, the government eliminated the multiple exchange rate system and replaced the 
rice export monopoly by a system of private exports subject to taxes, a reserve requirement and 
occasional quotas.  Rice exporters had to pay both a fixed ad valorem export duty and a variable 
specific export tax – the rice premium.  The government’s primary consideration in changing the 
premium level was to ensure an adequate supply of rice for the domestic market at reasonable 
prices, in addition to its permanent feature as a source of revenue.  The important place of rice in 
household budgets implied that the taxation of rice exports had a significant impact on the cost of 
living (Roy, 1981).  In addition to the two explicit export taxes, an implicit export tax operated 
through a compulsory rice reserve scheme.  Exporters were required to sell to the government a 
proportion of their rice (fixed in relation to the amount of rice exported) at below market prices.  
The government later sold this rice to urban consumers at subsidized prices.  This policy further 
depressed farmgate prices for paddy and was similar to an ad valorem export tax (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha, 1996).  In addition, the government periodically assigned export quotas to individual 
rice exporters. 
A perceived lack of promising alternatives to foreign trade taxes reinforced the 
government’s reliance on rice export taxes as a revenue source in the 1950s and 1960s.  “Widely 
dispersed distribution and production units, lack of honest administration, and a general 
unwillingness on the part of the population toward voluntary compliance to tax law made direct 
taxation on income, output, sales, or business profits extremely difficult” (Bertrand 1969). The 
taxation of rice exports was a more a politically expedient way for governments to exercise 
effective taxation authority.  This was especially true of the rice premium, since its tax burden on 
the rural community was hidden. 
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A remarkable change in the direction of rice pricing policy occurred in the 1970s.  The 
increasing rural-urban income disparity that resulted from successful industrialization and the 
mounting dissatisfaction with the military regime induced popular riots that brought down the 
authoritarian government in 1973.  “The increase in farmers’ education level under improved 
communication and transportation infrastructure made them more sensitive to their relative income 
with urban dwellers. Correspondingly, the number of protests and demonstrations by farmers 
began to rise in this period” (Choeun, 2006).  To appease agricultural producers, the new 
representative government placed all revenues from the rice premium in a fund to support farmers 
and instituted a rice price support program.  Nonetheless, such measures proved insufficient to 
counteract the heavy burden of export taxation.   
As Thailand’s per capita income rose further, farmers’ welfare gained greater political 
weight in the government decisions.  Meanwhile, the importance of rice in urban household 
expenditure declined and the reliance of the government budget on rice export tax revenue waned 
owing to large increases in tax revenue form commerce and industry.  Under the pressure of the 
continued downfall of world rice prices in the 1980s, the government suspended the rice premium 
in 1986 (Choeun et al., 2006).  This policy reform took place with little reaction from employers 
or consumers.  “For the rice tax – which for decades was a highly contentious issue – to have been 
removed with such apparent ease suggests that its role had become an insignificant one for those 
with political influence or for those who were in a position to protest” (Dixon, 1999). 
In the early l990s and prior to the 1997 economic crisis, proposals were made for the 
subsidization of rice exports as an instrument of income redistribution toward poor rice farmers, 
but the possible adverse effects on Thailand’s terms of trade remained controversial (Warr, 2001).  
Pressures for the reintroduction of an export tax reemerged in the context of the 1997 economic 
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crisis.  Large exchange rate depreciation and severe fiscal problems provoked an urgent search for 
new sources of government revenue and for ways of shielding vulnerable social groups from 
potential large consumer price increases for rice.  After vigorous debates in which distributional 
issues dominated, the proposed tax was shelved (Warr, 2001).  More recently, Thailand has been 
the only major Asian rice exporter not to tax or restrict exports due to the substantial rise in 
international commodity prices in 2007-2008. 
 
2.5.2. Coverage, Structure and Level 
The taxation of rice exports has been the single most important government intervention in 
Thailand’s agricultural sector since World War II.  Nonetheless, other agricultural products have 
at times been subject to export taxation, including important crops such as maize and rubber.31 
The taxation of rice exports was accomplished through the application of four separate 
instruments: (i) the rice premium; (ii) the ad valorem export duty; (iii) the rice reserve requirement; 
and (iv) export quotas.  Their combined taxation burden was equivalent to an average ad valorem 
tax of 40 percent of the export price in 1959-1972, 56 percent in 1973-1974, and 22 percent in 
1975-1985 (Figure 2.22).32  If only the two explicit export taxes (the premium and the ad valorem 
export duty) are considered, the taxation burden was equivalent to an average ad valorem tax of 
35 percent in 1959-1972, 31 percent in 1973-1974, and 13 percent in 1975-1985. 
 
                                               
31 The export tax on maize was instituted with the goal of raising revenue for the central government.  Export quotas were also 
occasionally applied to maize.  However, Thailand’s loss of export market share to new low-cost producers such as China and 
Vietnam led the government to abolish the corn export tax in 1982 (Dixon, 1999).  Exports of rubber were subject to an export tax 
for general revenue purposes and a lower rubber cess that was to finance new rubber seedlings and rubber replanting.  The rubber 
export duty was suspended in 1987 (Aziz, 1990); the rubber cess was still applied in 2008.  
32 Choeun et al. (2006) report similar average rice export taxation rates: 45 percent for 1950-1970 and 24 percent for 1971-1985.  
Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) cite figures reported by Pinthong (1984), which are lower for the earlier period and higher for the 
mid and later periods: 31 percent in 1970, 67 percent in 1973-1974, and 13 percent in 1984. 
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Figure 2.22: Ad valorem equivalent of four government measures on rice exports, Thailand, 
1959-1986 
 
Source: Marks, Larson and Pomeroy (1998). 
 
The premium accounted for the bulk of the export taxation of rice, especially before 1973.  
It accounted on average for 80 percent of total export taxation in 1959-1972 and 40 percent in 
1973-1985.  The rate of the rice premium depended on the world price.  When the price was high, 
the premium was raised to discourage exports and ensure domestic supply and reasonable prices.  
The Thai government raised the premium rates for rice in the period from 1973 to 1974, when 
world rice prices rose rapidly due to widespread food shortages (Yukawa, 1988).  As the world 
price declined steadily after 1981, the premium rate was gradually reduced and finally eliminated 
in 1986 (Aziz, 1990).   
The rate of the ad valorem export duty was fixed at 5 percent of the FOB value.  Changes 
in the official rate were difficult to come across because they had to be approved by Parliament.  
However, by manipulating the standard price used in the calculation of the tax, the Customs 
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Department was able to vary this tax rate slightly with the world price.  The tax rate was lowered 
to 2.5 percent in 1985.  The objective of the fixed export duty was to generate government revenue.  
Hence, its proceeds accrued to the Ministry of Finance. 
Although the rice reserve requirement system was established in 1962, it only became 
widely used after 1972.  It accounted on average for 0.6 percent of total export taxation in 1962-
1972 and 27 percent in 1973-1982.  In addition to depressing domestic rice prices, the reserve 
requirement allowed the Ministry of Commerce to use the rice obtained at below-market prices to 
launch a cheap rice program.  Amid falling world food prices, the compulsory rise reserve scheme 
was ended in 1982 (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). 
Export quotas were used throughout most of the 1959-1985 period, but were relatively 
more important in 1972-1974 and 1978.  The primary objective behind the imposition of 
quantitative controls “appears to have been the Commerce Ministry’s wish to limit competition 
among exporters as a strategy for cartelizing the trade and thus for extracting additional monopoly 
profits from foreign buyers – profits that would accrue mostly to exporters” (Siamwalla and 
Setboonsarng, 1991). 
The rice premium was the intervention of choice in the early years because the Ministry of 
Commerce had exclusive control over its rates and proceeds.  Starting in 1974, changes in the 
premium had to be approved by the cabinet and all revenue from the premium was to accrue to the 
farmers’ fund under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture.  As a result, the Ministry of 
Commerce began to prefer the rice reserve requirement over the premium as an instrument of 
intervention” (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng, 1991).   
The adverse impact of export taxation on rice producers was reinforced by overall trade 
policies that protected the industrial sector and macroeconomic policies that resulted in the 
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overvaluation of the domestic currency.  Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1991) computed average 
direct nominal protection rates (NPRD) of -0.19 to -0.40 in 1962-84 and total nominal protection 
rates (NPRT) of -0.27 to -0.47 in the same period (Table 2.19).  The NPR values computed by 
Choeun et al. (2006) for the period 1950-2002 show that after direct disincentives were phased out 
in the mid-1980s, indirect disincentives – primarily through import protection in manufacturing – 
have continued to disfavor rice production, albeit at a much lower rate of approximately 10 percent 
in 1990-2002 (Figure 2.23). 
 
Table 2.19: Direct Nominal Protection Rate (NPRD) and  Total Nominal Protection Rate 
(NPRT), Rice, Thailand, 1962-1984  
 
Period NPRD NPRT (S) NPRT (U) 
1962-1972 -0.29 -0.37 -0.39 
1973-1975 -0.40 -0.45 -0.47 
1976-1984 -0.19 -0.27 -0.33 
 
Notes:  (S): Assumes current account deficit is sustainable. (U): Assumes current account deficit is unsustainable. 
Source:  Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1991). 
 
 
Figure 2.23: Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), Rice, Thailand, 1950-2002 
 
Source: Choeun et al. (2006). 
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As of 2007, Thailand applied export taxes to only one agricultural product – cattle hides – 
and one non-agricultural product category – wood, sawn wood and articles made of wood.  Export 
taxes accounted for 0.3 percent of central government revenue in 2005-2006 (WTO, 2008b), 
almost all of which was collected from the exportation of wood and wood products.  Thailand 
exports only small amounts of cattle hides and is in fact a net importer of this product.  Over 60 
percent of the raw hides consumed by the domestic tanning industry are currently imported (Thai 
Tanning Industry Association, 2008).  As a result, agricultural export taxes have virtually no 
impact on government revenue. 
In addition to cattle hides and wood and wood articles, three agricultural products – rice, 
rubber and silk – and two non-agricultural products – certain fish and metal scrap  – continue to 
be subject to statutory export taxes (Table 2.20).  Although applied rates for these products are 
currently set at zero, in principle they could be raised up to statutory levels without legislative 
approval.  This generates uncertainty in Thailand’s trade regime, as relatively high export taxes on 
key export commodities, such as rice, may be imposed at any moment (WTO, 2008b).  
 
Table 2.20: Statutory and applied export tax rates, Thailand, 2007 
 
Sector Commodity Statutory Rate Applied Rate 
Agriculture 
Raw hides Baht 5 per kg Baht 5 per kg 
Parings, waste and dust Baht 4 per kg Baht 0.4 per kg 
Rice 10% 0% 
Rubber 40% 0% 
Raw silk and silk yarn Baht 100 per kg 0% 
Non-Agriculture 
Wood and sawn wood 40% 0% to 40% 
Articles of wood 10% to 20% 10% to 20% 
Certain fish 75% 0% 
Metal scrap 50% 0% 
 
Source: Author.  Based on WTO (2008b). 
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2.5.3. Economic Impacts 
Warr (2001) uses an empirically based, applied general equilibrium model to analyze the economic 
effects of a rice export tax in Thailand.  He draws upon available statistical estimates of the 
elasticity of international demand for Thailand’s rice exports and approximates the solution to 
nonlinear problems using linearized general equilibrium models.  The disaggregated approach of 
the study makes it possible to: (i) conduct the welfare analysis of a particular intervention in the 
explicit “second-best” context in which market distortions elsewhere in the economy remain in 
place; and (ii) examine in detail its income distributional implications. 
Warr simulates the welfare outcomes from a rice export tax or subsidy at different export 
demand elasticity for rice, where welfare is measured by aggregate real consumption.  When the 
export demand elasticity for rice is -2.5, the optimal tax rate is 42 percent and generates a moderate 
welfare gain of 0.63 percent.  This implies that aggregate real consumption, computed on the 
assumption that a Baht in the hands of each household has equal social value, would rise slightly.  
However, to have a more complete understanding of the economic effects of an export tax, it is 
important to look at its distributional implications. 
An export tax affects the distribution of income across households through three 
mechanisms: (i) effects on household gross incomes operating through factor returns; (ii) effects 
on household budgets operating through consumer good prices; and (iii) effects on household 
disposable incomes operating through changes in taxes.  Warr finds that the slight gain in aggregate 
welfare created by the export tax rate of 42 percent is concentrated in the urban areas, especially 
among the richest households, and occurs at the expense of the rural and urban poor, particularly 
the former.  Simulated macroeconomic and distributional effects are summarized in column I of 
Table 2.21.
Table 2.21: Simulated economic and distributional effects of an export tax on rice, percentage changes, Thailand 
 
Simulation I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Macroeconomic Results
Gross domestic product
Nominal (local currency) -0.62 -2.07 -0.30 -1.17 -1.25 -0.28 -0.59 -4.78
Real -0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.37 -0.54 0.11 0.04 -1.88
Consumer price index -1.47 -2.30 -1.34 -1.75 -1.66 -1.24 -1.30 -3.43
GDP deflator -0.54 -2.12 -0.28 -0.79 -0.72 -0.39 -0.63 -2.42
Wage (nominal)
Skilled 3.83 5.27 6.59 4.47 4.47 3.38 -1.79 5.47
Unskilled -9.37 -8.06 -7.14 -11.07 -11.38 -9.14 -1.86 -17.11
Returns to variable captial (nominal)
Nonagriculture 0.14 1.51 2.73 0.04 -0.07 -0.72 -0.23 -0.95
Agriculture -10.11 -10.18 -9.68 -11.72 -11.83 -0.72 -9.45 -16.79
Aggregate Real Consumption 0.63 0.28 0.33 0.87 0.70 0.74 0.95 -2.39
Distributional Effects
Household welfare effects
Rural  RQ1 (poorest quintile) -3.82 -2.55 -2.40 -4.56 -4.54 -2.57 -1.15 -6.45
Rural  RQ2 -4.10 -2.66 -2.59 -4.82 -4.50 -2.99 -1.78 -6.81
Rural  RQ3 -3.49 -1.95 -1.83 -4.11 -3.99 -2.27 -1.49 -5.83
Rural  RQ4 -1.81 -0.89 -0.86 -2.37 -2.26 -0.97 -0.73 -4.25
Rural  RQ5 (richest quintile) 0.40 0.74 0.58 -0.04 0.07 0.80 -0.06 -2.56
Urban  UQ1 (poorest quintile) -0.95 0.60 0.97 -1.28 -1.52 -1.08 0.72 -2.28
Urban  UQ2 0.94 2.17 2.44 0.79 0.51 0.60 1.20 -0.06
Urban  UQ3 2.58 3.23 3.44 2.51 2.11 2.16 1.88 1.45
Urban  UQ4 4.23 3.76 3.94 4.08 3.41 3.73 3.05 2.02
Urban  UQ5 (richest quintile) 7.00 3.95 4.01 6.47 5.26 6.47 5.51 1.69
 
Simulation I: Export demand elasticity is -2.5; export tax of 42 percent; tax adjustment mechanism operates through income taxes; factor demand elasticities based 
on econometric estimation; immobility of sector mobile capital between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors; elasticities of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labor based on empirical estimates using industrial data. 
Simulation II: As in Simulation I, except that the tax adjustment mechanism operates through import tariffs. 
Simulation III: As in Simulation I, except that the tax adjustment mechanism operates through value-added taxes. 
Simulation IV: As in Simulation I, except that factor demand in rice sector is CES with elasticity of substitution of 0.5. 
Simulation V: As in Simulation I, except that factor demand in rice sector is CES with elasticity of substitution of 1.0. 
Simulation VI:  As in Simulation I, except that sector mobile capital is mobile economy-wide. 
Simulation VII:  As in Simulation I, except that skilled and unskilled labor are close substitutes in production. 
Simulation VIII: As in Simulation I, except that export demand elasticity is -5. 
Source: Warr (2001). 
The return to factors intensively employed in rice production – land and unskilled labor – 
decline as the price of rice falls.  In rural Thailand, even the poorest income quintile group derives 
a significant proportion of its total income from the ownership of land.  This partly explains the 
result that rural households of all income quintiles are more negatively affected by a rice export 
tax than urban households.  Both the rural and urban poor suffer from the reduction in the return 
to unskilled labor, while the urban rich gain from the rise in the returns to other mobile factors, 
including skilled labor and mobile forms of capital.  Changes in good prices reduce the decline in 
real incomes for all rural households and for the poorest urban quintile while still leaving them net 
losers. Finally, increased revenue collection from a rice export tax allows for reduced income tax 
rates, which benefit primarily the richest households and reinforce the regressive distributional 
effect of the export tax on rice.  This reflects the assumption that as a government revenues rise, 
personal income tax rates adjust downward to balance the government’s budget. 
Warr’s results concur with Ayal’s (1965) findings more than thirty years earlier: “At first 
blush one would expect that the lower rice prices, by improving the urban sector’s term of trade, 
would bring about higher real wages to urban employees. However, although true in principle, this 
aspect has been of little significance in practice.  […]  [S]alary earners, especially in the lower 
echelons, have been even worse off, because the rise in pay has lagged behind the rise in prices.  
The net result is that although, ceteris paribus, the employees would be better off with cheap rice, 
in fact their salaries are neither completely independent of rice prices nor have they risen with 
other prices. […] Non-rice businessmen gain from the tax both as consumers and as employers. 
[…] The tax decreased their labor costs and increased their investible surplus.” 
Warr examines the sensitivity of the distributional results to: (i) fiscal adjustments; (ii) 
factor demand elasticities; (iii) factor mobility assumptions; and (iv) factor aggregation 
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assumptions.  He finds that while these assumptions do influence the results, the distributional 
effects of a rice export tax itself are powerful enough to dominate the distributional effects of 
alternative assumptions.  These results are summarized in columns II through VII in Table 2.21.  
By and large, the qualitative pattern of the distributional results remains unchanged. 
Warr also explores the implications of errors in estimating the optimal tax rate.  Given 
uncertainty about the true value of the export demand elasticity, errors are necessarily be made in 
any attempt to set an optimal tax.  The relationship between the tax rate and its welfare 
consequence is strongly asymmetric: as the optimal tax rate is exceeded, the welfare gain quickly 
turns into a large loss.  Warr assumes an export demand elasticity for rice of -2.5 for his base 
simulations, seemingly the largest absolute value broadly consistent with the limited econometric 
evidence available.  He also examines what would happen if the true elasticity was -5, but the 
export tax rate was set at 42 percent on the erroneous assumption that the elasticity was -2.5.  His 
findings are summarized in column VIII in Table 2.21.  There would be a large aggregate welfare 
loss 2.39 percent.  The distributional effects would be even more severe, with greater losses for 
the entire rural population as well as the urban poor, and little gains for the urban rich.  Because 
the cost of setting the rate too high greatly outweighs the loss from setting correspondingly too 
low, Warr concludes that there is a strong case for setting the rate of any export tax conservatively. 
Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1991) estimate the effects of direct and total government 
intervention on rice output in 1961-1984.  Direct intervention includes the four key trade policy 
instruments discussed in Subsection 2.5.2 (rice premium, ad valorem export duty, rice reserve 
requirement and export quotas); total intervention includes direct intervention as well as 
macroeconomic policies and general trade policies – primarily the protection of the manufacturing 
sector.  Short-run and cumulative effects are summarized in Table 2.22.  Average short-run and 
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cumulative output effects of direct intervention in 1961-1972 were -11.5 percent and -19 percent, 
respectively; for 1973-1984, they were -7 percent and -13 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 2.22: Effect of price intervention on rice output, Thailand, 1961-1984 
 
Year 
Short-run Effect Cumulative Effect 
Direct Total Direct Total 
1961 -14.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1962 -14.4% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1963 -11.7% -15.5% n.a. n.a. 
1964 -12.9% -17.0% n.a. n.a. 
1965 -15.0% -17.5% -23.4% n.a. 
1966 -14.1% -16.8% -24.0% n.a. 
1967 -9.6% -13.1% -18.4% -23.2% 
1968 -10.4% -13.4% -20.1% -25.4% 
1969 -12.8% -17.1% -20.6% -26.4% 
1970 -8.6% -14.1% -17.0% -23.9% 
1971 -6.4% -12.3% -14.1% -21.4% 
1972 -8.0% -13.4% -14.1% -22.3% 
1973 -8.1% -11.5% -15.2% -23.2% 
1974 -12.6% -14.9% -17.7% -23.7% 
1975 -14.9% -15.9% -22.3% -26.1% 
1976 -8.8% -12.5% -18.2% -22.3% 
1977 -3.9% -7.4% -13.0% -17.5% 
1978 -5.3% -10.3% -12.0% -17.6% 
1979 -7.7% -11.9% -11.9% -17.1% 
1980 -5.3% -10.2% -11.1% -17.0% 
1981 -6.1% -9.9% -10.6% -16.5% 
1982 -6.0% -10.2% -10.8% -17.1% 
1983 -2.5% -5.8% -8.1% -14.2% 
1984 -1.7% -6.9% -5.1% -11.9% 
1961-1972 -11.5% -15.0% -18.9% -23.8% 
1973-1984 -6.9% -10.6% -13.0% -18.7% 
 
Notes: Simple distributed-lag form is assumed for the long run.  Elasticities and distributed-lag coefficients obtained 
from econometric estimates in the literature.  Rice output elasticity assumed to decline linearly between 1960 
and 1980 to reflect the exhaustion of surplus land. 
Source: Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1991). 
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Bertrand (1969) argues that the two main effects of the rice export tax in the agricultural 
sector were: (i) the obstruction of the modernization of a large part of Thai agriculture, and (ii) the 
distortion of the rate of return on production of rice relative to other agricultural products.  He sees 
Thailand’s poor performance in fertilizer use as one of the best indicators of how export taxation 
obstructed the modernization of the sector: in 1962-1963, per capita fertilizer use in the Southeast 
Asian country corresponded to only 6 percent and 7 percent of the comparable levels in Taiwan 
and South Korea.  Bond et al. (1966) showed that the application of fertilizer was uneconomical 
under the price structure prevailing in Thailand in the 1960s.  Behrman (1968) found that the 
benefits/costs factors were often against the application of improved inputs in Thailand, and that 
most of the chemical inputs applied in the country were not for the rice crop, but mainly for 
vegetable and tobacco crops and mulberry bushes.  According to Lam (1977), the cost of fertilizers 
relative to the farm price of paddy was higher in Thailand than in all other Asian countries except 
Burma (present-day Myanmar).  Consequently, usage of major chemical fertilizers such as 
nitrogen, phosphates and potash per unit area in Thailand in the 1970s was the lowest in Asia, 
except again for Burma. 
In a study of agricultural productivity growth in eighteen countries across South and East 
Asia, Suhariyanto (2001) found that Thailand had the second worst performance in terms of total 
factor productivity (TFP) between 1965 and 1996.  TFP declined at an annual rate of 1 percent in 
Thailand during this period, while it increased at annual rates of 3.55 percent in Malaysia, 1.57 
percent in the Philippines and 0.17 percent in Indonesia (Table 2.23).  Thailand was the only 
middle-income country in Asia to experience negative growth in agricultural TFP in 1965-1996.  
The country also had the region’s second worst performance in terms of technical efficiency 
change (TEC) and the third worst in terms of technical change (TC).  Technical efficiency in 
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Thailand’s agricultural sector fell at the remarkable rate of 1.33 percent per year for more than 
three decades.  This was coupled with very low growth in technical progress.  Innovation in 
Thailand’s agricultural sector grew at a rate that was approximately one-half of Indonesia’s, one-
fourth of the Philippines’ and one-tenth of Malaysia’s.  Myanmar and Nepal were the only two 
countries in South and East Asia to experience lower rates of technological progress in the 
agricultural sector than Thailand between 1965 and 1996.  Since Suhariyanto’s analysis covers a 
time period that spans beyond the 1986 elimination of Thailand’s rice export taxes, his figures 
must be interpreted with caution. 
 
Table 2.23: Percentage annual growth rates of agricultural productivity, South and East Asia, 
1965-1996 
 
Country 
 Technical 
Efficiency Change 
(TEC)  
 Technical 
Change 
(TC) 
 Total Factor 
Productivity 
(TFP) 
Malaysia 0.00 3.55 3.55 
South Korea 0.00 3.30 3.30 
Japan 0.00 2.70 2.70 
Laos -0.26 2.02 1.76 
Philippines 0.07 1.26 1.33 
Sri Lanka -0.62 1.29 0.67 
Mongolia -0.31 0.82 0.51 
China -0.41 0.88 0.47 
North Korea -0.70 0.40 0.30 
Indonesia -0.45 0.63 0.18 
Myanmar -0.09 0.07 -0.02 
Vietnam -0.71 0.54 -0.17 
Bangladesh -0.77 0.35 -0.42 
Pakistan -1.29 0.82 -0.47 
India -1.05 0.55 -0.50 
Nepal -0.89 0.20 -0.69 
Thailand -1.33 0.33 -1.00 
Cambodia -3.02 1.19 -1.83 
 
Source: Suhariyanto (2001). 
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2.5.4. Effectiveness in Achieving Policy Objectives 
The two key declared policy objectives of Thailand’s rice export taxes in the second half of the 
twentieth century were the collection of government revenue and the control of domestic prices.  
In addition, two undeclared policy goals also guided Thai government interventions in the rice 
export market in this period.  First, Thailand attempted to impose optimal export taxes to take 
advantage of its assumed monopoly power in the world rice market, with the goal of improving its 
terms of trade and maximizing aggregate welfare gains at the cost of foreign consumers and 
domestic rice farmers (Choeun et al., 2006; World Bank, 1986).  Second, export taxes were used 
to “modernize” the economy by encouraging capital, labor and entrepreneurs to move away from 
rice production and into manufacturing and other economic activities (Ayal, 1965, Bertrand, 
1969). 
The collection of government revenue was the dominant policy objective in the period 
immediately following the Second World War.  The rice export monopoly that was established to 
pay Thailand’s war indemnities and the successive taxes on exports proved to be a convenient 
source of government revenue.  Given the seeming absence of alternative forms of taxation at the 
time, rice export taxes were a rather successful measure.  In the 1950s, they accounted for over 20 
percent of central government revenue.  However, as Thailand achieved progressively higher 
levels of development, other effective revenue sources became available and the government 
turned less dependent on rice export taxes.  Concurrently, the suppression of domestic prices 
became the central goal of export taxes.  In the 1960s, rice was Thailand’s key staple food 
constituting about 36 percent of total food expenditure.  As the Shultzian food problem was 
dominant, the Thai government redistributed income from rice producers to consumers.  As seen 
in Subsection 2.5.3, rice export taxes and the resulting low domestic rice prices were an inefficient 
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way to support poor urban consumers.  Ultimately, the taxes had an adverse effect on the welfare 
of the most vulnerable urban groups, as their wages were linked to the price of rice. 
On the other hand, the taxes did contribute to the development of the manufacturing sector.  
Since rice was a wage good, low prices meant that industrialists benefited from the low wages paid 
to their employees.  Furthermore, low rice prices encouraged the abandonment of rice cultivation 
and the migration to urban areas, ensuring an ever-increasing supply of labor to the incipient 
manufacturing sector.  Together with other, largely independent, developments, Thailand’s rice 
export tax caused a reduction in the number of middlemen and discouraged new investments in 
the rice sector:  “It freed people with business acumen – notably Sino-Thai middlemen – for other 
economic activities.  It also freed capital, which potentially could be invested in the rice sector, for 
other purposes.  Both could be viewed as favorable for development in that they encourage the 
expansion of the non-rice urban sector” (Ayal, 1965).  Whether or not this was an appropriate goal 
is outside the scope of the current study, but Thailand did succeed in developing a diverse industrial 
sector and increasing per capita income levels.  The share of manufacturing in total GDP rose from 
17.7 percent in 1951 to 41.5 percent in 1995, and per capita income expanded from US$355 to 
US$2,000 in the same period (measured in 1998 US$). 
Finally, while several studies have estimated that Thailand’s rice export taxes did increase 
the world price of rice, it is unclear whether the country actually maximized aggregate national 
welfare.  Given the uncertainty about the true level of the elasticity of demand for Thai rice exports, 
it is more likely that the government did not set the export tax rate at the optimal level.  This is 
especially true considering the changing levels of taxation.  Assuming an elasticity of -4, as in 
Choeun et al. (2006), the average applied export tax was well above the corresponding optimum 
level (25 percent) in 1950-1970, but converged to it in 1971-1985.  Assuming an elasticity of -2.5, 
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as in Warr (2001), conflicting results are reached: applied export tax rates were closer to the 
corresponding optimal level (40 percent) in 1950-1970, and substantially below it in 1971-1985.  
Since welfare losses from incorrectly estimating the optimal tax rate are significant, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Thailand’s rice export taxes failed to maximize national aggregate welfare. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The assessment of the global experience with agricultural export taxes provides insightful lessons 
on both the factors that motivate the adoption of such measures and their impacts on the 
agricultural sector and the economy at large.  This is especially relevant in the context of the recent 
surge in world commodity prices, which has led a myriad of countries to adopt or raise export 
taxes on agricultural products.  As this study shows, export taxes have generally been ineffective 
in delivering their intended policy goals and have adversely affected economic incentives, output, 
income distribution and growth prospects.  The main findings are summarized below. 
Export taxes are only one of a number of government measures that effectively burden 
agricultural exports.  Other instruments of agricultural export taxation include export quotas, 
export bans, export licensing requirements and commodity marketing boards.  Export taxes are 
generally preferred to quotas or bans on both analytical and practical grounds (Devarajan et al., 
1996).  Moreover, multilateral trade rules are permissive regarding export taxes and restrictive 
regarding export bans and quotas.33 
                                               
33 According to article XI of the GATT, “no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges […] 
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on […] the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.”  Exceptions to this general rule apply to limited cases, 
including export restrictions (i) that are applied to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other essential products, 
(ii) that are necessary protect human, animal or plant life or health; (iii) that are necessary to ensure essential quantities 
of materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when domestic price of such materials is held below the 
world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; or (iv) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under certain 
intergovernmental commodity agreements. 
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In addition to export taxes and other direct restrictions exports, agriculture is indirectly 
taxed by exchange rate overvaluation and tariff protection of non-agriculture.  At times, the 
negative economic impact of indirect taxation has been substantially greater than that of explicit 
export taxes, as was the case for grains and beef in Argentina in 1961-1985 (Sturzenegger, 1991), 
wheat and beef in Chile in 1960-1974 (Valdés et al., 1991), rice and cotton in Egypt in 1960-1972 
(Dethier, 1991), copra in the Philippines in 1960-1982 (Bautista, 1996), tea, rubber and coconut in 
Sri Lanka in 1953-1985 (Bhalla, 1991), and wheat, barley tobacco, cotton and hazelnuts in Turkey 
in 1961-1983 (Olgun, 1991).  Furthermore, in some countries, explicit export taxes have tended to 
compensate for variations in the real exchange rate: they are higher when the prevailing real rate 
of exchange or the international prices high.  This was the case of Argentina in 1960-1991, 2002 
and 2007-2008. 
As of 2008, at least sixty countries impose explicit export taxes on agricultural products.  
With the exception of Canada and Iceland, they are all developing countries.34  Product coverage 
ranges from a single product (such as cocoa in Ghana) to all agricultural products (as in Argentina).  
The relative importance of covered products also varies significantly across countries.  In one 
extreme are countries where covered products represent a large share of total export value (such 
as Argentina and Ghana); in the other, countries where the taxed commodities account for a 
miniscule portion of total exports (such as Brazil and Thailand). 
The agricultural products that are subject to export taxation in the greatest number of 
countries are raw hides and skins, coffee, vegetable oils, cocoa, and livestock.  The objectives and 
outcomes of export taxation are often dependent on the characteristics of the product to be 
exported: whether it is a staple food or an industrial raw material; whether or not it is also 
                                               
34 Canada taxes exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products; Iceland taxes exports of live horses. 
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consumed locally; the institutional structure and cultural makeup of the sector producing it; the 
availability of substitutes both on the demand and the supply sides; and the degree of market power 
enjoyed by the exporter (Ayal, 1965). 
Countries have used agricultural export taxes to achieve a number of different objectives: 
to generate public sector revenue; to curb domestic prices and inflation; to promote higher value-
added activities; to improve the terms of trade; to distribute income; to stabilize commodity prices; 
among others.  The relative importance of agricultural export taxes as a source of public revenue 
has declined significantly in recent decades.  The average share of export duties in central 
government revenue for a sample of 63 developing countries fell from 4 percent in 1980-1989 to 
1.4 percent in 1990-1999 and 0.7 percent in 2000-2006.  While at least 25 countries derived over 
10 percent of central government revenue from export taxes in the 1970s and 1980s, only a handful 
did so in 1996-2006.  Currently, the two main outliers are Côte d’Ivoire and Argentina, both of 
which derive between 10 and 20 percent of public revenue from export taxation. 
Export taxes are ineffective at controlling prices and curbing inflation in the medium and 
long run.  While they may seem successful in the short run, their continuous application has 
disincentives effects on production that ultimately lead to increased domestic prices.  In addition, 
export taxes may encourage smuggling and the development of a domestic black market, which 
ultimately increase domestic upward price pressures. 
While export taxes on primary agricultural products may provide sufficient incentives to 
the promotion of downstream processing industries, they can also be counterproductive.  
Argentina’s differential export taxes and remarkable comparative advantage in soybean production 
have attracted substantial investments to the domestic crushing industry and turned the country 
into the world’s number one exporter of soybean oil and meal.  On the other hand, Ghana’s export 
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tax on cocoa and Mongolia’s export tax on raw cashmere have failed to promote the development 
of their processing industries.  The two countries remain exporters of predominantly unprocessed 
and low value-added products and have suffered from widespread smuggling. 
Although export taxes in theory allow countries with sufficient market power to improve 
their terms of trade and maximize aggregate domestic welfare, in practice uncertainty about the 
true elasticity of export demand may lead to significant efficiency losses.  This was the case with 
Thailand’s rice export taxes between 1950 and 1986.  In addition, the emergence of new producers 
and existence of product substitutes may reduce the inelasticity of demand.  Several developing 
countries that were believed to have enough monopoly power and taxed exports of key agricultural 
commodities lost significant market share to competitors.  This group includes Ghana (cocoa), 
Pakistan (jute), Sri Lanka (tea) and Uganda (cotton). 
While export taxes can be used to transfer wealth between different domestic groups, the 
direction of such transfers has often been from the poorest and most vulnerable groups and to the 
most sophisticated and influential sectors.  This was the case with the export taxes on rice in 
Thailand and raw cashmere in Mongolia.  In Argentina, recent studies show that most benefits 
from agricultural export taxation accrue to rich urban consumers and that the elimination of such 
taxes would leave the Gini coefficients for household per capita income and labor income largely 
unchanged. 
Excessive export taxation creates incentives for smuggling, especially when the 
commodity has a high unit value, countries share long unpatrolled borders, customs 
administrations are inefficient, and transportation and logistics costs are low.  Examples of 
agricultural products that have been subject to widespread smuggling due to export taxes include 
cocoa along the Côte d’Ivoire-Ghana border, raw cashmere along the Mongolia-China border, and 
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rubber along the Cambodia-Vietnam border.  While export taxes have typically encouraged 
smuggling, more recently they have also been applied to combat it.  The leading examples are 
Brazil’s and Canada’s export taxes on cigarettes. 
Export taxes adversely affect economic incentives.  Artificially depressed rates of return 
for agricultural commodities discourage investment and promote market exit.  As early as the 
1960s, Ayal (1965) warned that “[h]ardly any investments have been made in Thailand in facilities 
for the rice business for a number of years now, not even in upcountry mills. […]  In parts of 
Bangkok where land values are very high [rice] mills have been torn down.”  Thailand’s poor 
performance in fertilizer use in 1950-1986 indicates how export taxation obstructed the 
modernization of the rice sector.  Fertilizer application was uneconomical under the prevailing 
price structure at the time, when Thailand had the second highest relative cost of fertilizers in Asia.  
In Argentina, the number of tractors per hectare of arable land remained largely unchanged during 
most of the 1970s and 1980s.  More recently, Argentina’s taxes and quotas on beef exports have 
diverted foreign direct investment into the Uruguayan meat industry.  Furthermore, high export 
taxes on soybeans have encouraged Argentine farmers to invest in Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil.  
As of 2008, more than half of Uruguay’s soybean production was carried out by Argentines. 
Export taxes also affect output and income distribution.  The long-run effect of Thailand’s 
export taxes was to reduce annual rice output by approximately 19 percent in 1961-1972 and 13 
percent in 1973-1984.  Argentina’s annual production of wheat and beef would have been on 
average 31 percent and 26 percent higher, respectively, in the absence of export taxes in 1960-
1985.  In contrast, Argentina’s agricultural sector has experienced remarkable growth in 2002-
2008.  The margin for grains, especially soybeans, has been so attractive that planting has remained 
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profitable despite the imposition of export taxes.  However, the situation may change as 
international agricultural prices start to decline and domestic energy subsidies are reduced. 
Significant income transfers occurred from rural producers to urban consumers, 
middlemen and downstream processors of agricultural raw materials.  In Indonesia, export taxes 
on palm oil negatively affected both smallholder farmers and large private estates, while net gains 
were almost equally split between cooking oil consumers and distributors.  In Thailand, both the 
rural and the urban poor suffered from export taxes because the lower domestic price of rice led to 
decreased factor returns to unskilled labor.  The benefits accrued to rich urban consumers and to 
industrialists that employed unskilled labor. 
In summary, the empirical evidence summarized above indicates that agricultural export 
taxes are ultimately self-defeating.  While in the short run they may generate much-needed 
government revenue and curb domestic prices, in the long run they shift economic incentives, 
discourage the adoption of improved inputs, and adversely affect yield and output.  In addition, 
export taxes have often benefited sophisticated economic groups and hurt the most vulnerable 
sectors of society.  Due in part to its excessive taxation of the agricultural sector, Argentina has 
come to epitomize a country that has turned a blind eye on comparative advantage and eluded 
significant development opportunities.  In the other hand, Thailand provides an interesting 
example of a country that heavily taxed agricultural exports at earlier stages of development and 
later reduced the level of taxation as it achieved industrialization.  Higher per capita income levels 
and alternative sources of revenue allowed the Thai government to eventually suspend export 
taxes.  Thailand’s transition away from high agricultural export taxation levels shows an 
alternative to the current overburden of agriculture in Argentina and other developing countries.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MEASUREMENT OF ETHANOL SUBSIDIES AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC 
DISTORTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN AND UNITED STATES POLICIES 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Governments across the globe subsidize biofuel production through a complex set of policy 
instruments that include blending mandates, tax exemptions and rebates, production subsidies, 
input subsidies, and market price support, among others.  Justified with reference to goals as 
diverse as curbing global warming, increasing energy security and promoting rural development, 
these support mechanisms have spurred unprecedented demand for biofuels and stimulated 
massive investments in production.  Global biofuel output more than quintuplicated in the last 
decade, rising from 20 billion liters in 2001 to over 110 billion liters in 2011 (EIA, 2014).  As the 
sector expands and domestic biofuel policies become more multifaceted, governments have 
increasingly exchanged accusations of unfair practices that distort production and trade.35  In the 
meantime, significant debate has emerged regarding the adequacy of existing World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules to deal with biofuels (Howse et al., 2006; Kojima et al., 2007; Harmer, 
2009; Weiss, 2011).  This chapter contributes to the ongoing discussion on biofuels by proposing 
a methodology to measure the subsidy component of biofuel policies, quantifying their associated 
effects on prices, supply, demand and trade, and determining whether they violate multilateral 
                                               
35 In December 2007, at the request of Canada and Brazil, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) established a panel to investigate US agricultural subsidies, including to corn, the main feedstock 
for ethanol production in this country.  In June 2008, the European Commission (EC) initiated investigations that 
culminated in the establishment of anti-subsidy and anti-dumping duties against biodiesel imports from the US.  In 
November 2011 and August 2012, the EC initiated similar investigations against, respectively, ethanol imports 
originating in the US and biodiesel imports originating in Argentina and Indonesia.  These investigations culminated 
in the termination of anti-subsidy proceedings, but in the imposition of definite anti-dumping duties.  In August 2012, 
Argentina requested the establishment of a WTO panel against the EU due to a Spanish law that required that only 
EU fuel could meet quotas for biofuels used in transport.  In addition, Brazil protested for over two decades against a 
US ethanol import charge that denied foreign producers the benefit of the domestic ethanol tax credit.  The US 
suspended this additional charge unilaterally in 2012. 
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trade rules.  The analysis focuses on ethanol, the single most widely used type of biofuel, and on 
the United States and Brazil, the world’s largest producers and consumers of biofuels.  
Ethanol, also known as ethyl alcohol, is a renewable, high-octane, clean-burning, motor 
fuel, generally obtained from sugarcane or corn.  It is by far the world’s most important type of 
biofuel, accounting on average for 85 percent of world biofuel production in 2002-2012 (Table 
3.1).  Although ethanol’s share in total biofuel production declined during this period, output at 
the end of the decade was still 3.5 times larger than that of biodiesel, the second most common 
type of biofuel. Other types of biofuels, such as biomethanol and green diesel, are seldom produced 
at a commercial scale and, therefore, account for a negligible share of global biofuel production.36 
 
Table 3.1: World biofuel production, by type of biofuel, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Production (Billion liters) Share of Biofuel Production 
Ethanol Biodiesel Total Biofuel Ethanol  Biodiesel 
2002 21.9 1.5 23.4 94% 6% 
2003 27.0 2.0 29.0 93% 7% 
2004 29.7 2.5 32.3 92% 8% 
2005 33.9 4.1 38.1 89% 11% 
2006 41.5 7.2 48.8 85% 15% 
2007 53.6 10.4 64.0 84% 16% 
2008 70.7 15.2 85.9 82% 18% 
2009 77.0 17.9 94.9 81% 19% 
2010 88.6 19.6 108.2 82% 18% 
2011 86.8 23.4 110.2 79% 21% 
2012 85.9 25.0 110.9 77% 23% 
2002-2012 
average 
56.1 11.7 67.8 85% 15% 
 
Sources: ANP (2014), EIA (2014a), LMC International (2013) and OECD-FAO (2013). 
 
 
                                               
36 As of 2012, there were only three biomethanol plants in operation in the world, with startup dates in 2010-2011 and 
a combined capacity of 204.5 kt per year (IEA-ETSAP and IRENA, 2013).  In addition, only four green diesel 
production facilities were identified worldwide in 2013, with a combined capacity to process 2.1 million tons of 
vegetable oils per year (Vonortas and Papayannakos, 2014). 
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Brazil and the United States are the world’s leading players in the ethanol sector.  Together, 
the two countries accounted for 89 percent of world production and 88 percent of world 
consumption in 2002-2012 (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Their leadership position in the ethanol market 
has been facilitated by the convergence of market forces (i.e. high world prices for foreign 
petroleum and readily available domestic feedstock) and significant government support.  While 
Brazil’s large-scale adoption of ethanol as a substitute to fossil fuels dates back to the National 
Alcohol Program (Proálcool) that ensued the 1970s oil crises, the United States’ drastic shift 
towards ethanol use occurred in the early twenty-first century, following statewide bans on the use 
of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) as an oxygenate additive in gasoline and federal legislation 
establishing annual targets for the volume of renewable fuel that must be blended in transportation 
fuel. 37   Although strong incentives have given rise to fledgling ethanol industries elsewhere, 
ethanol production in these countries is still small compared to ethanol production in the United 
States and Brazil.38 
This chapter is divided into three sections, in addition to this introduction.  Section 3.2 
reviews policy instruments that support ethanol in the United States and Brazil and presents a 
methodology to estimate their subsidy equivalent value.  The proposed metric is based on the 
concepts of support used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) to monitor and evaluate developments in agricultural policy, most notably the producer 
support estimate (PSE) and the consumer support estimate (CSE).  The analysis focuses on the 11-
year period following the deregulation of the Brazilian sugarcane industry (2002-2012). 
                                               
37 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a volume target of 28.4 billion liters of renewable fuel use by 2012.  The 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 extended the target to 136.3 billion liters by 2022. 
38 The European Union (EU), China and Canada are the world’s three main producers and consumers of ethanol after 
the United States and Brazil.  They accounted for respectively 4.8 percent, 2.6 percent and 2 percent of world ethanol 
output in 2011.  All other countries in the world combined accounted for only 3.5 percent of production in the same 
year, most of which was concentrated in Thailand, Australia, Colombia and India (EIA, 2014). 
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Table 3.2: World ethanol production, by main producers, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Production (Billion liters) Share of US & Brazil in 
World Production US Brazil EU China ROW World 
2002 8.1 12.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 21.9 94% 
2003 10.6 14.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 27.0 93% 
2004 12.9 14.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 29.7 93% 
2005 14.8 16.0 0.8 1.2 1.1 33.9 91% 
2006 18.5 17.8 1.5 1.6 2.1 41.5 87% 
2007 24.7 22.6 1.8 1.7 3.0 53.6 88% 
2008 35.2 27.1 2.7 2.0 3.6 70.7 88% 
2009 41.4 26.1 3.4 2.1 3.9 77.0 88% 
2010 50.3 28.2 4.1 2.1 3.8 88.6 89% 
2011 52.7 22.9 4.2 2.3 4.8 86.8 87% 
2012 50.0 23.5 4.3 2.3 5.7 85.9 86% 
2002-2012 
average 
29.0 20.5 2.2 1.6 2.7 56.1 89% 
 
Note:  ROW: rest of the world. 
Sources: ANP (2014), EIA (2014a), and LMC International (2013). 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: World ethanol consumption, by main consumers, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Consumption (Billion liters) Share of US & Brazil 
in World Consumption US Brazil EU China ROW World 
2002 7.8 9.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 18.3 94% 
2003 10.7 8.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 20.8 91% 
2004 13.4 10.3 0.6 1.0 0.6 25.9 92% 
2005 15.4 10.6 1.1 1.2 0.8 29.0 89% 
2006 20.7 11.3 1.8 1.6 1.1 36.5 88% 
2007 26.1 15.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 47.4 87% 
2008 36.7 19.6 3.5 2.0 2.6 64.4 87% 
2009 41.8 22.8 4.5 2.1 3.1 74.3 87% 
2010 48.7 22.2 5.7 2.1 3.7 82.4 86% 
2011 48.8 19.3 6.0 2.2 5.2 81.6 83% 
2012 48.8 17.8 5.7 2.3 5.3 79.9 83% 
2002-2012 
average 
29.0 15.2 2.9 1.6 2.4 51.0 88% 
 
Note:  ROW: rest of the world. 
Sources: ANP (2014), EIA (2014a) and LMC International (2013). 
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Section 3.3 assesses the magnitude of market distortions caused by U.S. and Brazilian 
ethanol support policies.  It constructs a partial equilibrium model of the ethanol sector to evaluate 
the impact of support mechanisms on prices, supply, demand and trade.  Finally, Section 3.4 draws 
conclusions and discusses policy implications in light of recent market developments and changes 
in ethanol support instruments in the United States and Brazil.  A special focus is given to 
multilateral trade rules and existing jurisprudence to determine whether grounds exist or existed 
for the initiation of trade litigation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) against U.S. or 
Brazilian ethanol policy instruments.  In light of the subsidy equivalent values and economic 
distortions estimated in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, it draws from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) to 
determine whether the United States and Brazil failed to live up to multilateral obligations. 
 
3.2.  Subsidy Equivalent Value of Ethanol Policies 
Measuring subsidies to biofuels is motivated by the interest of governments and society in 
understanding the effects of biofuels policies on areas as diverse as trade, the environment, energy 
security, food security, and development.  While a subsidy indicator alone does not contain 
information on these effects, it is a crucial input in economic models aimed at estimating them.  
As a comprehensive and consistent method for quantifying subsidies permits comparisons of 
support levels both across time and between countries, it facilitates the examination of policy 
progress domestically and serves as a common base for the establishment of international policy 
dialogue.  This section investigates US and Brazilian public policy instruments that support ethanol 
and present a methodology to assess their subsidy equivalent values.  Results obtained in this 
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section are used as inputs in Section 3.3 to estimate the impacts of ethanol subsidies on prices, 
production, consumption and trade. 
There exists no set of internationally agreed standards for estimating the subsidy value of 
programs, and for preparing and using aggregates and derived indicators (Jones and Steenblik, 
2010).  Numerous methodologies for estimating subsidy values have been developed for particular 
products and sectors by inter-governmental organizations (FAO, IEA, OECD, World Bank and 
WTO), non-governmental organizations (Earth Track, the Environmental Working Group and the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development) and national government agencies.39  These 
methodologies may vary significantly due to their distinct definitions of subsidy and different 
valuation methods. 
Notable among such methodologies is the one underlying the family of support indicators 
developed by the OECD: the producer support estimate (PSE), general services support estimate 
(GSSE), consumer support estimate (CSE), and total support estimate (TSE).  Used extensively 
since 1987 to measure support for agricultural commodities, these indicators serve as a useful tool 
for policy dialogue not only amongst OECD countries, but also with non-OECD countries, 
international organizations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and academia.  
More recently, the OECD has outlined a comprehensive scheme for discussing support to the 
energy sector in line with the PSE framework (OECD, 2010a). 
In this section, the PSE and its associated indicators are taken as the primary building 
blocks in the construction of subsidy equivalent values for the US and Brazilian ethanol sectors.  
Distinguished according to the recipient of the support, the OECD support indicators estimate the 
annual monetary value of gross transfers arising from policy measures that support a given 
                                               
39 Jones and Steenblik (2010) compiled a manual of different methodologies used by these organizations to calculate 
subsidy values. 
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commodity, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on production or income (OECD, 
2010b).  These transfers may arise from either taxpayers, consumers or producers, and include not 
only budgetary expenditures, but also market price support and concessions that do not require 
actual monetary disbursements.  In order for a policy instrument to qualify for inclusion in one of 
the indicators of support, it must generate an explicit or implicit transfer that supports either 
producers (PSE), general services provided to producers (GSSE) or consumers (CSE) in a given 
sector.  General policy measures available throughout the entire economy are not considered in the 
estimation of any of these indicators.  A detailed description of the principles applied in estimating 
the OECD support indicators of support, along with more practical underpinnings of the 
methodology, are found in OECD (2010b). 
 
3.2.1. United States 
Government support has long played a vital role in the expansion of the ethanol industry in the 
United States.  Since the first major federal subsidy to ethanol – a full exemption from the motor 
fuel excise tax – was introduced in the Energy Tax Act of 1978, hundreds of programs have been 
put in place to subsidize nearly every stage of the ethanol production chain (Koplow, 2006).  This 
subsection quantifies the subsidy equivalent value of key US policy instruments used to support 
the ethanol sector in 2002-2012, including tax exemptions and credits, tariffs and other import 
charges, mandatory blending requirements, input subsidies, and producer payments. 
Policy instruments are grouped into four broad categories, according to the method used to 
quantify the transfers they provide to the ethanol sector: 
(i) Measures that involve revenue foregone; 
(ii) Measures that provide market price support; 
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(iii) Measures that lower input costs; and 
(iv) Measures that entail budgetary transfers. 
The following subsections examine policies in each of these categories and estimate the 
total subsidy equivalent value for the ethanol sector in the United States. 
 
3.2.1.1 Revenue Foregone 
Support may be provided to a particular sector in ways that do not imply actual budgetary transfers, 
but at the cost of revenue foregone by the government (OECD, 2010b).  In much the same way as 
would happen with a program involving explicit budgetary expenditures, these implicit transfers 
entail that some revenue is foregone and economic incentives are provided to producers or 
consumers in a given sector.  Fiscal incentives in the form of tax exemptions and tax credits were 
the single most important type of transfers based on revenue foregone provided to the US ethanol 
sector in 2002-2012.40 
 
Consumption Tax Concessions 
The federal motor fuel excise tax exemption for ethanol was first established by the Energy Tax 
of Act of 1978.  Although the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of Act of 1980 introduced an income 
tax credit for ethanol blenders as an alternative support mechanism for the fledgling biofuel sector, 
the tax exemption was generally favored as it offered more benefits than the tax credit.41  The two 
                                               
40 Preferential lending is another type of implicit transfer that supports the US ethanol sector.  For example, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 instituted loan guarantee programs for ethanol produced from sugar and cellulosic or municipal 
solid waste sources.  In addition, a number of states provide subsidized loans to ethanol producers and authorize tax-
exempt financing for ethanol projects (Koplow, 2006). 
41 There are several reasons why the ethanol tax exemption was preferred over the tax credit.  First, while the tax 
exemption was available upfront, the benefit of the tax credit had to await either the filing of the income tax return or 
the payment of estimated taxes.  Second, the ethanol tax credit was itself taxable as gross income, which reduced the 
value of the credit.  Third, the ethanol tax credit was a component of the general business tax credit and was subject 
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policy instruments were extended and modified by successive pieces of legislation, including the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998, which established exemption and credit 
rates of 53 cents per gallon of ethanol in 2001-2002, 52 cents per gallon in 2003-2004, and 51 
cents per gallon in 2005-2007.  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 replaced the two 
historical tax subsidies with a Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) of 51 cents per 
gallon, which was reduced to 45 cents per gallon in the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 
2008, and ultimately suspended in December 2011. 
According to the PSE methodology, tax concessions should be included in estimated support 
when they are sector-specific or when agents in a specific sector are their principal beneficiaries.  
If a tax concession grants a fiscal advantage to a particular sector or group, then there must 
necessarily exist another sector or group that does not benefit from such concession in the same 
manner.  Therefore, the implicit support provided to the former can be measured in comparison to 
the treatment provided to the latter.  In the case of tax exemptions and credits provided to the US 
ethanol sector, the counterfactual is the prevailing tax rate on gasoline. 
The VEETC and its preceding tax exemption made blenders more willing to blend ethanol 
into gasoline.  They shifted the demand curve for ethanol to the right and raised the domestic price, 
but left the supply curve unchanged.  Transfers arising from federal consumption tax concessions 
(FCTC) are estimated by multiplying the tax concession rate by the amount of ethanol that was 
blended in the United States, more formally expressed as follows: 
 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆  (𝑄𝑃
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑄𝑀
𝑈𝑆) (3.1) 
 
 
                                               
to the carryforward and carryback rules.  Finally, since the tax credit was not refundable, it could be used only against 
a positive tax liability (Lazzarini, 1999). 
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where  𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Transfers arising from federal consumption tax concessions 
𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Tax rate differential of federal consumption tax concessions 
𝑄𝑃
𝑈𝑆:  US fuel ethanol production 
𝑄𝑀
𝑈𝑆:  US fuel ethanol imports 
Estimated transfers from federal consumption tax concessions are summarized in Table 3.4, 
along with estimates for transfers from other federal and state tax concessions to the ethanol sector 
in the United States between 2002 and 2012.  The VEETC and its preceding federal ethanol excise 
tax exemption accounted for an average annual subsidy of US$3.2 billion in 2002-2012, or US$3.5 
billion if the year of 2012 is excluded from the average.  This support reached its peak in 2011, 
when a total of US$6.3 billion in federal tax revenue were foregone. 
 
Table 3.4: Government revenue foregone in favor of ethanol, United States, 2002-2012 
  (US$ million) 
 
Year 
___Consumption Tax Concessions__ ___Production Tax Concessions___ Total 
Revenue 
Foregone Federal  State Total Federal State Total 
2002 1,141 78 1,219 18 4 22 1,240 
2003 1,465 94 1,559 20 6 26 1,585 
2004 1,843 116 1,959 21 15 36 1,995 
2005 2,060 125 2,186 23 16 39 2,225 
2006 2,864 140 3,004 98 22 120 3,124 
2007 3,550 188 3,738 108 35 143 3,880 
2008 5,004 286 5,290 105 47 152 5,443 
2009 5,011 207 5,218 105 47 152 5,370 
2010 5,991 178 6,169 108 49 157 6,326 
2011 6,345 221 6,567 109 38 147 6,713 
2012 0 226 226 0 10 10 235 
2002-2012 
average 
3,207 169 3,376 65 26 91 3,467 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations.  Based on EIA (2014b), USDA (2014a) and state statutes. 
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In addition to the federal tax exemptions and credits, ten states provided tax concessions 
associated with the consumption of fuel mixtures of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline 
(E10) between 2002 and 2012.42  The share of these states in US ethanol fuel consumption declined 
from 21 percent in 2002 to 6 percent in 2012.  While two states – Iowa and Oklahoma – provided 
tax credits for motor fuel retail dealers, nine states – Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maine, Montana and South Dakota – granted exemptions or rate reductions on motor fuel 
taxes and other taxes connected with motor fuel consumption. 
Iowa originally granted a tax credit of 2.5 cents per gallon of blended fuel sold in excess 
of 60 percent of total fuel sales between 2002 and 2008.  A variable tax credit, contingent on both 
the volume of total motor fuels sales and the share of biofuel sales on total gasoline sales, was 
implemented in tax years 2009 through 2012, with rates ranging from 2.5 to 8 cents per gallon of 
pure ethanol sold (Harris, 2009).  In Oklahoma, retail dealers were eligible for a tax credit of 1.6 
cents per gallon of ethanol blended into gasoline between 2006 and 2012, as long as they provided 
an identical price reduction to the purchaser of the blended fuel. 
Idaho fully exempted ethanol from the motor fuel tax of 25 cents per gallon between 2002 
and 2009.  Iowa and South Dakota provided average tax rate reductions of 17 cents and 18 cents 
per gallon of blended ethanol between 2002 and 2012.  In Connecticut and Maine, reductions were 
more limited both in size (10 cents per gallon of blended ethanol) and in duration (2002-2005 in 
the former, and 2008-2009 in the latter).  In Montana, a 15 percent reduction on the tax rate of 
blended fuel applied between 2005 and 2009.  In Alaska, a reduction of 6 cents per gallon of 
blended fuel applied in areas and during the months in which ethanol blended fuel was sold in an 
                                               
42 A larger number of states provided tax concessions for fuel mixtures of at least 85 percent ethanol (E85).  Since 
E85 represented less than 1 percent of total fuel ethanol consumption in the United States in 2002-2012, these 
concessions are not addressed in this section. 
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effort to attain federal and state air quality standards for carbon monoxide.  Finally, Hawaii and 
Illinois granted rate reductions not on the motor fuel tax itself, but on other taxes associated with 
fuel consumption.  Hawaii exempted E10 and higher blends from the general excise tax between 
2002 and 2009, and Illinois reduced the sales tax on E10 by 30 percent from 2002 to mid-2003 
and 20 percent from mid-2003 to 2012. 
Total transfers to the ethanol sector arising from state consumption tax concessions (SCTC) 
correspond to the sum of transfers provided by tax concessions across all states.  Transfers from 
individual tax concessions are estimated by multiplying the applicable tax rate differential by the 
qualifying volume of fuel ethanol consumed in the respective state.  More formally: 
 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = ∑ 𝐺𝑐
𝑠
𝑠
= ∑ 𝑡𝑐
𝑠 𝜔𝑐
𝑠 𝑄𝑐
𝑠
𝑠
+ ∑(𝑡𝑔
𝑠 − 𝑡𝑒
𝑠)𝑄𝑐
𝑠
𝑠
 (3.2) 
where  𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Transfers arising from state consumption tax concessions 
𝐺𝑐
𝑠:  Transfer arising from consumption tax concessions in state s 
𝑡𝑐
𝑠:  Consumption tax credit rate in state s 
𝜔𝑐
𝑠: Share of state s consumption that qualifies for tax credit 
𝑄𝑐
𝑠:  Ethanol consumption in state s 
𝑡𝑔
𝑠:  Tax rate on gasoline in state s 
𝑡𝑒
𝑠:  Tax rate on blended ethanol in state s 
Unlike in equation 3.1, where production and import levels are used to estimate transfers 
from federal consumption tax concessions, consumption levels are used in equation 3.2 because 
state tax concessions are contingent on the consumption of ethanol within the borders of a given 
state.  While the federal tax credit applied to all ethanol blended with gasoline in the United States, 
irrespective of whether it was consumed domestically, state tax credits and tax rate reductions 
applied only to sales that took place in a particular state.  The parameter 𝜔𝑘
𝑠 , which modifies state 
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consumption levels in the first part of equation 3.2, is equal to one for all states, with the exception 
of Iowa.  Since only blended fuel sales in excess of 60 percent of total fuel sales are eligible for 
Iowa’s retail tax credit, 𝜔𝑐
𝐼𝑜𝑤𝑎 may only vary between 0 and 0.4.  In the calculations carried out in 
this subsection, 𝜔𝑐
𝐼𝑜𝑤𝑎 is assumed to equal 0.2. 
Total transfers arising from state consumption tax concessions were on average US$169 
million per year between 2002 and 2012 (Table 3.5).  While this figure is small compared to the 
US$3.2 billion in average transfers from federal consumption tax concessions in the same period, 
state consumption tax concessions had a significant impact at the local level in some parts so of 
the country, raising the per liter level of subsidization by approximately 50 percent.  This was the 
case in Idaho, Iowa and South Dakota, where local consumption subsidies of 25, 21 and 20 cents 
per gallon corresponded to 56 percent, 47 percent and 44 percent, respectively, of the federal tax 
credit of 45 cents per gallon in 2009. 
 
Table 3.5: State consumption tax concessions for ethanol, United States, 2002-2012 
  (US$ million) 
 
Year AK CT HI IA ID IL ME MT OK SD Total 
2002 2 0.4 0 13 0 57 - - - 5 78 
2003 2 2 0 14 0 72 - - - 5 94 
2004 3 15 0 19 0 73 - - - 5 116 
2005 - 4 13 12 4 83 - 4 - 6 125 
2006 - - 17 12 3 96 - 5 1 5 140 
2007 - - 22 20 6 122 - 9 1 7 188 
2008 - - 51 28 7 176 2 11 3 8 286 
2009 - - 43 28 3 113 3 6 2 8 207 
2010 - - - 29 - 141 - - 2 6 178 
2011 - - - 29 - 184 - - 3 6 221 
2012 - - - 27 - 191 - - 2 5 226 
2002-12 
average 
1 2 13 21 2 119 1 3 1 6 169 
 
Note: A dash indicates that consumption tax concessions were not provided in a given year. 
Sources: Author’s calculations.  Based on state statutes and EIA (2014b). 
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Production Tax Concessions 
The main production tax concession provided by the federal government to the ethanol sector 
between 2002 and 2012 was the Small Ethanol Producer Tax Credit (SEPTC).  Established by the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, it provided a supplemental tax credit of 10 cents per 
gallon for producers that had, at all time during the tax year, not more than 30 million gallons of 
productive capacity of any type of ethanol.  The incentive applied only to the first 15 million 
gallons of ethanol produced in a tax year and was allowed as a credit against the producer’s income 
tax liability.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded the eligibility threshold to producers with 
an annual production capacity of 60 million gallons. Like the VEETC, the SEPTC expired in 2011. 
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 introduced a second federal production tax 
credit for ethanol producers: the Cellulosic Biofuel Producer Tax Credit (CBPTC).  Producers of 
cellulosic ethanol obtained from any lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter that is available on a 
renewable or recurring basis were eligible for a tax credit of 46 cents per gallon of second 
generation biofuel sold or used in-house between 2009 and 2012, in addition to any other tax credit 
or benefit generally available to first generation biofuels.  However, since the cellulosic biofuel 
industry took longer than foreseen to achieve commercial viability, the CBPTC was not actively 
used.  The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that only 20,000 
gallons of fuels using cellulosic biomass from commercial-scale facilities were produced until late 
2012 (EIA, 2013).  If any payments were made to ethanol producers under the CBPTC, they were 
likely very modest.  Therefore, transfers under this program are assumed to have been nil during 
the period under analysis.  As a result, total transfers arising from federal production tax 
concessions (FPTC) are defined to be equal to transfers under the SEPTC program. 
 196 
 
The estimated transfer arising from the SEPTC for qualifying plants with an annual output 
below 15 million gallons is equal to the SEPTC tax credit rate multiplied by the plant’s annual 
output.  For qualifying plants with an annual output above 15 million gallons, the transfer is equal 
to the tax rate differential multiplied by 15 million.  Aggregate SEPTC transfers are equal to the 
sum of SEPTC for all qualifying plants, more formally expressed as follows: 
 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ∑ 𝑄𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑗
𝑗
 (3.3) 
where 𝑄𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑗
= {
 𝑄𝑝
𝑗
          if  𝑄𝑝
𝑗
≤ ?̅?𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶  and plant 𝑗 meets eligibility requirements
?̅?𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶    if  𝑄𝑝
𝑗
> ?̅?𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶  and plant 𝑗 meets eligibility requirements
0             otherwise                                                                             
    
𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Transfers arising from federal production tax concessions 
𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆   SEPTC tax credit rate 
𝑄𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑗
: Qualifying SEPTC volume for plant j 
𝑄𝑝
𝑗
:  Ethanol output of plant j 
?̅?𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶 : Maximum per plant qualifying SEPTC volume 
As production data at the plant level are difficult to obtain, nameplate plant capacity is used 
as a proxy for plant output.  For years in which a plant is idle, output is set at zero.  Since some 
plants may operate below nameplate capacity, estimates may slightly overestimate the impact of 
the tax credit on government revenue.  Producers operating above nameplate capacity would have 
little or no effect on estimated transfers, as the capacity of most plants is above 15 million gallons 
and payments apply to only the first 15 million gallons of ethanol produced by each plant. 
The SEPTC accounted for an average annual subsidy of US$65 million in 2002-2012, or 
US$72 million if 2012 is excluded from the average (Table 3.4).  Estimated transfers were under 
US$23 million per year in 2002-2005, when only plants with a productive capacity at or below 30 
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million gallons qualified for the tax credit.  After the eligibility threshold was raised to 60 million 
gallons, transfers soared to US$98 million in 2006 and US$109 million in 2011. 
In addition to the SEPTC, five states (Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, New York and 
Wyoming) provided production tax credits directly tied to plant output between 2002 and 2012.  
Five other states (Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma and South Carolina) had production tax 
credits on the books, but did not produce fuel ethanol on a commercial scale during this period.43  
Credits ranged from US$0.036 per gallon in Maine to US$1.00 per gallon in Kentucky, and were 
generally subject to caps per producer and per year.  Transfers arising from state production tax 
concession (SPTC) are estimated using a generalized version of equation (3.3).  More formally: 
 
𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = ∑ (𝑡𝑝
𝑠 ∑ 𝑄𝑠
𝑗
𝑗
)
𝑠
 (3.4) 
where 𝑄𝑠
𝑗
= {
𝑄𝑝
𝑗
           if  𝑄𝑝
𝑗
≤  ?̅?𝑠 and plant 𝑗 meets eligibility requirements
?̅?𝑠                if  𝑄𝑝
𝑗
> ?̅?𝑠  and plant 𝑗 meets eligibility requirements
   0             otherwise                                                                           
    
𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Transfers arising from state production tax concessions 
𝑡𝑝
𝑠:  Production tax credit rate in state s 
𝑄𝑠
𝑗
:  Qualifying volume for plant j in state s 
𝑄𝑝
𝑗
:  Ethanol output of plant j 
?̅?𝑠:  Maximum per plant qualifying volume in state s 
Total transfers arising from state production tax credits averaged US$26 million per year 
between 2002 and 2012 (Table 3.6).  This corresponds to 40 percent of the average annual value 
of federal production tax credits provided in the same period.  Transfers under state production tax 
                                               
43 Ten other states provided incentive payments linked to ethanol production in 2002-2012.  Since these payments 
were in the form of grants, they are accounted under budgetary outlays in Subsection 3.2.1.4. 
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credits increased significantly over time, from a low of US$4 million in 2002 to a peak of US$49 
million in 2010, due to both an increase in the number of states offering production tax credits and 
an expansion in the ethanol production capacity of these states.  The significant fall in transfers 
between 2011 and 2012 was due in large part to the discontinuation of producer incentives in 
Nebraska, the second largest ethanol-producing state in the country. 
 
Table 3.6: State production tax concessions linked to output, United States, 2002-2012 
  (US$ million) 
 
Year IN KY NE NY WY Total 
2002 - - 2 - 2 4 
2003 - - 4 - 2 6 
2004 - - 13 - 2 15 
2005 - - 14 - 2 16 
2006 - - 20 - 2 22 
2007 6 5 22 - 2 35 
2008 10 5 29 2 2 47 
2009 10 5 26 4 1 47 
2010 7 5 33 4 - 49 
2011 5 5 24 4 - 38 
2012 2 5 - 3 - 10 
2002-2012 
average 
4 3 17 1 1 26 
 
Note: A dash indicates that state production tax concessions were not provided in a given year. 
Sources: Author’s calculations.  Based on state statutes and EIA (2014b). 
 
Several states also offered tax credits and tax exemptions on investment in ethanol 
infrastructure, including production, storage, distribution and delivery facilities and equipment.  
For example, Florida provided an income tax credit for 75 percent of all capital, operation, 
maintenance and research and development costs incurred in connection with an investment in the 
production, storage and distribution of ethanol or other biofuels.  Georgia provided an exemption 
from the sales and use tax to tangible personal property used in or for the construction of a facility 
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dedicated to the production and processing of ethanol between July 2007 and June 2012.  Transfers 
arising from ethanol infrastructure investment tax credits are not estimated in this section due to 
the difficulty in obtaining investment-specific data. 
Total federal government revenue foregone in favor of the US ethanol sector (𝐺𝑅𝐹
𝑈𝑆), defined 
as the sum of consumption tax concessions (𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 )  and production tax 
concessions (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ), averaged US$3.5 billion a year between 2002 and 2012.  
Transfers varied significantly over time, from a peak of US$6.7 billion in 2011 to a bottom of 
US$205 million in 2012.  The great majority of these transfers were consumption tax concessions, 
with production tax credits accounting for only 3 percent of total revenue foregone during this 
period.  The federal government provided the overwhelming majority of these subsidies.  While 
states accounted for only 5 percent of total revenue foregone in 2002-2011, they became the only 
source of consumption and production tax credits once the VEETC and SEPTC were eliminated 
in December 2011. 
 
3.2.1.2 Market Price Support 
Market price support (MPS) measures generate transfers from consumers and taxpayers to 
producers by creating a gap between the domestic producer price and the border price.  Measuring 
the subsidy equivalent value of MPS measures consists of calculating this market price differential 
(MPD) and multiplying it by the total quantity produced domestically. 
Import barriers are the classic example of MPS measures.  In the case of the ethanol sector 
in the United States, the impact of tariffs on domestic and world prices was affected by 
environmental regulations and MTBE state bans in 2004-2006 and a renewable fuel blending 
mandate in 2006-2012.  While these measures did not affect the wedge between domestic and 
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world prices, they did create a price premium for ethanol by requiring a minimum consumption 
volume.  As a result, blending mandates generated additional transfers to the ethanol sector in a 
global level by artificially raising returns to producers in the United States and elsewhere. 
Between 2002 and December 2011, US import charges on undenatured ethanol consisted 
of an ad valorem import tariff of 2.5 percent and a specific additional import duty of 14.27 cents 
per liter (54 cents per gallon).44  Designed to offset the benefit of the excise tax exemption in the 
case of imports, the latter was first instituted by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 and 
ultimately allowed to expire once federal tax credits were eliminated in December 2011.  Although 
the additional duty remained in place for 34 years, it was in violation of US multilateral obligations.  
More specifically, it infringed the dual requirement established in GATT Article VIII that any 
additional charge or duty on imports must involve a service rendered in connection with the 
importation of a good and must not represent an indirect protection to domestic products. 
Given that annual average border prices for ethanol varied between 27 and 54 cents per 
liter between 2002 and 2009, the combined burden of the ad valorem tariff and the specific 
additional duty on imports was equivalent to an ad valorem tariff of 30 to 55 percent.  This 
substantial tariff peak helped keep imports at bay, despite relatively high domestic prices in the 
United States.  As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the significant expansion in fuel ethanol consumption 
in the United States in 2002-2012 was not accompanied by an increase in import levels.  Except 
in 2006, when foreign ethanol accounted for 14 percent of domestic consumption, imports 
responded on average for only 2.6 percent of total US fuel ethanol demand. 
                                               
44 Imports of denatured ethanol were subject to an MFN import tariff of 1.9 percent and an MFN additional duty of 
14.27 cents per liter (54 cents per gallon). 
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Figure 3.1: United States fuel ethanol consumption and import levels, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Author.  Based on USDA (2014a). 
 
Due to the sizeable MFN ad valorem equivalent tariff, ethanol imports entered the United 
States thanks in large part to preferential trade arrangements and a duty drawback mechanism for 
domestic manufacturers.  Between 2002 and 2011, 54 percent of all fuel ethanol imports entered 
the United States free of duty under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),45 the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Area (CAFTA-DR),46 and the 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).47  The great majority of these preferential imports 
consisted of anhydrous ethanol from CBERA and CAFTA-DR beneficiary countries, which was 
                                               
45 Ethanol imports from CBERA beneficiary countries, whether or not produced from agricultural feedstock grown in 
a CBERA country, were admitted free of duty in 2002-2005.  While imports of ethanol produced exclusively from 
local agricultural feedstock continued to benefit from duty-free access in 2006-2012, duty-free treatment for ethanol 
dehydrated from non-CBERA and non-CAFTA-DR agricultural feedstock was restricted to a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) 
of 60 million gallons or 7 percent of the US domestic ethanol market, whichever was greater. An additional 35 million 
gallons could enter free of duty if it contained at least 30 percent ethanol produced from local feedstock, and an 
unlimited amount could enter free of duty if it contained at least 50 percent ethanol produced from local feedstock.  
Imports of fuel ethanol from CBERA and CAFTA-DR countries did not exceed the quota in any year in 2002-2012. 
46  The six countries that signed the CAFTA-DR agreement with the United States were formerly CBERA 
beneficiaries.  Although CAFTA-DR countries ceased to be beneficiary countries under CBERA, they continued to 
enjoy duty-free access for ethanol in the United States. 
47 The Andean Trade Preference Act and the US-Israel Free Trade Area also contemplated duty-free access to ethanol 
imports, but no imports of fuel ethanol were made under these preferential trade arrangements in 2002-2012. 
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obtained through the dehydration of hydrous ethanol originally produced in Brazil.  As depicted 
in Figure 3.2, indirect imports of Brazilian ethanol via CBERA and CAFTA-DR countries were 
greater than imports coming directly from Brazil in more than half of the years in 2002-2012. 
 
Figure 3.2: Ethanol imports, by import regime and countries of origin, United States, 2002-12 
 
Source: Author.  Based on EIA (2014a) and USDA (2014a). 
 
The duty drawback mechanism was used by US importers to circumvent the prohibitive 
MFN additional duty on ethanol imports.  The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, permitted the refund 
of duty if the duty-paid good was re-exported or used to make a good that is exported. Special 
provisions allowed importers to substitute the imported duty-paid product by a like product in the 
manufacture of the article for exportation.  Therefore, a person who manufactured gasoline and 
imported ethanol could export jet fuel —by selling it to airlines with international flights out of 
the  United States— and still obtain a refund of the duty paid on ethanol, even if the fuel did not 
contain ethanol (Stubbs, 2010).  In order to curtail this loophole, the Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008 established that duty paid on ethanol imports could only be refunded if the 
exported article upon which a drawback claim was based contained ethanol. 
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An implicit ethanol blending mandate was introduced in the United States in the early 
twentieth century when a number of states banned MTBE48 and Congress decided not to shield 
MTBE manufacturers from water contamination lawsuits.  Ever since the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 had required the use of oxygenated and reformulated gasoline in areas with 
unhealthy levels of air pollution, MTBE and ethanol had been close substitutes in the gasoline 
oxygenate market.  In addition, the two additives had been close substitutes in the octane enhancer 
market for conventional gasoline sold in all areas of the United States.  While refiners were allowed 
to choose between a number of approved additives, MTBE was the product of choice in most cities 
outside the Midwest for its lower cost and more favorable blending characteristics.49  However, 
the increasing number of state bans and the lack of liability protection forced blenders to drop 
MTBE and switch over to more expensive ethanol between 2004 and 2006.50  Figure 3.3 depicts 
the changing shares of additives in the composition of gasoline weight in the four largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States.  
                                               
48 Iowa was the first state to limit the use of MTBE as fuel additive in the United States.  In February 2000, it 
established that no more than 2 percent of MTBE by volume was allowed in gasoline sold in the state.  Effective on 
July 2000, the cap was lowered to 0.5 percent by volume.  In the same month, three other Midwestern states imposed 
partial MTBE bans: Minnesota (0.33 percent by volume), Nebraska (1 percent) and South Dakota (2 percent). In 
January 2001, South Dakota lowered its cap to 0.5 percent.  These partial bans had limited impact on gasoline additive 
markets, as these states were not significant consumers of MTBE.  Subsequently, six states implemented complete 
bans on MTBE: Colorado (effective as of May 2002), Michigan (June 2003), California, Connecticut and New York 
(January 2004), and Minnesota (July 2005).  In addition, ten states limited MTBE in motor vehicle fuel to no more 
than trace amounts: Washington (January 2004), Illinois, Indiana and Kansas (July 2004), Wisconsin (August 2004), 
Arizona (January 2005), Ohio (July 2005), Missouri and North Dakota (August 2005), and Kentucky (January 2006).  
This second wave of complete and partial bans had a substantial impact on gasoline additive markets, as it involved 
states that accounted for a substantial share of total MTBE consumed in the United States.  Six other states (Maine, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont) also passed legislation limiting MTBE in 
motor fuel to no more than trace amounts, but the May 2006 federal phase out of the oxygenate requirement came into 
force before state regulations became effective. 
49 Unlike ethanol, MTBE can be shipped through existing pipelines, and its volatility is lower, making it easier to meet 
emission standards.  Moreover, ethanol-blended gasoline cannot be intermingled with other gasolines during the 
summer months.  MTBE was the oxygenate of choice in all metropolitan areas subject to the Reformulated Gasoline 
Program in the 1990s, except for greater Chicago, Milwaukee-Racine (WI) and Covington (KY), where ethanol was 
the preferred gasoline additive (EPA, 2014). 
50 MTBE has not been used in significant quantities in oxygenated or reformulated gasoline areas since 2005. A similar 
decrease in MTBE use has also been observed in conventional gasoline areas (EPA, 2014). 
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Figure 3.3: Additives as a share of gasoline weight in selected metropolitan areas,  
United States, 1995-2006 
 
Notes: Short-term fluctuations reflect seasonal (summer vs. winter) differences in gasoline composition. 
Data for the Los Angeles metropolitan area is only available for 1996-2005. 
Source: Author.  Based on EPA (2014). 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.): Additives as a share of gasoline weight in selected metropolitan areas, 
United States, 1995-2006 
 
Notes: Short-term fluctuations reflect seasonal (summer vs. winter) differences in gasoline composition. 
Source: Author.  Based on EPA (2014). 
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In the New York metropolitan area (Panel A), ethanol accounted for close to zero percent 
of the weight of reformulated gasoline until January 2004, when the state introduced a ban on 
MTBE.  Within two years, ethanol completely substituted MTBE as a gasoline additive.  In the 
Los Angeles metropolitan area (Panel B), ethanol replaced MTBE even before California 
implemented its ban on MTBE in January 2004.  All major refiners in the state switched to ethanol 
in early 2003 in anticipation of impending regulatory changes (RFA, 2003).  By the end of the 
year, ethanol accounted for more than 90 percent of the additives in gasoline sold in the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area. 
Due to its proximity to the heart of the Corn Belt, the Chicago metropolitan area (Panel C) 
relied heavily on ethanol as a gasoline additive since the inception of the oxygenate requirements 
established in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  As of 1999, no traces of MTBE were find 
in surveys of reformulated gasoline in Chicago (EPA, 2014).  The only other reformulated gasoline 
areas in the United States where ethanol accounted for the majority of gasoline additive use were 
Covington (KY), Louisville (KY), Milwaukee-Racine (WI) and Saint Louis (MO), all located in 
the Midwestern region of the country.  Chicago became the first city in the United State to ban the 
manufacture, blending, delivery, sale, distribution or use of MTBE in December 2000. 
In the absence of a state ban on MTBE in Texas, gasoline blenders in the Dallas-Fort Worth 
metropolitan area (Panel D) continued to rely almost exclusively on MTBE as an additive until an 
explicit federal ethanol blending mandate came into force in 2006.  A similar pattern was observed 
in other US metropolitan areas located in states that did not implement MTBE bans, including 
Baltimore, Boston, Houston, Manchester, Philadelphia, Providence, Richmond, Virginia Beach, 
and Washington. 
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In order to attain the minimum levels of oxygen required by the Winter Oxygenated Fuels 
Program and the Reformulated Gasoline Program, blenders were compelled to mix gasoline with, 
respectively, 7.4 percent and 5.8 percent of ethanol by volume (EIA, 2000).  Given the levels of 
oxygenated and reformulated gasoline sales prevailing in the United States in 2004-2006, the 
phasing out of MTBE established a guaranteed minimum annual demand for 8 billion liters of 
ethanol as an oxygenate.  It also created an additional annual demand for 10.1 billion liters of 
ethanol as an octane enhancer for conventional gasoline.  In total, the substitution away from 
MTBE effectively established an implicit blending mandate equivalent to 18.1 billion liters of 
ethanol per year. 
Established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was 
the first explicit biofuel mandate at the US federal level, requiring 4 billion gallons (15.1 billion 
liters) of renewable fuel to be blended into gasoline in 2006 and 7.5 billion gallons (28.4 billion 
liters) by 2012.51  Given that the implicit mandate for ethanol as a gasoline additive already 
required 18.1 billion liters of the biofuel per year, the explicit RFS mandate was not binding in its 
two initial years.  The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 expanded the RFS program 
significantly by including diesel, in addition to gasoline, and by extending target volumes to 9 
billion gallons (34 billion liters) in 2008 and 36 billion gallons (136.3 billion liters) by 2022, of 
which 21 billion gallons (79.5 billion liters) for advanced (i.e. non-corn starch) biofuels.  The 
effective cap on corn starch ethanol that may qualify under the RFS program corresponds to the 
difference between the total renewable fuel mandate and the advanced biofuel mandate, or 15 
billion gallons (56.8 billion liters) by 2022. 
                                               
51 At the time the federal ethanol mandate was instituted in 2005, Minnesota and Hawaii had already implemented 
statewide ethanol mandates requiring a 10 percent blend of ethanol in gasoline.  In Hawaii, the rule applied to only 85 
percent of the gasoline sold in the state.  These state mandates were predated by a 1999 county level mandate in Clark 
County, Nevada, requiring a 10 volume percent ethanol blend for gasoline sold from October through March. 
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Import tariffs create a gap between domestic and border prices.  When tariffs and binding 
mandates occur at the same time, equilibrium prices are higher, but the gap remains unchanged.  
The benefit of calculating the value of price support transfers through an MPD is that it isolates 
the effect of tariffs from that of blending mandates.  Additional policies that raise the price received 
by producers for a commodity without raising consumer prices, like production and consumption 
subsidies, are accounted for under revenue foregone or budgetary outlays. 
Total transfers to ethanol producers arising from MPS in the United States are equal to the 
MPD multiplied by the appropriate ethanol base quantity, which is either domestic production or 
consumption, depending on the US net trade status in a given year.  More formally: 
 𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑀𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝑄𝐵
𝑈𝑆 = (𝑃𝑈𝑆 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓) ∗ 𝑄𝐵
𝑈𝑆  (3.5) 
where:  𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 :   Transfers to US ethanol arising from MPS measures 
𝑄𝐵
𝑈𝑆:  US ethanol base quantity 
𝑃𝑈𝑆:  US ethanol price 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓:  Reference ethanol price 
Annual average domestic producer prices are obtained from the USDA (2014a).  In order 
to capture the appropriate opportunity cost, the choice of reference price is determined by the 
country’s net trade status in a given year.  As the United States was a net importer of ethanol 
between 2002 and late 2009, the reference price for this sub-period corresponds to an import price 
based on the Brazilian ex-mill anhydrous ethanol price (CEPEA, 2014), adjusted for insurance and 
freight costs (USITC, 2014).  Since the country was a net exporter between late 2009 and 2012, 
the reference price in this second sub-period is given by the FOB unit value of US exports (USITC, 
2014), discounted for the average cost of transporting ethanol from the Midwestern region of the 
United States to the port of New York (Reynolds, 2002). 
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International trade in ethanol is done under two six-digit tariff subheadings of the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS): undenatured ethanol (HS 220710) 
and denatured ethanol (HS 220720).  The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States further 
divides these subheadings into three eight-digit tariff items: undenatured ethanol for beverage 
purposes (HS 22071030), undenatured ethanol for non-beverage purposes (HS 22071060), and 
denatured ethanol (HS 22072000).  Since HS 22071030 is not a biofuel, the export unit value for 
ethanol calculated in this subsection corresponds to the weighted average of the export unit values 
for the other two ethanol tariff items (HS 22071060 and HS 22072000). 
MPS estimates for ethanol in the United States in 2002-2012 are summarized in Table 3.7.  
Price transfers to producers were on average US$1.8 billion per year in the sub-period in which 
the United States was a net importer of ethanol and US$427 million per year in the sub-period in 
which the country was a net exporter.  Transfers were especially high in 2006-2008, when annual 
MPS fluctuated between US$2.7 billion and US$ 4 billion per year.  At the time, ever expanding 
and more cost efficient production in Brazil kept the world price significantly below the US 
domestic price, as reflected in annual MPDs of between US$0.11 per liter and 0.15 US$ per liter. 
After the world food price and financial crises in 2008-2009, the situation changed 
drastically.  Ethanol MPS in the United States was zero in two out of three years in 2010-2012.  A 
poor sugarcane harvest in India drove up world sugar prices, contributing to a diversion of 
sugarcane in Brazil away from ethanol and into sugar production.  Lower growth in Brazilian 
sugarcane yields further reduced feedstock availability.  Skyrocket world sugar prices, increased 
debt, and a substantial appreciation of the Brazilian Real led to rising production costs and spiraling 
ethanol prices in Brazil.  In a context of higher prices and lower Brazilian exports, the United 
States became a net ethanol exporter in late 2009. 
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Table 3.7: Market price support for ethanol, United States, 2002-2012 
 
Net 
Trade 
Status 
Year 
Producer 
Price 
Reference 
Price 
MPD 
Base 
Quantity 
MPS 
(US$/liter) (US$/liter) (US$/liter) (Million liters) (Million US$) 
Net 
Importer 
2002 0.30 0.27 0.02 8,101 195 
2003 0.36 0.32 0.04 10,616 435 
2004 0.45 0.30 0.15 12,887 1,871 
2005 0.47 0.42 0.05 14,780 793 
2006 0.68 0.53 0.15 18,489 2,863 
2007 0.59 0.48 0.11 24,685 2,716 
2008 0.65 0.54 0.11 35,237 4,018 
Jan-Jul 2009 0.45 0.39 0.06 22,631 1,323 
2002-Jul 2009 
annual average 
       1,802 
Net 
Exporter 
Aug-Dec 2009 0.51 0.56 (0.05) 18,691 0 
2010 0.51 0.57 (0.07) 48,673 0 
2011 0.71 0.68 0.03  48,805 1,459 
2012 0.63 0.65 (0.03) 48,763 0 
Aug 2009-2012 
annual average 
        427 
 
Notes: MPD: Market price differential.  MPS: Market price support. 
Reference price is adjusted CIF import price in 2002-July 2009 and FOB export price in Aug 2009-2012.   
Base volume is ethanol production in 2002-July 2009 and ethanol consumption in Aug 2009-2012. 
Sources: Author’s calculations.  Based on CEPEA (2014), EIA (2014a), USDA (2014a) and USITC (2014). 
 
US environmental standards contributed to the negative MPD between domestic and 
foreign ethanol.  At the federal level, the RFS advanced biofuels volume requirements, for which 
sugarcane ethanol qualifies but corn ethanol does not, established a premium for imported 
sugarcane ethanol.  The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) further contributed to the 
establishment of a premium for fuels with a lower carbon intensity score.  As sugarcane ethanol is 
significantly less carbon intense than corn ethanol, the LCFS assigned it a greater number of credits 
that fuel providers may use to offset the high carbon intensity scores of fossil fuels and ensure that 
annual carbon intensity targets for their overall fuel pool are met. 
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A positive MPD in 2011 implies that domestic ethanol sales were priced higher than 
exports.  Accordingly, the European Commission found that the United States was engaging in 
dumping practices in the European market between October 2010 and September 2011 (EU, 2013).  
Moreover, the imminent expiration of federal tax credits in 2011 encouraged blenders to intensify 
blending operations in order to get as much of the credit as possible prior to year-end, which 
promoted higher domestic prices.  In the renewed context in which the United States was a net 
exporter of ethanol, import tariffs became virtually irrelevant, making the elimination of the 
additional import duty less problematic.  Nonetheless, if domestic prices rise and world prices fall 
in the future, the United States may attempt to reinstate the additional duty on ethanol imports. 
 
3.2.1.3 Lower Input Costs 
Given that 70 percent of total costs incurred in ethanol production in the United States are 
associated with the acquisition of feedstock, corn and grain sorghum subsidies can be an important 
element in determining profitability in the industry.  Subsidies on feedstock decrease the domestic 
price of grains and have a positive impact on the margin of ethanol plants, which are largely 
dependent on the availability of cheap local feedstock supplies.  While production costs may not 
have a major impact on pricing decisions, they do affect production volume.  Plants typically 
operate as long as their net plant price exceeds cash production costs.  Once sales prices fall to a 
level that does not allow a gross margin above production costs, they will shut down temporarily.  
Total feedstock subsidies for the ethanol industry in the United States (𝐺𝐹𝑆
𝑈𝑆) are defined as 
the sum of corn and grain sorghum subsidies prorated by the shares of domestic feedstock that 
went into the production of ethanol.  More formally: 
 𝐺𝐹𝑆
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐺𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆 = 𝜃𝐶
𝑈𝑆?̂?𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝜃𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆?̂?𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆 (3.6) 
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where   𝐺𝐶
𝑈𝑆:  Corn feedstock subsidies for US ethanol industry 
𝐺𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆:  Grain sorghum feedstock subsidies for US ethanol industry 
𝜃𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Share of US corn output used by the ethanol industry 
?̂?𝐶
𝑈𝑆:  Total corn production subsidies in the United States 
𝜃𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆 :  Share of US grain sorghum output used by the ethanol industry 
?̂?𝐺𝑆
𝑈𝑆:  Total grain sorghum production subsidies in the United States 
Total corn and grain sorghum production subsidies in the United States averaged US$5.2 
billion a year between 2002 and 2012 (Table 3.8).  Since certain subsidy programs were counter-
cyclical in nature, payments varied significantly from year to year, ranging from a low of US$3 
billion in 2003 to a high of nearly US$11 billion in 2006.  A significant portion of these subsidies 
supported the US ethanol production chain, as distilleries consumed large shares of domestic corn 
and grain sorghum output.  With the expansion in the share of domestic corn destined to ethanol 
production from 11 percent in 2002 to 43 percent in 2012, the estimate of total feedstock subsidies 
going to the ethanol industry escalated from US$664 million in 2002 to US$2.2 billion in 2012. 
The subsidy figures in Table 3.8 indicate both the colossal magnitude of agricultural 
domestic support in the United States and the key position of the US ethanol industry as a primary 
user of subsidized feedstock.  However, in order to identify the true impact that agricultural 
subsidies had on the ethanol sector between 2002 and 2012, it is necessary to determine whether 
these subsidies translated into lower feedstock input prices for ethanol producers.  Based on a 
partial equilibrium model of the world corn sector, Sumner (2005) concluded that US agricultural 
subsidies depressed the world price of corn by 9 to 10 percent in 2006.  Replicating Sumner’s 
model for the entire 2002-2012 period, we estimate that the effect of subsidies on corn prices was 
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generally modest, ranging between –1 percent and –3 percent for all years, except 2005 (–7.2 
percent) and 2006 (–10 percent), when subsidization levels were extraordinarily high. 
 
Table 3.8:  Prorated feedstock subsidies for ethanol, United States, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Agricultural Subsidies 
Share of Output Used 
in Ethanol Production 
Prorated Feedstock Subsidies 
Corn Sorghum Total Corn Sorghume Corn Sorghum Total 
Million US$ Million US$ Million US$ % % Million US$ Million US$ Million US$ 
2002 5,809 497 6,306 11% 5% 639 25 664 
2003 2,712 254 2,966 12% 6% 325 15 341 
2004 2,846 264 3,110 11% 9% 313 24 337 
2005 8,355 538 8,893 14% 11% 1,170 59 1,229 
2006 10,345 534 10,879 20% 13% 2,069 69 2,138 
2007 2,985 242 3,227 23% 17% 687 41 728 
2008 3,836 284 4,120 31% 12% 1,189 34 1,223 
2009 4,200 311 4,511 35% 29% 1,470 90 1,560 
2010 4,101 272 4,373 40% 31% 1,640 84 1,725 
2011 3,674 265 3,939 40% 32% 1,470 85 1,554 
2012 4,838 317 5,155 43% 43% 2,080 136 2,217 
2002-2012 
average 
4,882 343 5,225 25% 19% 1,187 60 1,247 
 
Notes: Agricultural subsidies include direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, loan deficiency payments, 
marketing loan gains, certificate exchange gains, and crop insurance.  e Estimate. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on USDA (2014b), USDA (2014c) and USDA (2014d). 
 
Transfers to the ethanol sector arising from lower feedstock costs are estimated by 
multiplying the total quantity of corn used in the production of ethanol by the annual average price 
of corn and the percentage price effect of corn subsidies.  More formally: 
 𝐺𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = −( 𝐿𝐶
𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐶
𝑊𝜇𝐶 ) (3.7) 
where   𝐺𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 :  Transfers to US ethanol arising from lower input costs 
𝐿𝐶
𝑈𝑆:  Quantity of corn used by the ethanol industry in the United States 
𝑃𝐶
𝑊:  World price of corn 
𝜇𝐶 :  Percentage price effect of US corn subsidies 
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Total transfers to ethanol producers arising from lower input costs are summarized in Table 
3.9.  Between 2002 and 2012, the US ethanol sector benefited on average from US$204 million a 
year in lower feedstock costs as a result of agricultural production subsidies provided by the federal 
government.  This indirect subsidy for ethanol producers varied significantly over time due to the 
countercyclical nature of certain US agricultural support programs, ranging from US$45 million 
in 2003 to US$424 million in 2006.  The subsidy per unit of corn used was generally between 
US$1.50 and US$2.50 per ton, but reached record highs in 2005 (US$6 per ton) and 2006 (US$8 
per ton), when corn production subsidies were at their highest.  Given that feedstock costs 
accounted for 70 percent of the cost structure of an average ethanol mill in the United States, corn 
subsidies generated an average reduction of 2 percent in the total costs of the US ethanol industry 
between 2002 and 2012.  In years with higher corn subsidy levels, such as 2005 and 2006, the 
average reduction in the total cost of the ethanol industry ranged from 5 percent to 7 percent.   
 
Table 3.9: Lower input costs for ethanol due to corn subsidies, United States, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Corn Price 
Estimated Price Effects 
of Corn Subsidies 
Corn Used 
in Ethanol  
Lower 
Input Costs 
(US$/ton) (%) (US$/ton) (million tons) (US$ million) 
2002 78.80 -2.9% -2.26 25 56 
2003 92.80 -1.7% -1.55 29 45 
2004 96.80 -2.3% -2.22 33 73 
2005 82.40 -7.2% -5.97 40 239 
2006 80.00 -10.0% -8.00 53 424 
2007 121.60 -1.8% -2.14 76 163 
2008 168.00 -1.3% -2.12 93 197 
2009 162.40 -1.4% -2.29 115 263 
2010 142.00 -1.4% -2.05 125 258 
2011 207.20 -1.0% -1.99 125 249 
2012 248.80 -1.0% -2.43 116 282 
2002-2012 
average 
134.62 -2.9% -3.00 76 204 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on USDA (2014b), USDA (2014c) and USDA (2014d). 
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3.2.1.4 Budgetary Outlays 
Budgetary transfers are the most transparent category of support.  They are also the easiest to 
measure, as they are observed and do not need to be estimated.  Measuring budgetary transfers is 
an accounting exercise: it depends on data availability and not on estimation methodologies. 
The US federal government maintained a number of subsidy programs for ethanol, biofuels 
and renewable energy between 2002 and 2012, including the Bioenergy Program, the Bioenergy 
Program for Advanced Biofuels, the Biorefinery Assistance Program, the Rural Energy for 
America Program, and several research and development initiatives.  Federal budgetary outlays to 
the ethanol sector (𝐺𝐹𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆 ) between 2002 and 2012 are summarized in Table 3.10, along with state 
and total budgetary outlays to the ethanol sector (𝐺𝑆𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆  and 𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆, respectively) in the same period. 
 
Table 3.10: Budgetary outlays to the ethanol sector, United States, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
_________________Federal Budgetary Outlays_______________ 
State 
Budgetary 
Outlays 
Total 
Budgetary 
Outlays 
Bioenergy 
Program 
Bioenergy 
Program for 
Advanced 
Biofuels 
Biorefinery 
Assistance 
Program* 
Repowering 
Assistance 
Program 
Total  
(Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) 
2002 66 - - - 66 45 111 
2003 131 - - - 131 55 186 
2004 129 - - - 129 49 178 
2005 66 - - - 66 38 104 
2006 14 - - - 14 38 52 
2007 - - - - 0 41 41 
2008 - - - - 0 54 54 
2009 - 7 233 0 240 47 287 
2010 - 18 43 2 63 46 109 
2011 - 18 84 0 103 45 148 
2012 - 10 117 5 132 29 161 
2002-2012 
average 
37 5 43 1 86 44 130 
 
Note: Outlays listed under the Biorefinery Assistance Program include additional grants provided by the DOE. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on data from multiple official US federal and state government sources. 
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Originally established by executive order in 1999 and reauthorized by the Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002, the Bioenergy Program made payments to ethanol and biodiesel 
producers who augmented their purchases of eligible agricultural commodities and converted those 
commodities into increased bioenergy production, as compared to the corresponding period in the 
prior fiscal year.  The program lasted from 2002 to June 2006.  Annual payments to ethanol 
producers for eligible purchases of agricultural feedstock under the Bioenergy Program were 
approximately US$130 million in both 2002 and 2003, and dropped to US$69 million in 2004 and 
US$14 million in 2005.  Most of the support was directed to purchases of corn, which accounted 
for 96.5 percent of total program outlays to ethanol producers.  Grain sorghum and wheat had a 
limited participation, accounting for respectively 3.2 percent and 0.3 percent of total outlays. 
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 replaced the Bioenergy Program with the 
Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels (BPAB), which provided producers of advanced 
biofuels with payments contingent on base and incremental production volumes, plant size, and 
feedstock type.  Eligible payment recipients must produce biofuels from renewable biomass, other 
than corn kernel starch.  In fiscal year 2009, BPAB payments totaled US$14.7 million, of which 
US$7.3 went to ethanol producers (US$6.8 million for ethanol produced from grain sorghum and 
US$500,000 for ethanol obtained from other non-corn kernel sources).  BPAB payments for 
ethanol producers more than doubled in fiscal years 2010 and 2011.  For the entire 2009-2012 
period, BPAB payments to ethanol producers were on average US$13.5 million per year. 
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 also introduced three renewable energy 
subsidy programs for which ethanol was eligible: the Biorefinery Assistance Program (BAP), the 
Repowering Assistance Program (RAP), and the Rural Energy for America Program (REAP).  The 
BAP provided guaranteed loans for the development and construction of commercial-scale 
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biorefineries or for the retrofitting of existing facilities using eligible technology for the 
development of advanced biofuels.  Obligated USDA amounts for ethanol production facilities 
under this program totaled US$27 million in 2009, US$84 million in 2010 and US$117 million in 
2012.  A number of BAP recipients received additional grants from the United States Department 
of Energy (DOE) in the order of US$206 million in 2009 and US$43 million in 2010.  The dollar 
amounts listed under BPA outlays in Table 3.10 include this supplementary funding. 
The RAP provided payments to eligible biorefineries to help offset the costs associated 
with converting existing fossil fuels systems with renewable biomass fuel systems.  RAP payments 
to ethanol producers totaled US$2 million in 2010 and US$5 million in 2012.  Finally, the REAP 
provided grants and loan guarantees to agricultural producers and small rural business to facilitate 
access to renewable energy systems, make energy efficiency improvements to non-residential 
buildings and facilities, use renewable technologies that reduce energy consumption, and 
participate in energy audits, renewable energy development assistance, and feasibility studies.  
Since he great majority of REAP funding has been used for renewable energy sources other than 
ethanol, disbursements under this program are not included in the estimate of total budgetary 
outlays for the US ethanol sector. 
Other US federal programs that provided payments to the ethanol sector between 2002 and 
2012 included research and development initiatives under the auspices of the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Energy.  As research and development subsidies constitute 
support to general services and do not provide transfers to specific producers or consumers, they 
are not included in support estimates for the ethanol sector in this chapter. 
In addition to federal payments, ten states provided budgetary transfers to ethanol 
producers directly linked to ethanol production levels.  For example, Missouri’s Ethanol Producer 
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Incentive Fund provided payments of US$0.20 per gallon for the first 12.5 million gallons of 
ethanol produced by each producer and U$0.05 for the second 12.5 million gallons.  Minnesota 
paid ethanol producers US$0.20 per gallon up to annual limits of US$3 million per plant and 
US$30 million for all plants in the state.  Between 2002 and 2011, Minnesota alone provided 
producer payments in the order of US$200 million, or an average of US$20 million per year. 
Total budgetary outlays for US ethanol producers averaged US$130 million a year between 
2002 and 2012, with two-thirds coming from federal funds and the balance from state 
governments. 
 
3.2.1.5 Subsidy Equivalent Value 
Drawing from the OECD methodology for calculating Total Support Estimates (TSE) for 
agricultural products, transfers to the ethanol sector are classified according to their intended 
recipient as either production or consumption subsidies. 
Measures that affect producers ethanol producers in the United States – production tax 
concessions (𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ), market price support (𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 ), lower input costs (𝐺𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ) and budgetary outlays 
(𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆) – are included in the Producer Support Estimate (𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆).  Measures that affect consumers 
– consumption tax concessions (𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ) and adjusted market price support (𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆∗
𝑈𝑆 ) – are included 
in the Consumer Support Estimate (𝐶𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆).  For the 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆, MPS is adjusted to apply to quantities 
consumed (as opposed to quantities produced in the 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆).  More formally: 
 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆 = 𝐺𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆 (3.8) 
 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆 = 𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 − 𝐺𝑀𝑃𝑆∗
𝑈𝑆  (3.9) 
Based on these values, it is possible to derive the Subsidy Equivalent Value (SEV) for the 
US ethanol sector, which corresponds to the sum of all forms of support under the PSE and CSE, 
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adjusted for double-counting given that the transfers associated with MPS policies appear in both 
the PSE and CSE calculations.  Consequently, SEV amounts to the sum of the PSE and 
consumption tax concessions.  More formally: 
 𝑆𝐸𝑉𝑈𝑆 = 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆 + 𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆  (3.10) 
The SEV estimated in this chapter differs from the TSE calculated by the OECD in that it 
does not incorporate transfers provided as general services, such as investments in research, 
development, training, inspection and promotion.  While the OECD classifies these transfers under 
the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) category and includes them in the derivation of the 
TSE, they are excluded from the SEV because they do not cause significant distortions in 
production, consumption or trade.  Therefore, the acronym SEV is used to distinguish between the 
indicator derived in this chapter and the one originally developed by the OECD. 
PSE, CSE and SEV for the ethanol sector in the United States are summarized in Table 
3.11.  The SEV was on average US$5.2 billion per year between 2002 and 2012, of which US$1.8 
billion came in the form of producer support and US$3.4 billion as consumption tax concessions. 
Support varied significantly over time, from a low of US$674 million in 2012 to a high of US$9.7 
billion in 2008.  The year of 2012 stands out as it reflects significant policy changes in the United 
States, such as the elimination of the VEETC, SEPT and additional import duty, as well as the 
suspension of a number of state consumer and producer tax concessions.  The period between late 
2009 and 2012 also reflects changes in world market conditions, with production costs rising in 
Brazil, the United States becoming a net exporter, and environmental standards in the United States 
creating a premium for imported sugarcane, resulting in the emergence of policy-induced two-way 
trade between the world’s two largest producers of ethanol. 
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Table 3.11: Subsidy equivalent value for the ethanol sector, United States, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Measures Affecting 
______________Producers______________ 
Measures Affecting 
______Consumers______ 
Subsidy 
Equivalent 
Value 
(SEV) PTC MPS LIC BO PSE CTC MPS* CSE 
2002 22 195 56 111 383 1,219 189 1,030 1,602 
2003 26 435 45 186 693 1,559 439 1,120 2,252 
2004 36 1,871 73 178 2,159 1,959 1,947 7 4,117 
2005 39 793 239 104 1,175 2,186 824 1,362 3,361 
2006 120 2,863 424 52 3,459 3,004 3,213 -209 6,464 
2007 143 2,716 163 41 3,063 3,738 2,867 870 6,800 
2008 152 4,018 197 54 4,421 5,290 4,168 1,110 9,711 
2009 152 1,323 263 287 2,025 5,218 1,338 3,880 7,243 
2010 157 0 258 109 523 6,169 0 6,169 6,692 
2011 147 1,459 249 148 2,002 6,567 1,459 5,107 8,569 
2012 10 0 282 161 453 226 0 226 678 
2002-2012 
average 
91 1,425 204 130 1,850 3,376 1,496 1,879 5,226 
 
Notes: PSE: Producer support estimate; CSE: Consumer support estimate; PTC: Production tax concessions; MPS: 
Market price support; LIC: Lower input costs; BO: Budgetary outlays; CTC: Consumption tax concessions; 
MPS*: Adjusted market price support. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Nearly two-thirds of the SEV for ethanol in the United States in 2002-2012 came in the 
form of consumption tax concessions, most notably through the VEETC.  Market price support 
accounted on average for 27 percent of total support.  Lower input costs represented 4 percent of 
total support, and production tax concessions and budgetary outlays each accounted for 2 percent.  
The make-up of the total subsidy equivalent also fluctuated over time.  While the VEETC 
accounted for the majority of support in every year, transfer due to MPS were as large as transfers 
under the VEETC in 2004 and 2006, the two years with the greatest differential between domestic 
and reference prices.  Finally, after the elimination of both federal tax credits and the specific 
import tariff in December 2011, lower input costs due to feedstock subsidies became the most 
important source of support to the ethanol sector, followed by direct producer payments under 
budgetary outlays. 
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Overall subsidization rates per liter of ethanol produced in the United States expanded 
significantly between 2002 and 2006, but generally followed a downward trend between 2007 and 
2012 (Figure 3.4).  The ethanol subsidization rate increased from 20 cents per liter in 2002 to a 
peak of 35 cents per liter in 2006.  Subsequently, it declined to 28 cents per liter in 2007-2008, 16 
cents per liter on average in 2009-2011, and 1.3 cents per liter after the elimination of the VEETC, 
SEPTC and the additional import duty in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Ethanol SEV and SEV per liter produced, United States, 2002-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
3.2.2. Brazil 
Support for the ethanol sector in Brazil dates back to the National Alcohol Program (Proálcool) 
that emerged in the aftermath of the first oil crisis of the 1970s.  Strong government intervention 
in favor of ethanol production and consumption through a number of diverse policy instruments 
contributed to the development of the world’s most advanced biofuel sector.  After a hiatus in the 
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1990s, in which ethanol lost ground to cheap imported gasoline, the sector made a successful come 
back in the early twenty-first century, now in a deregulated context.  Fuel price controls, which 
had been progressively relaxed since 1996, were finally eliminated in 2002.  One year later, the 
first flexible-fuel vehicles with the ability to run on either ethanol or blended gasoline became 
available in the Brazilian market — a sign of a new era for the ethanol sector. 
There are two types of ethanol used as transportation fuel in Brazil: anhydrous ethanol, 
which is blended into gasoline, and hydrous ethanol, which is used alone in vehicles with flexible-
fuel engines.  Brazilian policies and prices vary according to the type of ethanol in question.  The 
competition between hydrous ethanol and gasoline occurs daily at filling stations, as consumers 
with flexible-fuel vehicles elect their fuel of choice based on relative prices.  Since the first 
commercial flexible-fuel vehicles were launched in early 2003, they have led sales of new 
automobiles and rapidly transformed the profile of Brazil’s automobile fleet.  Figure 3.5 illustrates 
the change in the composition of the Brazilian fleet, by fuel type, between 2006 and 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Brazilian automobile and light vehicle fleet (Otto cycle), by fuel type, 2006-2012 
 
Source: UNICA (2014). 
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Although the growth in the flexible-fuel automobile fleet intensified competition between 
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in Brazil, some competition between the two fuels already existed 
prior to the advent of the flexible-fuel engine, as they were preceded by engines that ran 
exclusively on hydrous ethanol.  From the 1980s until 2003, Brazilian consumers selected between 
gasoline and hydrous ethanol when they decided on the type of automobile to buy at the dealer.  
Since 2003, Brazilians have been able to choose between gasoline and hydrous ethanol every time 
they fill up at the pump.  A key difference between transportation fuel markets in the United States 
and Brazil is that while ethanol is used only in blended fuels in the former, it may be a direct 
substitute to gasoline at the point of sale in the latter. 
Between 2002 and 2012, the ethanol sector in Brazil was supported by a lower tax burden 
as compared to gasoline at both the federal and state levels.  In addition, minimal amounts of 
support were provided in the form of production subsidies to sugarcane producers and marketing 
credit equalization for ethanol distilleries.  Despite the existence of a mandatory requirement to 
blend ethanol into gasoline, domestic ethanol prices were below border prices in 2002-2012.  This 
subsection investigates Brazilian ethanol policies under the same prism used to analyze US ethanol 
policies, namely by examining whether transfers are provided through revenue foregone, market 
price support or budgetary outlays. 
 
3.2.2.1. Revenue Foregone 
The Brazilian government stimulates the consumption of hydrous ethanol at the expense of C-
gasoline (a mixture of 75-80 percent gasoline and 20-25 percent anhydrous ethanol) through the 
imposition of a lower tax burden on the former as compared to the latter. 
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Transportation fuels were subject to four key tributes in Brazil in 2002-2012: (i) the 
Contribution for Intervention in the Economic Domain (CIDE), (ii) the Contribution to the Social 
Integration Program (PIS), (iii) the Contribution to Finance Social Security (COFINS), and (iv) 
the Tax on the Circulation of Merchandise and Services (ICMS).  While CIDE, PIS and COFINS 
are federal “contributions” (i.e. taxes destined to finance specific social or economic programs), 
ICMS is a state tax.  Ethanol received preferential tax treatment in Brazil in the form of lower 
taxation rates in all three of the federal contributions, as well as in lower ICMS rates in some key 
Brazilian states, most notably in São Paulo. 
The CIDE was first instituted in 2002, as a tax on the commercialization and importation of 
petroleum and derived products, natural gas and derived products, and fuel ethanol.  Statutory rates 
vary according to fuel type, with the highest rate falling on gasoline and the lowest on ethanol.  
From the outset, a presidential decree exempted ethanol from the tax.  Figure 3.6 depicts CIDE 
rates for gasoline between 2002 and 2012.  The rate was fixed at R$0.28 per liter from January 
2002 to April 2008, and fluctuated between R$0.091 per liter and R$0.23 per liter from May 2008 
to June 2012.  Between July 2012 and December 2012, gasoline was exempt from the tax. 
PIS and COFINS are social contributions levied on the gross revenues of legal entities to 
finance unemployment benefits and the social security system,.  Since they are similar in structure, 
they are often lumped together and referred to as PIS/COFINS.  Gross revenues derived from the 
sale of transportation fuels are subject to a special regime of concentrated taxation.  In the case of 
gasoline, PIS/COFINS contributions are calculated by applying a higher concentrated rate on 
producers and importers, whilst exempting distributors and retailers.  In the case of ethanol, 
producers, importers and distributors are subject to higher concentrated rates, exemptions applying 
only to retailers.  Concentrated PIS/COFINS rates differ across fuel and legal entity types.  In 
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2012, gasoline producers and importers were subject to a combined PIS/COFINS rate of R$0.2616 
per liter or 28.5 percent of gross revenues, whichever was lower.  By comparison, ethanol 
producers and importers were taxed at a rate of R$0.0435 per liter or 8.4 percent of gross revenues, 
and ethanol distributors at a rate of R$0.12029 per liter or 21 percent of gross revenues.  Given 
prevailing fuel prices, legal entities generally favored specific over ad valorem rates in 2002-2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: CIDE tax rate for gasoline, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil (2014). 
 
ICMS is a value-added tax applied on goods and certain transportation and communication 
services.  ICMS rates for transportation fuels may vary across fuel type, between states, and over 
time.52  Average annual ICMS rates on hydrous ethanol in 2002-2012 ranged from 14.3 percent in 
São Paulo to 29 percent in Pará, with most states having a rate of 25 percent.  Variance was less 
                                               
52 While several Brazilian states adopt a standard formula by which the ICMS tax is the product of the ICMS rate and 
the price paid by consumers, some states adopt an alternative approach in which the ICMS tax corresponds to the 
product of the ICMS rate and an official estimated price.  This alternative ICMS tax does not vary with the real price 
of the purchased product, but with an estimated price that can vary significantly over time and across states.  Since it 
would be very onerous to collect the necessary data to apply this alternative method, ICMS taxes for all Brazilian 
states are calculated according to the standard methodology. 
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pronounced in the case of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline, with average annual ICMS rates ranging 
from a low of 23.5 percent in Roraima to highs of 29 percent in Pará (for anhydrous ethanol) and 
30.9 percent in Rio de Janeiro (for gasoline).  National average ICMS rates, weighted by the share 
of each state in national hydrous ethanol sales, were 18.2 percent for hydrous ethanol, 25.4 percent 
for anhydrous ethanol and 25.7 percent for gasoline. 
In 2012, ICMS rates on hydrous ethanol were lower than those for gasoline in twelve out of 
the twenty-seven states in Brazil.53  Most importantly, these states accounted for 90 percent of 
national hydrous ethanol sales.  In addition, ICMS rates on anhydrous ethanol were lower than 
they were on gasoline in seven of these states.  Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict annual average ICMS 
tax rate differentials between gasoline and hydrous and anhydrous ethanol in 2002-2012.  Tax rate 
differentials ranged from 0.4 percentage points in Rio Grande do Norte to 10.7 percentage points 
in São Paulo in the case of hydrous ethanol, and between 0.6 percentage points in Pará to 5.3 
percentage points in Rio de Janeiro in the case of anhydrous ethanol. 
Total consumption tax concessions in favor of ethanol in Brazil (𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑅 ) correspond to the 
sum of revenue foregone as a result of CIDE, PIS/COFINS and ICMS differential tax rates in favor 
of ethanol.  Implicit transfers to ethanol due to CIDE are estimated by multiplying the CIDE tax 
rate differential by the volume of ethanol that was domestically produced and consumed in Brazil: 
 𝐺𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑡𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 ∗ (𝑄𝐶
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑄𝑀
𝐵𝑅) (3.11) 
where  𝐺𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 :  Transfers to Brazilian ethanol arising from CIDE 
𝑡𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 :  CIDE tax rate differential in favor of ethanol 
𝑄𝐶
𝐵𝑅:  Brazilian consumption of ethanol 
𝑄𝑀
𝐵𝑅:  Brazilian imports of ethanol  
                                               
53 Brazil has 26 states and 1 federal district.  For simplification purposes, the federal district is counted as a state. 
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Figure 3.7: ICMS tax rate differentials between gasoline and hydrous ethanol, by state,  
        2002-2012 average 
 
Source:  State secretariats of finance (2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: ICMS tax rate differentials between gasoline and anhydrous ethanol, by state,       
       2002-2012 average 
 
Source:  State secretariats of finance (2014). 
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Revenue foregone due to PIS/COFINS is less straightforward to calculate since gasoline 
and ethanol are subject not only to different tax rates, but also to distinct taxation rules.  While 
gasoline is subject to concentrated taxation at the producer level, hydrous ethanol is levied at both 
the producer and distributor levels.  In addition, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol are subject to 
different sets of rules.  Transfers to ethanol due to PIS/COFINS are given by the difference 
between what the federal government collected under existing rules and what it would collect if 
ethanol was treated in the same way as gasoline, more formally expressed as follows: 
𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑆
𝐵𝑅 = [𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐺
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
∗ (𝑄𝑃𝐻
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑄𝑋𝐻
𝐵𝑅)]
− {[𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐸
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
∗ (𝑄𝑃
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑄𝑋
𝐵𝑅)] + [𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐻
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ (𝑄𝐶𝐻
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑄𝑀𝐻
𝐵𝑅 )]} 
(3.12) 
where  𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑆
𝐵𝑅 :  Transfers to Brazilian ethanol arising from PIS/COFINS 
𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐺
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑: PIS/COFINS tax rate on gasoline producer 
𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐸
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑: PIS/COFINS tax rate on ethanol producer 
𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐻
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 : PIS/COFINS tax rate on hydrous ethanol distributor 
𝑄𝑃
𝐵𝑅 :  Brazilian production of ethanol 
𝑄𝑋
𝐵𝑅 :  Brazilian exports of ethanol 
𝑄𝑃𝐻
𝐵𝑅 :  Brazilian production of hydrous ethanol 
𝑄𝑋𝐻
𝐵𝑅 :  Brazilian exports of hydrous ethanol 
𝑄𝐶𝐻
𝐵𝑅:  Brazilian consumption of hydrous ethanol 
𝑄𝑀𝐻
𝐵𝑅 :  Brazilian imports of hydrous ethanol 
Transfers to ethanol arising from ICMS are equivalent to the sum of revenue foregone in 
each state for each type of ethanol.  For a given type of ethanol (hydrous vs. anhydrous), revenue 
foregone is given by the product of the state ICMS differential rate, the state consumer price and 
the volume of Brazilian ethanol consumed in that particular state: 
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 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆
𝐵𝑅 = ∑ 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐸
𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐸
𝑖 ∗ (𝐶𝐻𝐸
𝑖 − 𝐼𝐻𝐸
𝑖 )
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆𝐴𝐸
𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐴𝐸
𝑖 ∗ (𝐶𝐴𝐸
𝑖 − 𝐼𝐴𝐸
𝑖 )
𝑖
 (3.13) 
where  𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆
𝐵𝑅 :  Transfers to Brazilian ethanol arising from ICMS 
𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐸
𝑖 : ICMS tax rate differential in favor of hydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆𝐴𝐸
𝑖 : ICMS tax rate differential in favor of anhydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐸
𝑖 :  Consumer price of hydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐶𝑃𝐴𝐸
𝑖 :  Consumer price of anhydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐶𝐻𝐸
𝑖 :  Consumption of hydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐶𝐴𝐸
𝑖 :  Consumption of anhydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐼𝐻𝐸
𝑖 :  Imports of hydrous ethanol in state i 
𝐼𝐴𝐸
𝑖 :  Imports of anhydrous ethanol in state i 
Consumption levels are used in the estimations of 𝐺𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 , 𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑆
𝐵𝑅  and 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆
𝐵𝑅  because exports 
are not subject to either CIDE, PIS/COFINS or ICMS.54  This is in contrast with the derivation of 
revenue foregone due to the VEETC in the United States, which was based on production levels.  
The choice of the relevant quantity depends on the incidence of each policy instrument.  While the 
VEETC applied to all ethanol blended within the United States, irrespective of where it was 
produced or consumed, Brazilian tax incentives applied only to domestically consumed ethanol.  
Moreover, imports are deducted from consumption levels in the estimations of 𝐺𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸
𝐵𝑅 , 𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑆
𝐵𝑅  and 
𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑆
𝐵𝑅  in order to account only for support that went to domestic producers.  Nevertheless, the 
exclusion of import volumes has little effect on estimates, as imports were insignificant in 2002-
2010 and accounted for only 3-6 percent of domestic consumption in 2011-2012. 
                                               
54 The Brazilian Federal Constitution exempts exports from PIS/COFINS and CIDE (Article 149, Paragraph 2), as 
well as from ICMS (Article 155, Paragraph 2, X, a). 
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Table 3.12 summarizes total consumption tax concessions in favor of ethanol in 2002-2012, 
as well as separate estimates for transfers arising from CIDE, PIS/COFINS and ICMS in the same 
period.  As there were no production tax concessions for ethanol in Brazil, total consumption tax 
concessions equal total revenue foregone.  Tax concessions provided an average annual subsidy 
of US$2.7 billion to the Brazilian ethanol sector in 2002-2012, of which US$2.1 billion at the 
federal level (CIDE and PIS/COFINS) and US$600 million at the state level (ICMS).  Until 2011, 
CIDE was the single most important source of revenue foregone, accounting for 90 percent of all 
tax concessions in 2002-2003 and 60 percent in 2004-2011.  After gasoline was exempted from 
CIDE in July 2012, ICMS became the main source of revenue foregone in favor of ethanol in 
Brazil.  State governments have adopted an increasingly active role in supporting the ethanol sector 
through tax concessions.  While only two states had an ICMS tax rate differential in favor of 
hydrous ethanol in 2002, twelve did so in 2012. The share of state tax concessions in total revenue 
foregone grew from 1.5 percent in 2002 to 25 percent in 2008 and 51 percent in 2012.  Most 
notably, transfers to ethanol arising from ICMS increased from US$15 million in 2002 to over 
US$1 billion in 2010-2012. 
The state of São Paulo plays a key role in subsidizing ethanol consumption in Brazil.  It is 
the country’s largest producer and consumer of both sugarcane and ethanol.  Between 2002 and 
2012, it accounted for 58 percent of domestic ethanol output and 43 percent of domestic demand.  
Furthermore, the state has the country’s largest population, gross domestic product, and 
automobile fleet.  Not surprisingly, São Paulo was the state with the lowest ICMS tax rate on 
ethanol (12 percent) and the highest tax differential against gasoline (13 percentage points).  Given 
this differential and its large share in domestic consumption, São Paulo independently accounted 
on average for 63 percent of all state level revenue foregone in the country in 2002-2012. 
 231 
 
Table 3.12: Government revenue foregone in favor of ethanol, Brazil, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Transfers arising 
from CIDE 
Transfers arising 
from PIS/COFINS 
Transfers arising 
from ICMS 
Total Revenue 
Foregone 
(Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) (Million US$) 
2002 893 64 15 972 
2003 760 48 27 836 
2004 986 266 187 1,439 
2005 1,214 343 258 1,815 
2006 1,451 400 456 2,307 
2007 2,188 884 604 3,676 
2008 2,250 -108 782 2,924 
2009 2,403 801 993 4,198 
2010 2,678 1,147 1,124 4,948 
2011 2,232 726 1,126 4,085 
2012 386 604 1,042 2,031 
2002-2012 
average 
1,586 470 601 2,657 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
3.2.2.2. Market Price Support 
Unlike in the United States, MPS policies did not have a significant effect on prices in Brazil 
between 2002 and 2012.  Despite the existence of an import tariff for ethanol, domestic prices in 
Brazil were below reference prices.  As a result, estimated MPS for ethanol in Brazil was zero for 
the entire period under analysis (Table 3.13). 
Brazil was a net exporter of ethanol in every year in 2002-2012.  Imports were virtually 
non-existent in 2002-2010, when the country was the world’s largest ethanol exporter.  Although 
import volumes increased in 2011-2012, the country remained a net exporter.  Brazil’s ad valorem 
tariff on ethanol imports, which was set at 20 percent between 2002 and 2009, was reduced to zero 
in 2010 and remained at that level until December 2012.  Moreover, no export subsidies, export 
taxes or export bans were in place for either ethanol, sugar or sugarcane between 2002 and 2012.  
As a result, domestic ethanol producers were not shielded from foreign competition. 
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Table 3.13: Market price support for ethanol, Brazil, 2002-2012 
 
Net 
Trading 
Status 
Year 
Producer 
Price 
Reference 
Price 
Market 
Price 
Differential 
Base 
Volume 
Market 
Price 
Support 
(US$/liter) (US$/liter) (US$/liter) (Million liters) (Million US$) 
Net 
Exporter 
2002 0.20 0.22 (0.02) 9,319 0 
2003 0.21 0.22 (0.00) 8,330 0 
2004 0.20 0.21 (0.01) 10,306 0 
2005 0.30 0.30 (0.00) 10,553 0 
2006 0.41 0.43 (0.02) 11,268 0 
2007 0.36 0.41 (0.05) 15,205 0 
2008 0.40 0.45 (0.06) 19,584 0 
2009 0.39 0.40 (0.01) 22,823 0 
2010 0.52 0.52 (0.00) 22,162 0 
2011 0.71 0.71 (0.00) 19,328 0 
2012 0.57 0.67 (0.10) 17,790 0 
 
Notes: Reference price and base volume correspond to FOB export price and consumption volume, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on ANP (2014), CEPEA (2014) and EIA (2014a). 
 
3.2.2.3. Lower Input Costs 
Production subsidies for sugarcane in Brazil were either zero or very low in every year in the 
period between 2002 and 2012.  As a result, their impact on both the world price of sugarcane and 
the costs of the ethanol industry were nil. 
Feedstock subsidies for the ethanol industry in Brazil (𝐺𝐹𝑆
𝐵𝑅) are defined as sugarcane 
production subsidies prorated by the share of the domestic sugarcane output that went into the 
production of ethanol.  More formally: 
 𝐺𝐹𝑆
𝐵𝑅 = 𝐺𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅 = 𝜃𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅  ?̂?𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅 (3.14) 
where   𝐺𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅:  Sugarcane feedstock subsidies for ethanol industry in Brazil 
𝜃𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅 :  Share of Brazilian sugarcane output used by the ethanol industry 
?̂?𝑆𝐶
𝐵𝑅:  Total sugarcane production subsidies in Brazil 
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Crop subsidy levels, prorated feedstock subsidies, and estimated subsidies in the form of 
lower input costs for the Brazilian ethanol industry are summarized in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.14: Feedstock subsidies and lower input costs for ethanol, Brazil, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Sugarcane 
Production 
Subsidies 
Share of Sugarcane 
Output Used in 
Ethanol Production 
Prorated  
Feedstock 
Subsidies 
Lower Input Costs 
(Million US$) (%) (Million US$) (Million US$) 
2002 7 50% 4 0 
2003 6 51% 3 0 
2004 0 52% 0 0 
2005 0 53% 0 0 
2006 0 50% 0 0 
2007 0.2 55% 0.1 0 
2008 0.7 60% 0.4 0 
2009 32 57% 18 0 
2010 30 55% 17 0 
2011 45 52% 23 0 
2012 0.7 50% 0.4 0 
2002-2012 
average 
11 53% 6 0 
 
Source: Author.  Based on MAPA (2014). 
 
Sugarcane subsidies averaged US$11 million per year in Brazil between 2002 and 2012, a 
very modest figure compared to the average US$4.9 billion per year in corn subsidies provided in 
the United States in the same period.  The magnitude of Brazilian sugarcane and US corn subsidies 
and their relative shares in the total production value of each crop during the 2002-2012 period are 
contrasted in Table 3.15. 
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Table 3.15: Sugarcane subsidies in Brazil and corn subsidies the United States, total values 
and relative shares in the total value of production of each crop, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Sugarcane in Brazil Corn in the United States 
Production 
Subsidies 
Subsidies as a 
Share of Crop 
Production Value 
Production 
Subsidies 
Subsidies as a 
Share of Crop 
Production Value 
(Million US$) (%) (Million US$) (%) 
2002 7 0.2% 5,809 31% 
2003 6 0.1% 2,712 13% 
2004 0 0.0% 2,846 12% 
2005 0 0.0% 8,355 34% 
2006 0 0.0% 10,345 47% 
2007 0.2 0.0% 2,985 9% 
2008 0.7 0.0% 3,836 7% 
2009 32 0.1% 4,200 9% 
2010 30 0.1% 4,101 9% 
2011 45 0.2% 3,674 6% 
2012 0.7 0.0% 4,838 6% 
2002-2012 
average 
11 0.07% 4,882 17% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on MAPA (2014), USDA (2014b), USDA (2014c) and USDA (2014d). 
 
Given that sugarcane subsidies in Brazil represented on average less than 0.1 percent of the 
sugarcane production value in 2002-2012, it is assumed that they had no impact on sugarcane 
prices and input costs for the domestic ethanol industry during this period.  By contrast, corn 
subsidies represented on average 17 percent of the domestic value of production of corn in the 
United States in the same period.  In 2006, the year in which corn subsidization achieved its highest 
level, US corn subsidies represented 47 percent of the value of production. 
 
3.2.2.4. Budgetary Outlays 
Minimal amounts of support were provided to the Brazilian ethanol sector in the form of budgetary 
outlays in 2002-2012.  Table 3.16 summarizes payments this subsidy category.  Budgetary 
 235 
 
transfers to ethanol in Brazil (𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝐵𝑅) consisted of credit equalization subsidies under the Ethyl 
Alcohol Fuel Stock Financing Program.  They were on average US$2 million in payments per year 
between 2002 and 2012.  No disbursements were made under this program for seven consecutive 
years (2004 through 2011).  These figures are especially low when compared to the average of 
US$106 million per year in budgetary support provided to the ethanol sector in the United States 
in the same period. 
 
Table 3.16: Budgetary outlays to the ethanol sector, Brazil, 2002-2012 
 
 
 
Source: MAPA (2014). 
 
3.2.2.5. Subsidy Equivalent Value 
As defined in equation (3.10), the SEV is equal to the sum of the PSE and the CSE, adjusted for 
double counting of MPS policies.  Since transfers to ethanol arising from production tax 
concessions, MPS and lower input costs are equal to zero in Brazil, PSE, CSE and SEV 
calculations may be simplified as follows: 
Year  
Marketing Credit 
Equalization 
Subsidies 
Total  
Budgetary 
Outlays 
(Million US$) (Million US$) 
2002 3 3 
2003 13 13 
2004 7 7 
2005 0 0 
2006 0 0 
2007 0 0 
2008 0 0 
2009 0 0 
2010 0 0 
2011 0 0 
2012 0.4 0.4 
2002-2012 
average 
2 2 
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 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐵𝑅 = 𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝐵𝑅 (3.15) 
 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝐵𝑅 = 𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑅  (3.16) 
 𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐵𝑅 = 𝐺𝐵𝑂
𝐵𝑅 + 𝐺𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑅  (3.17) 
PSE, CSE and SEV for the Brazilian ethanol sector are summarized in Table 3.17.  Between 
2002 and 2012, the SEV was on average US$2.7 billion a year, or just over half of what support 
to ethanol was in the United States in the same period.  While revenue foregone, market price 
support and lower input costs all played an important role in subsidizing ethanol in the United 
States, support in Brazil was concentrated almost exclusively on revenue foregone.  Consumption 
tax concessions accounted for 99.9 percent of all support provided to ethanol between 2002 and 
2012, of which approximately four-fifths were at the federal level and the rest at the state level. 
 
Table 3.17: Subsidy equivalent value for the ethanol sector, Brazil, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
Measures Affecting 
______________Producers______________ 
Measures Affecting 
______Consumers______ 
Subsidy 
Equivalent 
Value 
(SEV) PTC MPS LIC BO PSE CTC MPS* CSE 
2002 0 0 0 3 3 972 0 972 975 
2003 0 0 0 13 13 836 0 836 849 
2004 0 0 0 7 7 1,439 0 1,439 1,446 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 1,815 0 1,815 1,815 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 2,307 0 2,307 2,307 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 3,676 0 3,676 3,676 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 2,924 0 2,924 2,924 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 4,198 0 4,198 4,198 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 4,948 0 4,948 4,948 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 4,085 0 4,085 4,085 
2012 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 2,031 0 2,031 2,032 
2002-2012 
average 
0 0 0 2 2 2,657 0 2,657 2,660 
 
Notes: PSE: Producer support estimate; CSE: Consumer support estimate; PTC: Production tax concessions; MPS: 
Market price support; LIC: Lower input costs; BO: Budgetary outlays; CTC: Consumption tax concessions; 
MPS*: Adjusted market price support. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3.9 summarizes SEV for ethanol in Brazil and United States between 2002 and 
2012.  Ethanol subsidies in both countries increased significantly between 2002 and 2011, and fell 
dramatically in 2012 thanks to the elimination of the CIDE tax rate differential in Brazil and the 
VEETC in the United States.  Combined US and Brazilian subsidies reached their peak level in 
2008, when ethanol received US$12.6 billion in transfers in the two countries, a sum comparable 
to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Bolivia, Honduras or Jamaica at the time.  By contrast, 
combined US and Brazilian subsidization of the ethanol sector declined to US$2.7 billion in 2012. 
Total ethanol subsidies were higher in the United States than in Brazil in every single year 
in the period under analysis, except in 2012.  The relative difference between ethanol support 
levels in the two countries was greatest in 2004, 2006 and 2008, when estimated support in the 
United States was three times higher than in Brazil.  In most other years, support to ethanol in the 
United States was between 1.5 and 2.5 times as high as support in its South American counterpart. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Ethanol subsidy equivalent values (SEV) in Brazil and the United States, 2002-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3.10 compares subsidization rates per liter of ethanol produced in Brazil and the 
United States between 2002 and 2012.  The ethanol subsidization rate in Brazil increased from 6-
8 US cents per liter in 2002-2003 to 16-18 US cents per liter in 2009-2011, and fell to 9 US cents 
per liter in 2012.  By contrast, the rate of subsidization of ethanol in the United States was between 
three and four times higher than in the Brazil in 2003-2004, and between two and three times as 
high in 2005-2008.  In 2009 and 2011, ethanol subsidization rates in the United States were roughly 
equivalent to those in Brazil.  Subsequently, the subsidy equivalent value per liter of ethanol 
produced in the United States fell to only 1.3 cents in 2012.  Per unit rates of subsidization of 
ethanol in Brazil and the United States, along with the detailed breakdown of subsidies at the 
consumer and producer levels provided in Table 3.11 and Table 3.17, are employed in Section 3.3 
to estimate the distortions caused by government policies on prices, production, consumption and 
trade. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Ethanol subsidization rates in Brazil and the United States, 2002-2012 
 
Note: Subsidization rates correspond to ethanol subsidy equivalent values divided by ethanol production. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
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3.3. Economic Impact of Ethanol Support 
The objective of this section is to estimate the size of the market distortions caused by US and 
Brazilian support to the ethanol sector between 2002 and 2012.  It is organized in four subsections.  
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 examine the modeling framework and data used to assess the impact 
of government policies on prices, production, consumption and trade.  Subsection 3.3.3 considers 
model implementation in more detail, paying special attention to how the market effects of 
consumption tax concessions and import tariffs may differ when applied simultaneously with an 
ethanol blending mandate.  Finally, Subsection 3.3.4 discusses the estimated results under different 
reform scenarios. 
 
3.3.1. Modeling Framework 
A single commodity, multi-country, non-spatial, partial equilibrium model of trade is used to 
quantify the price, production, consumption and trade effects of reducing ethanol support.  The 
structure of the model is similar to that of other partial equilibrium models used to assess the impact 
of policies on agricultural trade, such as the ones in Vanzetti and Graham (2002), Tokarick (2003), 
Poonyth et al. (2004), Sumner (2005), Alston et al. (2007) and Cabral and Jales (2008).  For each 
scenario, the model simulates the prices and quantities that would have obtained in a base year had 
the policy reforms implied by the given scenario been retroactively applied to that year. 
Fuel ethanol is assumed to be a homogeneous product.  This implies that full substitution 
is presumed between domestic and imported ethanol, as well as among imports from different 
sources.  While the degree of homogeneity of most traded ethanol is such as to warrant the perfect 
substitution assumption, the introduction of a separate mandate for advanced biofuels in the United 
States in 2009 created a policy-induced differentiation between products that are essentially 
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undistinguishable based on their physical characteristics.  As a result, the model does not capture 
the intricacies of the two-way trade that emerged between conventional (corn-based) ethanol from 
the United States and advanced (sugarcane-based) ethanol from abroad, especially from Brazil. 
The world ethanol market is divided into five segments: the United States, Brazil, the 
European Union, 55 China, and the rest of the world (ROW).  The four first segments are the 
world’s largest producers and consumers of ethanol, accounting for 96 percent of world output and 
88 percent of world demand between 2002 and 2012.  Modeling of the world ethanol market is 
based on the supply and demand functions for each of the five market segments,56 as described in 
equations 3.18 and 3.19 below: 
 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖𝑑 ln  (𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖) (3.18) 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖𝑑 ln  (𝑃𝑊 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖) (3.19) 
where  𝑆𝑖:  Supply in country i 
𝜂𝑖: Price elasticity of supply in country i 
𝑃𝑊: World price 
𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖: PSE unit value in country i, given by 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖 = 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖 𝑄𝑃
𝑖⁄  
𝐷𝑖: Demand in country i 
𝜀𝑖: Price elasticity of demand in country i 
𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖: CSE unit value in country i, given by 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖 = 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝑖 𝑄𝐶
𝑖⁄  
                                               
55 The European Union (EU) went through two enlargement processes between 2002 and 2012.  While EU membership 
comprised fifteen countries in 2002, ten countries joined the union in 2004, and two more in 2007.  For the purposes 
of the model described in this section, the EU is defined – for every year between 2002 and 2012 – to be composed of 
the 27 countries that were members in December 2012. 
56 Although the European Union and the ROW correspond to collections of countries, hereinafter each of the five 
market segments in the model may be referred to as “countries” for sake of simplicity. 
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Supply in country i is related to per unit gross producer returns, including government 
support, which is given by (𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖).  Demand in country i is dependent on per unit consumer 
expenditures net of consumer support, which is given by (𝑃𝑊 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖). 
Equations 3.18 and 3.19 may be expressed as: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 (
1
𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝑊 +
1
𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖) 
(3.20) 
 
𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 (
1
𝑃𝑊 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝑊 −
1
𝑃𝑊 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖
𝑑𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖) 
(3.21) 
Defining 𝛼𝑖 as the share of 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖 in per unit producer gross receipts in country i, and 𝛽𝑖 as 
the share of 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖 in per unit consumption expenditures net of consumer support in country i, 
equations 3.20 and 3.21 may be rewritten as: 
 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 ((1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖) (3.22) 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 ((1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 − 𝛽𝑖𝑑 ln 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖) (3.23) 
where 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖/(𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖)  
 𝛽𝑖 = 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖/(𝑃𝑊 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖)  
World ethanol supply (𝑆𝑊) is given by the sum of the supply functions in the five market 
segments: 
 𝑑 ln 𝑆𝑊 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝜂𝑖 ((1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖)
𝑖
 (3.24) 
where 𝛿𝑖 is the share of country i in world ethanol production.  Similarly, world demand (𝐷𝑊) 
corresponds to the sum of the demand functions in the five market segments: 
 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑊 = ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝜀𝑖 ((1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 − 𝛽𝑖𝑑 ln 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖)
𝑖
 (3.25) 
where 𝜑𝑖 is the share of country i in world ethanol demand. 
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Letting world supply equal world demand and singling out 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 results in: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 = ∑ {[(
𝛿𝑖𝜂𝑖
𝐴
) (𝛼𝑖𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖)] + [(
𝜑𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝐴
) (𝛽𝑖𝑑 ln 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖)]}
𝑖
 (3.26) 
where  𝐴 = {∑[𝜑𝑖𝜀𝑖(1 − 𝛽𝑖)] − [𝛿𝑖𝜂𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝑖)]
𝑖
} 
 
Since the model examines the impacts of US and Brazilian subsidies only, PSE and CSE 
values for the European Union, China and the ROW are assumed to remain unchanged.  Moreover, 
as PSE in Brazil is either zero or close to zero in every year between 2002 and 2012, it is. Also 
assumed to remain unchanged.  Accordingly, equation 3.26 may be simplified as follows: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 = [(
𝛿𝑈𝑆𝜂𝑈𝑆
𝐴
) (𝛼𝑈𝑆𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑈𝑆)] + [(
𝜑𝑈𝑆𝜀𝑈𝑆
𝐴
) (𝛽𝑈𝑆𝑑 ln 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑈𝑆)]
+ [(
𝜑𝐵𝑅𝜀𝐵𝑅
𝐴
) (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝑑 ln 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝐵𝑅)] 
(3.27) 
Given the definitions of 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆 , 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝑈𝑆and 𝐶𝑆𝐸𝐵𝑅  provided in equations 3.8, 3.9 and 3.16, 
equation 3.27 may be rewritten in its detailed form as: 
 
𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 = {(
𝛿𝑈𝑆𝜂𝑈𝑆
𝐴
) [(𝛼𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑃𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ) + (𝛼𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 )
+ (𝛼𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐿𝐼𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ) + (𝛼𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐵𝑂
𝑈𝑆)]}
+ {(
𝜑𝑈𝑆𝜀𝑈𝑆
𝐴
) [(𝛽𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 ) − (𝛽𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 )]}
+ [(
𝜑𝐵𝑅𝜀𝐵𝑅
𝐴
) (𝛽𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑅 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑅 )] 
(3.28) 
Equation 3.28 provides a framework for assessing the effect of US and Brazilian subsidies 
on the market-clearing world price of ethanol.  By substituting 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 back into equations 3.22 
and 3.23, it is possible to derive the impacts of ethanol subsidies on supply and demand in each of 
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the five market segments.  The effects on net international trade flows are given by the resulting 
differences between production and consumption in each country.  Finally, impacts on world 
supply and demand are obtained by substituting 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 back into equations 3.24 and 3.25. 
Six different scenarios are investigated in this section.  Scenario 1 examines the market 
effects from hypothetically eliminating US consumption tax concessions in 2002-2012.  Scenario 
2 does the same for US import tariffs.  Scenario 3 considers the joint elimination of US 
consumption tax concessions and import tariffs.  Scenario 4 and Scenario 5 investigate the effects 
of removing total ethanol SEV in the United States and Brazil, respectively.  Finally, Scenario 6 
analyzes the simultaneous removal of SEV in the United States and Brazil. 
 
3.3.2. Data 
The effects estimated by the model depend on the values of the parameters and variables described 
in equation 3.28.  The components of PSE and CSE for the United States and Brazil are estimated 
in Section 3.2 and summarized in Table 3.11 and Table 3.17, respectively.57  Ethanol production 
and consumption data are from EIA (2014a) for 2002-2011, and from ANP (2014), LMC 
International (2013) and USDA (2014a) for 2012.  Supply and demand price elasticities are from 
Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) in the case of the United States (𝜂𝑈𝑆= 0.65 and 𝜀𝑈𝑆 = –0.43), and from 
Fabiosa et al. (2009) in the case of the European Union (𝜂𝐸𝑈  = 0.32 and 𝜀𝐸𝑈 = –0.18) and China 
(𝜂𝐶𝐻  = 0.17 and 𝜀𝐶𝐻 = –0.26).  For the ROW, elasticities are assumed to be equivalent to the simple 
average of European and Chinese elasticities (𝜂𝑅𝑂𝑊  = 0.245 and 𝜀𝑅𝑂𝑊  = –0.22). 
                                               
57 For purposes of the estimations carried out in Section 3.3, ethanol SEV in the United States is adjusted to reflect 
only support provided to plants that had reached commercial viability by December 2012.  Therefore, budgetary 
outlays provided to cellulosic ethanol plants under the BAP, as well as supplementary funding provided by the DOE 
to the same plants in 2009-2012, are excluded from total support provided to the ethanol sector in the United States.  
Since only US$43 million a year were provided on average to cellulosic ethanol plants in 2002-2012, average ethanol 
SEV in the United States in this period falls only marginally, from US$5.14 billion to US$5.10 billion. 
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Changes in the makeup of Brazil’s automobile fleet radically transformed the behavior of 
Brazilian consumers of transportation fuels between 2002 and 2012 (Costa and Guilhoto, 2011).  
Several studies have demonstrated that the emergence of the ﬂexible-fuel engine strengthened the 
position of ethanol as both an independent fuel and a substitute for gasoline, considerably altering 
its demand price elasticity.  Table 3.18 lists some of these studies, along with their estimated price 
elasticities of demand for ethanol in Brazil.  Eight studies (Azevedo, 2007; Pontes, 2009; Farina 
et al., 2010; Serigati et al., 2010; Souza, 2010; Freitas and Kaneko, 2011; Cardoso and Bittencourt, 
2013; Santos, 2013) derived elasticities for periods generally beginning in 2001 and ending in 
2011, which combine years both before and after the introduction of the flexible-fuel engine in the 
Brazilian market.  Two of these studies (Serigati et al., 2010; Cardoso and Bittencourt, 2013) also 
provide separate estimates for sub-periods pre- and post-flexible fuel engines.58  Finally, two 
additional studies (Iotty et al. 2009; Costa et al., 2013a) provide elasticities for periods after the 
introduction of flexible-fuel automobiles. 
In the current model, the price elasticity of demand for Brazil is assumed to vary over the 
2002-2012 period.  For the beginning year, it is equivalent to the average of the two estimates for 
the pre-flexible fuel sub-period (𝜀2002
𝐵𝑅  = –1.09); for the end year, to the average of the four 
estimates for the post-flexible fuel sub-period (𝜀2012
𝐵𝑅  = –2.76); and for the years between 2003 and 
2011, it is assumed to follow a linear trend between  𝜀2002
𝐵𝑅  and 𝜀2012
𝐵𝑅 .  The supply price elasticity 
for Brazil (𝜂𝐵𝑅  = 1.94) is obtained from Costa et al. (2013b) and is assumed to remain unchanged 
over the 2002-2012 period. 
                                               
58  Although the introduction of automobiles with flexible-fuel engines in Brazil occurred in 2003, Cardoso and 
Bittencourt (2013) define the start date of the post-flexible fuel engine sub-period as August 2006 given that the 
number of new automobiles was still small compared to the total fleet in 2003-2005.  August 2006 is selected as the 
boundary between the two sub-periods because it was the first month in which flexible fuel automobile sales 
outperformed gasoline automobile sales.  As Serigati et al. (2010) do not expressly define when the post-flexible fuel 
engine sub-period begins, it is assumed to be on January 2004.  
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Table 3.18: Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for ethanol, Brazil, 2001-2011 
  Study  Coverage Elasticity 
    
A1 Pontes (2009)  2001-2008 -0.93 
A2 Azevedo (2007) 2002-2006 -1.25 
A3 Farina et al. (2010) 2001-2009 -1.23 
A4 Souza (2010) 2001-2009 -1.54 
A5 Serigati et al. (2010) 2001-2009 -1.48 
A6 Santos (2013) 2001-2010 -1.25 
A7 Freitas and Kaneko (2012) 2003-2010 -1.41 
A8 Cardoso and Bittencourt (2013) 2001-2011 -1.48 
 Average of A1-A8  -1.32 
    
 Pre-flex fuel engine   
B1 Serigati et al. (2010) 2001-2003 -1.15 
B2 Cardoso and Bittencourt (2013) 2001-2006 -1.04 
 Average of B1-B2  -1.09 
    
 Post-flex fuel engine   
C1 Serigati et al. (2010) 2004-2009 -2.12 
C2 Cardoso and Bittencourt (2013) 2007-2011 -2.11 
C3 Iotty et al. (2009) 2005 -3.58 
C4 Costa et al. (2013a) 2006-2011 -3.25 
 Average of C1-C4  -2.76 
    
 
Source: Compiled by author from existing literature. 
 
3.3.3. Implementation 
The standard implementation of the model involves removing one or more types of ethanol support 
in the United States and Brazil by letting the percentage change in the corresponding PSE or CSE 
component equal –1 in equation 3.28.  However, given that ethanol blending mandates may restrict 
or impede quantity and price adjustments, specific implementation procedures are needed when 
these mandates are binding or become binding due to the removal of other support instruments. 
Although consumption subsidies generally shift the demand curve to right and result in 
higher quantities and market prices, when applied simultaneously with an ethanol blending 
mandate, they may have little or no effect on market equilibrium.  In order to appropriately estimate 
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the market effects of removing US consumption tax concessions, one must determine whether 
either the implicit (MTBE substitution) or explicit (RFS) ethanol mandates would bind in each of 
the years between 2002 and 2012. 
As illustrated by the three panels in Figure 3.11, one of three regimes may emerge when 
tax credits and blending mandates are applied simultaneously.  Let S be the supply curve for 
ethanol; D1 and D2, the pre-mandate demand curves for ethanol with and without the tax credit, 
respectively; and MA, MB and MC, three different blending mandate levels. For simplicity, and 
without loss of generality, zero net trade is assumed.  In the first regime, depicted in Panel A, the 
mandate MA is not binding, irrespective of the tax credit. Market equilibria are given by (Q1, P1) 
prior to the elimination of the tax credit and (Q2, P2) after its removal, neither of which are affected 
by MA.  Under this regime, which occurs when MA < Q2, the removal of tax credits leads to full 
quantity and price adjustments. 
In the second regime, depicted in Panel B, the mandate MB is not binding in the presence 
of the tax credit.  Once the tax credit is removed, MB becomes binding.  Market equilibria are given 
by (Q1, P1) prior to the elimination of the tax credit and (MB, PB) after the elimination of the tax 
credit, the latter being determined by the mandate.  Under this regime, which occurs whenever Q2 
< MB < Q1, quantity and price adjustments following the removal of tax credits are restricted by 
the binding mandate.  Finally, in the third regime, depicted in Panel C, the mandate MC is binding 
regardless of the tax credit.  Market equilibria are given by (MC, PC) prior to and after the 
elimination of the tax credit, both of which are determined by the mandate.  Under this regime, 
which occurs whenever MC > Q1, the removal of tax credits leads to no change in equilibrium 
quantity or price. 
  
 
Figure 3.11: Elimination of tax credits in the presence of a blending mandate 
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The model implementation of the removal of US consumption tax credits (Scenario 1) is 
conditional on the prevailing mandate regime.  When blending mandates are not binding, 
irrespective of the tax credit, the change in the world price is obtained by letting 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = −1 
in equation 3.28 and solving for 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊.  When blending mandates become binding due to the 
removal of the tax credit, the change in the world price is obtained by letting 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑈𝑆 equal the 
percentage difference between the mandate and the observed US consumption level, and 
subsequently solving equation 3.28 for 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊.  Finally, the world price remains unchanged when 
blending mandates are binding irrespective of the tax credit. 
The model implementation of the removal of US import tariffs (Scenario 2) is largely 
unaffected by blending mandates.  This is due to the fact that trade liberalization generally leads 
to lower domestic prices and higher consumption levels in the liberalizing country.  However, if 
consumption levels prior to the elimination of tariffs were determined by a blending mandate, trade 
liberalization may not affect quantity demanded.  Figure 3.12 illustrates how distinct mandate 
regimes affect market equilibrium quantities and prices following the elimination of import tariffs. 
Let T be the import tariff; MJ, MK and ML, three different blending mandate levels; S, the supply 
curve for ethanol; DJ, DK and DL, the demand curves for ethanol in the presence of mandates MJ, 
MK and ML, respectively; ES, the excess supply curve, determined by supply and demand 
conditions in the rest of the world; EDJ, EDK and EDL, the excess demand curves, determined by 
supply and demand conditions in the domestic market.   
In Panel J, mandate MJ has no impact on excess demand EDJ and the market equilibrium 
prior to the elimination of the tariff (PJ, DJ).  Once the tariff is removed, market equilibrium 
converges to the free trade price and quantity combination (Pft, Dft), which is also unaffected by 
the mandate.  This is true whenever MJ is lower than the autarchy equilibrium quantity. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.12: Elimination of import tariffs in the presence of a blending mandate 
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In Panel K, mandate MK affects excess demand EDK and the market equilibrium prior to 
the elimination of the tariff (PK, MK).  However, once the tariff is removed, market equilibrium 
converges to the free trade price and quantity (Pft, Dft), which is unaffected by the mandate.  This 
is true whenever MK is greater than the autarchy equilibrium quantity but lower than the free trade 
equilibrium quantity.  Finally, in Panel L, mandate ML affects excess demand EDL and market 
equilibria both prior to (PL, ML) and after the removal of the tariff (P*L, ML).  This is true whenever 
ML is greater than the free trade equilibrium quantity. 
Since observed consumption levels in the United States were above mandated quantities 
every year in 2002-2012, with the exception of 2006, the standard model implementation is applied 
as a general rule, i.e. 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆  is set equal to −1 in equation 3.28.  As the implicit ethanol 
blending mandate was binding in 2006, consumption is assumed to remain unchanged after the 
removal of the tariff.  The change in the world price is obtained by letting 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑈𝑆 = 0 , 
𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 = −1  under the US supply equation, and subsequently solving equation 3.28 for 
𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊. 
The implementation of the joint elimination of consumption tax concessions and import 
tariffs (Scenario 3) reflects the observations made above for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.  When 
blending mandates are not binding, irrespective of tax credits and import tariffs, changes in the 
world price are derived by applying the standard implementation approach, i.e. letting 
𝑑 ln ?̂?𝐶𝑇𝐶
𝑈𝑆 = −1 and 𝑑 ln ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆
𝑈𝑆 = −1 in equation 3.28.  When mandates become binding due to 
the joint elimination of tax credits and border protection, world price changes are obtained by 
letting 𝑑 ln 𝐷𝑈𝑆  equal the percentage difference between the mandate and the observed US 
consumption level, and subsequently solving equation 3.28 for 𝑑 ln 𝑃𝑊 . Finally, market 
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equilibrium remains unchanged when mandates are binding, regardless of tax concessions and 
tariffs. 
3.3.4. Results 
The estimated market effects of hypothetically eliminating US and Brazilian ethanol subsidies 
between 2002 and 2012 are described below for the six distinct reform scenarios.  As the most 
important sources of support to the ethanol sector in both the United States and Brazil were 
eliminated in 2012, period averages are restricted to the ten years between 2002 and 2011.  Since 
binding mandates and a country’s net trade status may cause results within a particular scenario to 
differ substantially over time, sub-period averages are presented in addition to period averages. 
 
Scenario 1: Elimination of US Consumption Tax Concessions 
Estimated world price effects from the removal of US consumption tax concessions are 
summarized in Table 3.19, along with changes in US and Brazilian production and consumption 
levels, and corresponding adjustments in world trade flows.  Detailed results for the five market 
segments in each of the six scenarios are presented in the appendix to this chapter.  For analysis 
purposes, the period between 2002 and 2012 is divided into three sub-periods: (i) from 2002 to 
2005, when US consumption tax concessions applied in a mandate-free environment; (ii) from 
2006 to 2011, when tax concessions interacted with both the implicit blending mandate imposed 
by state MTBE bans and the explicit mandate introduced by the RFS; and (iii) 2012, when only 
state tax concessions were in place, as the VEETC was eliminated in December 2011. 
The magnitude of the results obtained vary significantly across each of the three sub-
periods, being larger in 2002-2005, smaller in 2006-2011, and essentially zero in 2012.  The 
elimination of US consumption tax credits would have resulted in an average world price decline 
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of 6.5 percent in 2002-2005, causing production to fall in the United States (3.5 percent), but 
especially in Brazil (12 percent), where producers are highly sensitive to relative price fluctuations 
between ethanol and sugar.  Consumption would increase moderately in all market segments (1 to 
6.5 percent), except in the United States, where it would fall by 27.5 percent.  World trade would 
expand by 130 percent, as the United States would export its excess supply to the other market 
segments, including Brazil. 
 
Table 3.19: Estimated Effects of Eliminating US Consumption Tax Concessions, 2002-2012 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 -9.2% -5.1% -17.9% -45.5% 8.3% 311.5% 
2003 -6.0% -3.3% -11.7% -28.0% 6.5% 242.5% 
2004 -5.5% -2.3% -10.7% -20.0% 6.2% -20.2% 
2005 -4.4% -2.4% -8.6% -16.9% 5.7% -16.6% 
2006 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2007 -3.7% -1.9% -7.2% -12.5% 5.6% -43.6% 
2008 -3.5% -1.9% -6.9% -11.0% 6.4% -36.0% 
2009 -1.3% -0.8% -2.5% -3.9% 2.4% -19.7% 
2010 -0.8% -0.5% -1.5% -2.3% 1.6% 1.4% 
2011 -1.0% -0.6% -2.0% -2.8% 2.3% 4.3% 
2012 -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
2002-2011 
average 
-3.6% -1.9% -6.9% -14.3% 4.5% 42.4% 
2002-2005 
average 
-6.3% -3.3% -12.2% -27.6% 6.6% 129.3% 
2006-2011 
average 
-1.7% -0.9% -3.4% -5.4% 3.0% -15.6% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Within the pre-mandate sub-period, market effects would be stronger in 2002, when the 
federal tax exemption of 53 cents per gallon, plus average state tax concessions of 4 cents per 
gallon at the national level, corresponded to 50 percent of the domestic price of ethanol.  As MTBE 
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bans spread to a larger number of states and the price of MTBE substitutes rose, the size of 
consumption tax concessions relative to the price of fuel ethanol declined to 40 percent in 2003 
and 30 percent in 2004-2005.  While tax concessions remained important, their relative impact on 
consumption during this sub-period became less pronounced over time. 
State bans effectively worked as state-level ethanol blending mandates in areas that were 
previously using MTBE to comply with strict oxygenation requirements or to maintain fuel octane 
levels in the presence of other environmental constraints.  However, as one third of US ethanol 
consumption still occurred in states without MTBE bans in 2005, the combination of these implicit 
state mandates was not binding at the national level.59  Despite the large estimated reductions in 
US ethanol consumption between 2002 and 2005 under Scenario 1, the implicit state-level 
blending mandates would still have been met during this sub-period.  Higher ethanol prices would 
stimulate MTBE blending into gasoline in states without MTBE bans and divert ethanol that would 
otherwise be consumed in these states to states with MTBE bans. 
In contrast with the pre-mandate sub-period, the elimination of US consumption tax 
concessions in 2006-2011 would have decreased world prices on average by only 1.7 percent.  
Lower market prices would cause production to retract on average by just 1 percent in the United 
States and 3.5 percent in Brazil.  Consumption in the United States would decline by 5.5 percent 
– only one-fifth of the average percentage reduction estimated for 2002-2005.  Both consumption 
and production would remain virtually unchanged in the European Union, China and the ROW.  
Increased consumption in Brazil (3 percent on average), coupled with reduced domestic 
                                               
59 MTBE bans were restricted to four Midwestern states and Colorado in 2002, accounting for only 9.5 percent of total 
gasoline additive demand in the United States.  The progressive adoption of MTBE bans by fourteen other states and 
the introduction of a statewide ethanol blending mandate in Minnesota increased ethanol’s captive share in US 
gasoline additive demand to 13 percent in 2003, 40 percent in 2004 and 48 percent in 2005.  As a result, the share of 
US fuel ethanol consumption taking place in states with MTBE bans increased from 25 percent in 2002 to 65 percent 
in 2005. 
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production, would cut exports in half.  Since expanded US excess supply would not make up for 
the fall in Brazilian exports in most years, world trade would retract by 15 percent on average in 
2006-2011. 
Smaller market effects from removing US consumption tax concessions in 2006-2011, as 
opposed to 2002-2005, are largely due to the incidence of binding mandates that significantly 
restrict quantity and price adjustments.  The implicit mandate for ethanol as a replacement for 
MTBE became binding in 2006, when the lack of liability protection for the ether culminated in a 
full-fledged switch to ethanol at the national level.  The introduction of the RFS explicit blending 
mandate eventually pushed required minimum consumption levels beyond what was required to 
serve as a gasoline oxygenate and octane enhancer. 
The implicit blending mandate was binding in 2006 irrespective of the VEETC.  Therefore, 
the elimination of consumption tax concessions has no impact on equilibrium prices and quantities 
in this year.  While the RFS explicit blending mandate was not binding between 2009 and 2011, 
the removal of the VEETC would have caused it to become binding.  As a result, estimated price 
and quantity impacts for these three years are substantially lower than in most other years in 
Scenario 1. 
Finally, the market impacts from hypothetically eliminating residual state consumption tax 
concessions in 2012 would be essentially nil.  Only four states (Illinois, Iowa, Oklahoma and South 
Dakota) still offered tax credits or reduced taxation rates for E10 in 2012.  Since the estimated 
revenue foregone from these concessions in 2012 (US$226 million) corresponded to less than one 
percent of the total value of ethanol production in the United States, it is not surprising that the 
removal of these subsidies would have little impact on domestic and world markets. 
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Scenario 2: Elimination of US Import Tariffs 
The estimated market effects from the hypothetical elimination of US import tariffs are 
summarized in Table 3.20.  Under this scenario, the world price of ethanol is on average 4 percent 
higher than the levels actually observed between 2002 and 2011.  The increase is moderately higher 
in years when the United States was a net ethanol importer (5 percent in 2002-2009), and 
significantly lower when it was a net exporter (1 percent in 2010-2011).  The positive impact on 
the world price is most significant in 2004 (11 percent increase), the only year in 2002-2012 when 
the MPD was equivalent to the full size of the import tariff burden (15.5 cents per liter) and 
blending mandates were not binding.60 
 
Table 3.20: Estimated Effects of Eliminating US Import Tariffs, 2002-2012 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 2.5% -3.5% 4.8% 7.3% -2.2% 109.8% 
2003 3.2% -5.3% 6.3% 8.0% -3.4% 183.3% 
2004 10.9% -15.6% 21.1% 20.2% -12.2% 191.9% 
2005 3.4% -5.1% 6.6% 6.2% -4.4% 64.0% 
2006 3.9% -12.2% 7.6% 0.0% -5.6% 61.3% 
2007 6.0% -8.7% 11.7% 9.3% -9.1% 125.3% 
2008 6.1% -8.0% 11.8% 8.3% -11.0% 110.6% 
2009 2.8% -2.9% 5.4% 3.6% -5.2% 79.3% 
2010 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2011 1.6% -1.5% 3.1% 1.7% -3.6% -1.8% 
2012 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2002-2011 
average 
4.0% -6.3% 7.8% 6.5% -5.7% 92.4% 
2002-2009 
average 
4.8% -7.7% 9.4% 7.9% -6.6% 115.7% 
2010-2011 
average 
0.8% -0.7% 1.6% 0.9% -1.8% -0.9% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                               
60 Although the MPD was also equivalent to the full size of the import tariff burden in 2006, the implicit blending 
mandate was binding.  As a result, the estimated world price change is more modest this year. 
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Domestic prices in the United States decline on average by 12 percent in 2002-2009, with 
larger falls in 2004 (25 percent) and 2006 (20 percent).  In the absence of tariffs to shield domestic 
producers from foreign competition, ethanol output in the United States falls by 8 percent on 
average (12-15 percent in 2004 and 2006).  Blenders react to lower prices by increasing ethanol 
consumption by 8 percent on average, except in 2006, when consumption remains unchanged as 
it is determined by the implicit blending mandate.  As a result, US imports expand dramatically to 
an average level of 4.1 billion liters a year, nearly four times the average import level recorded in 
2002-2009.  The great majority of these imports would come from Brazil, with small amounts 
coming from China. 
The other segments of the world market react to US trade liberalization by expanding 
production and reducing domestic consumption in 2002-2009.  Output increases by 9.5 percent in 
Brazil, and 1-1.5 percent in the European Union, China and the ROW.  Higher world prices imply 
that consumers in Brazil switch away from hydrous ethanol and into gasoline blended with 
anhydrous ethanol, causing total ethanol consumption to drop by 6.5 percent.  Given that demand 
is less price elastic in the European Union, China and the ROW, consumption falls by only 1-1.5 
percent in these market segments.  Despite slightly smaller import levels in these three markets, 
total world trade more than doubles due to increased imports by the United States. 
The removal of import tariffs has only minor effects on production, consumption and trade 
in the sub-period when the United States was a net ethanol exporter (2010-2012), as MPS per liter 
of ethanol produced was either zero or significantly lower than in previous years.  In 2012, effects 
are nil as the low ad valorem tariff of 2.5 percent was the only import barrier in place after US 
authorities eliminated the large additional import duty in December 2011. 
 
 257 
 
Scenario 3: Elimination of US Consumption Tax Concessions and Import Tariffs 
The estimated market effects of the joint elimination of US consumption tax concessions and 
import tariffs are summarized in Table 3.21.  Results vary substantially over time, depending both 
on whether the effects of trade liberalization outweigh those from the removal of tax credits, and 
whether blending mandates become binding.  For analysis purposes, the period between 2002 and 
2012 is divided into four sub-periods: (i) from 2002 to 2003, when the effects of eliminating tax 
exemptions prevail over those from trade liberalization; (ii) from 2004 to 2008, when the effects 
of trade liberalization generally outweigh those from removing consumption tax concessions; (iii) 
from 2009 to 2011, when the effects from removing the VEETC generally overpower those from 
trade liberalization, but are restricted by binding mandates; and (iv) 2012, when residual support 
to ethanol in the United States is too small to significantly impact world prices. 
Average effects on world prices and production and consumption levels outside the United 
States are negligible under Scenario 3 for the 2002-2012 period as a whole.  Nonetheless, effects 
are significant once sub-periods are examined separately.  In 2002-2003, the elimination of 
consumption tax credits prevails over the removal of import tariffs and causes the world price to 
decrease by 5 percent on average.  This is less than the 7.5 percent retraction estimated for the 
same two years under Scenario 1, as trade liberalization offsets some of the downward price 
pressure created by the elimination of the blender’s tax exemption.  As domestic prices in the 
United States fall by more than in Scenario 1 or Scenario 2, the negative effects on production are 
more evenly distributed across the five market segments.  Whereas production in the United States 
and Brazil decrease by respectively 4 and 15 percent in 2002-2003 in Scenario 1, average reduction 
rates for the same period in Scenario 3 are approximately 9 percent for both countries.  
Consumption retraction in the United States remains large (29 percent on average), but less so than 
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in Scenario 1 for the same two years (37 percent on average), given that blenders are partially 
compensated for the loss of the tax credit by having access to cheaper imports. 
 
Table 3.21: Estimated Effects of Eliminating US Consumption Tax Concessions and 
  Import Tariffs, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 -6.8% -8.6% -13.1% -38.2% 6.0% 199.8% 
2003 -2.8% -8.5% -5.4% -20.0% 3.0% 56.2% 
2004 5.4% -17.9% 10.4% 0.3% -6.0% 94.9% 
2005 -1.0% -7.5% -2.0% -10.7% 1.3% -19.0% 
2006 3.9% -12.2% 7.6% 0.0% -5.6% 61.3% 
2007 2.3% -10.6% 4.5% -3.3% -3.5% 47.9% 
2008 2.5% -9.8% 4.9% -2.7% -4.6% 45.9% 
2009 0.21% -4.4% 0.4% -3.9% -0.4% 5.9% 
2010 -0.79% -0.5% -1.5% -2.3% 1.6% 1.3% 
2011 -0.03% -2.5% -0.1% -2.8% 0.1% 0.0% 
2012 -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
2002-2011 
average 
0.3% -8.3% 0.6% -8.4% -0.8% 49.4% 
2002-2003 
average 
-4.8% -8.6% -9.3% -29.1% 4.5% 128.0% 
2004-2008 
average 
2.6% -11.6% 5.1% -3.3% -3.7% 46.2% 
2009-2011 
average 
-0.2% -2.5% -0.4% -3.0% 0.4% 2.4% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Between 2004 and 2008, large MPDs ensure that positive price pressures from trade 
liberalization outweigh negative pressures from the removal of consumption tax credits, leading 
to an average increase of 2.5 percent in world prices.  Because US domestic prices in 2004-2008 
fall even more precipitously than in Scenario 2, domestic production declines are also larger (11.5 
percent on average).   Domestic consumption retraction is modest (3 percent on average) and 
significantly lower than in Scenario 1 for the same five years (12 percent on average), as trade 
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liberalization almost fully compensates for the removal of tax credits.  In Brazil, production 
expands by 5 percent and consumption falls by 3.5 percent, leading to a 45 percent increase in 
exports, virtually all destined to the United States.  As production and consumption volumes 
remain mostly unchanged in the European Union, China and the ROW, the increase in Brazilian 
exports translates into a similar expansion in world trade. 
Finally, as the joint elimination of tax credits and import tariffs activates the mandate in 
2010 and 2011, effects on price, production and consumption are small in the third sub-period.  
Although world prices remain mostly unchanged (0.2 percent average reduction), domestic prices 
in the United States fall by 4 percent on average, leading to modest retractions in both production 
(2.5 percent) and consumption (3 percent).  Markets outside the United States are virtually 
unaffected, except that the European Union and the ROW source larger shares of their imports 
from the United States as opposed to Brazil. 
 
Scenario 4: Elimination of US Subsidy Equivalent Value 
The hypothetical elimination of the SEV in favor of ethanol in the United States involves the 
removal of all consumption tax concessions, market price support, lower input costs and budgetary 
outlays estimated in Section 3.2, with the exception of payments to cellulosic ethanol plants under 
the BAP and supplementary DOE funding (see footnote 57).  Results are summarized in Table 
3.22.  Price, production and consumption effects in Scenario 4 are approximately 20 percent lower 
than in Scenario 3 in 2002-2003, 20 percent higher in 2004-2008, and remain close to zero in 2009-
2012.  The main exception involves consumption effects in the United States, which are nearly the 
same in the two scenarios, as production payments and lower input costs do not directly affect 
demand. 
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Table 3.22: Estimated Effects of Eliminating US Subsidy Equivalent Value, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 -5.8% -12.8% -11.3% -38.1% 5.2% 156.5% 
2003 -1.9% -12.1% -3.8% -20.1% 2.1% 6.0% 
2004 6.2% -20.6% 12.0% 0.2% -6.9% 109.1% 
2005 -0.2% -10.4% -0.4% -10.9% 0.3% -19.6% 
2006 4.8% -14.8% 9.2% 0.0% -6.8% 74.0% 
2007 2.7% -11.9% 5.3% -3.3% -4.1% 56.1% 
2008 2.8% -10.8% 5.5% -2.8% -5.1% 51.7% 
2009 0.8% -5.7% 1.5% -3.9% -1.4% 21.4% 
2010 -0.4% -1.4% -0.7% -2.3% 0.8% 0.6% 
2011 0.3% -3.1% 0.5% -2.8% -0.6% -0.3% 
2012 0.1% -0.6% 0.2% -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% 
2002-2011 
average 
0.9% -10.4% 1.8% -8.4% -1.7% 45.6% 
2002-2003 
average 
-3.9% -12.5% -7.5% -29.1% 3.6% 81.3% 
2004-2008 
average 
3.2% -13.7% 6.3% -3.4% -4.5% 54.3% 
2009-2011 
average 
0.2% -3.4% 0.4% -3.0% -0.4% 7.2% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The elimination of ethanol SEV in the United States causes world prices to rise on average 
by 1 percent between 2002 and 2011.  As in Scenario 3, this average conceals significant variation 
over time.  World prices fall on average by 4 percent in 2002-2003 and increase on average by 3 
percent in 2004-2008 and 0.2 percent in 2009-2011.  Most notably, world prices increase by 6 
percent in 2004 and 5 percent in 2006, an indication that US ethanol SEV caused significant price 
depression in these years. 
Following the hypothetical elimination of ethanol SEV in the United States, production in 
Brazil rises by 12 percent in 2004 and 9 percent in 2006.  Output also expands by 1.5-2 percent in 
the European Union and 1-1.5 percent in China and the ROW in 2004 and 2006.  By contrast, 
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production in the United States falls by 21 percent in 2004 and 15 percent in 2006.  As consumption 
in the United States remain essentially unchanged, US imports increase fivefold in 2004 (from 0.6 
to 3.3 billion liters) and twofold in 2006 (from 2.8 to 5.5 billion liters).  As a result, international 
trade flows expand by 110 percent in 2004 and 75 percent in 2006. 
US ethanol SEV caused world price depression in a total of seven out of eleven years in 
2002-2012.  Price depression was significant (5-6 percent) in 2004 and 2006, moderate (3 percent) 
in 2007 and 2008, and low (less than 1 percent) in 2009, 2011 and 2012.  As discussed in Section 
3.4, significant world price depression – like the ones observed in 2004 and 2006 – may establish 
grounds for a legal challenge against US ethanol support measures at the WTO. 
 
Scenario 5: Elimination of Brazilian Ethanol Subsidy Equivalent Value 
Whereas the effects from eliminating ethanol SEV in the United States differ substantially from 
year to year due to multiple interactions between distinct types of support measures, in Brazil the 
results from sector liberalization are consistent over time as virtually all support is provided in the 
form of tax rate reductions at the pump. 
The hypothetical removal of Brazil’s preferential tax rates in favor of ethanol leads to an 
average reduction of 6.5 percent in world prices between 2002 and 2011.  Although ethanol 
production declines across all five market segments, reductions are greater in Brazil (12.5 percent) 
than elsewhere (3.5 percent in the United States; 1-2 percent in the European Union, China and 
the ROW).  Consumption falls on average by 22 percent in Brazil, especially after 2003, when the 
introduction of flexible-fuel automobiles made consumers more responsive to relative fuel price 
changes.  Consumption in the other four market segments is only minimally affected (1-2 percent 
average increase).  International trade expands on average by 40 percent, as Brazilian excess 
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supply is exported mainly to the United States, but also to the European Union and the ROW.  
Estimated price and production effects in 2012 are roughly half as large as in 2002-2011 because 
the most important source of support for ethanol in Brazil – the CIDE tax differential – was 
removed by Brazilian authorities in July 2012. 
Unlike in the United States, ethanol SEV in Brazil does not lead to word price depression.  
On the contrary, Brazilian consumption tax concessions have a positive impact on world prices 
and create incentives for expanded production both domestically and abroad. 
 
Table 3.23: Estimated Effects of Eliminating Brazil’s Ethanol Subsidy Equivalent Value, 
2002-2012 
 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 -5.8% -3.2% -11.3% -0.5% -14.3% 33.3% 
2003 -5.1% -2.7% -9.9% 0.3% -13.2% 50.0% 
2004 -7.5% -3.2% -14.6% 0.2% -21.9% 22.3% 
2005 -6.8% -3.7% -13.2% 1.2% -22.2% 33.4% 
2006 -7.3% -3.5% -14.2% 0.0% -23.4% 21.1% 
2007 -8.5% -4.4% -16.5% 1.6% -29.1% 51.2% 
2008 -5.0% -2.6% -9.7% 1.1% -19.0% 30.5% 
2009 -6.9% -4.1% -13.4% 1.6% -27.1% 81.0% 
2010 -6.9% -4.4% -13.4% 2.0% -27.9% 64.3% 
2011 -5.3% -3.3% -10.3% 1.6% -23.6% 6.2% 
2012 -3.5% -2.3% -6.8% 1.5% -17.7% 34.2% 
2002-2011 
average 
-6.5% -3.5% -12.7% 0.9% -22.2% 39.3% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Scenario 6: Elimination of US and Brazilian Ethanol Subsidy Equivalent Values 
The hypothetical removal of both US and Brazilian SEV in favor of ethanol leads to an average 
reduction of 5.8 percent in world prices between 2002 and 2011.  As in Scenario 5, production 
declines across all five market segments.  However, this time average reductions are greater in 
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United States (14 percent), followed by Brazil (11 percent).  In the European Union, China and 
the ROW, production falls by 1-2 percent on average.  Brazilian consumption falls on average by 
10 percent in 2002-2003 and 27 percent in 2004-2011, reflecting the greater price elasticity of 
demand after the introduction of flexible fuel automobiles in 2003.  In the United States, the reverse 
occurs: consumption falls are large (29 percent on average) in 2002-2003, but modest (3 percent 
on average) in 2004-2011.  Consumption in the European Union, China and the ROW is only 
minimally affected (1-1.5 percent average increase).  As US excess demand and Brazilian excess 
supply rise, trade flows expand by 60 percent on average in 2002-2011, the second largest 
estimated expansion for the period as a whole after Scenario 2. 
 
Table 3.24: Estimated Effects of Eliminating US and Brazilian Ethanol Subsidy Equivalent 
Values, 2002-2012 
 
Year 
World 
Price 
______Production______ _____Consumption_____ World 
Trade US Brazil US Brazil 
2002 -11.6% -16.0% -22.6% -38.6% -9.1% 128.6% 
2003 -7.0% -14.9% -13.6% -19.7% -11.1% -37.1% 
2004 -1.4% -23.8% -2.7% 0.4% -28.8% 130.0% 
2005 -7.0% -14.2% -13.6% -9.6% -21.9% -14.7% 
2006 -2.6% -18.3% -5.0% 0.0% -30.2% 93.7% 
2007 -5.8% -16.3% -11.3% -1.7% -33.2% 105.5% 
2008 -2.2% -13.4% -4.2% -1.7% -24.2% 81.4% 
2009 -6.7% -10.1% -13.0% -3.9% -27.5% 85.3% 
2010 -8.0% -6.3% -15.4% -2.3% -25.8% 13.1% 
2011 -5.6% -6.7% -10.9% -2.8% -22.9% 6.3% 
2012 -3.4% -2.9% -6.6% 1.1% -18.0% 5.6% 
2002-2011 
average 
-5.8% -14.0% -11.2% -8.0% -23.5% 59.2% 
2002-2003 
average 
-9.3% -15.4% -18.1% -29.2% -10.1% 45.8% 
2004-2008 
average 
-3.8% -17.2% -7.4% -2.5% -27.7% 79.2% 
2009-2011 
average 
-6.8% -7.7% -13.1% -3.0% -25.4% 34.9% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
3.4. Conclusion 
Despite the remarkable growth in the use of ethanol as a transportation fuel in the last decade and 
the proliferation of government measures to promote the adoption of biofuels across the globe,61 
no international institution monitors and evaluates support to ethanol and other biofuels.  Although 
separate estimates of support have been presented for specific countries and years, there is a need 
for a consistent method that can be rigorously applied across countries and over time.  This chapter 
bridges this gap by proposing a robust and transparent methodology to systematically measure 
ethanol support and estimate its effects on domestic and world markets. 
Support to the ethanol sector in the United States and Brazil was very significant between 
2002 and 2011.  The world’s two largest biofuel producers and consumers provided their ethanol 
sectors with US$84 billion worth of transfers during this ten-year period.  To put it into perspective, 
combined expenditures of the agencies in charge of environmental protection in the United States 
and Brazil – the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Brazilian Institute 
for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) – reached US$85 billion in the 
same period.  While annual transfers to US and Brazilian ethanol increased almost uninterruptedly 
from US$2.6 billion in 2002 to US$12.6 billion in 2011, significant policy reforms in the two 
countries brought the level of support down to US$2.7 billion in 2012. 
Ethanol support was disproportionately concentrated in the United States, which accounted 
for over two-thirds of combined transfers in 2002-2011.  The average annual subsidy equivalent 
value for ethanol in the United States during this period was US$5.7 billion, which accounted for 
                                               
61 Global fuel ethanol output almost quadrupled in the last decade, growing from 22 billion liters in 2002 to 87 billion 
liters in 2011.  In addition to the United States and Brazil, various countries have implemented blending mandates, 
tax concessions or other government support incentives specifically designed to spur the adoption of ethanol as a 
transportation fuel, including Angola, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Malawi, Mozambique, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Sudan, Vietnam 
and Zimbabwe.   
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47 percent of the domestic production value and resulted in an average subsidization rate of 23 
cents per liter of ethanol produced.  By contrast, the average annual subsidy equivalent value in 
Brazil was US$2.7 billion, accounting for 23.5 percent of the domestic production value and 
yielding an average subsidization rate of 12.5 cents per liter of ethanol produced.  Detailed annual 
estimates of ethanol subsidy equivalent values and the various PSE and CSE components for the 
United States and Brazil are summarized in Table 3.11 and Table 3.17, respectively. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the quantification of ethanol subsidies in a 
number of ways.  First, it provides a consistent assessment of transfers to the ethanol sector in the 
two largest producers of ethanol.  Despite the key role played by Brazil as both a biofuel producer 
and consumer, most studies that measure ethanol subsidies have focused on the United States and 
other OECD countries (Koplow, 2006, 2007; Kutas et al., 2007; Steenblik, 2007; Quirke et al., 
2008; Steenblik et al., 2008; Laan et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2010).  One exception is IEA (2010), 
which quantifies ethanol subsidies for Brazil, China, the European Union and the United States 
between 2007 and 2009.  Nevertheless, the results reported by the IEA not only lack detail, but 
also significantly underestimate actual subsidization levels in Brazil and the United States.  To the 
best of our knowledge, the current chapter provides the only systematic, detailed and quantified 
comparison of ethanol support in the United States and Brazil. 
Second, while most studies focus on a particular year, this chapter examines subsidies over 
an eleven-year period (2002-2012), during which significant policy and market developments took 
place.  In the United States, this period encompasses the move away from MTBE as a gasoline 
additive, the introduction of the RFS ethanol blending mandate, the change in the country’s ethanol 
net trade status, and the elimination of federal tax credits and the additional import charge.  In 
Brazil, the period covers the introduction of flexible-fuel automobiles, the institution of state-level 
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preferential tax treatment for ethanol, the rise in sugar relative prices, and the elimination of the 
CIDE tax on gasoline.  Hence, the estimates provided in this chapter reflect a wide range of policy 
and market developments, and permit the identification of effects from variations in the magnitude 
and composition of ethanol support over time. 
Third, this chapter provides a thorough assessment of transfers to the ethanol sector at both 
the federal and state levels.  Given that federal support is as a rule substantially larger than state 
support, much of the research on ethanol is only peripherally related to state government 
incentives.  A thorough investigation of state statutes and data resulted in estimates of state-level 
ethanol support that correspond to 5 percent of total support to ethanol in the United States in 
2002-2011, and 17 percent of total support in Brazil in the same period.  While the share of state 
support in total support in the United States dropped from 8 percent in 2002 to 4 percent in 2011, 
in Brazil it increased from 2 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2011.  Most notably, after Washington 
and Brasília removed key federal support measures in 2012, the relative weight of state-level 
subsidies in total ethanol support rose to 40 percent in the United States and 50 percent in Brazil.  
The analysis of state-level support in the United States and Brazil revealed that other 
studies often cited as authoritative sources on subsidy quantification are incomplete.  For example, 
the estimates of total ethanol support presented for Brazil in IEA (2010) – US$2.3 billion in 2007, 
US$2.5 billion in 2008 and US$2.6 billion in 2009 – seem to be based exclusively on the 
exemption of ethanol from the federal CIDE tax.  These IEA figures closely match our own 
estimates for transfers arising from the CIDE tax (US$2.2 billion in 2007, US$2.3 billion in 2008 
and US$2.4 billion in 2009), but are a far cry from our estimates of total support (US$3.7 billion 
in 2007, US$2.9 billion in 2008 and US$4.2 billion in 2009), which also account for transfers 
arising from the PIS/COFINS and ICMS taxes.  In addition, studies that do quantify ethanol 
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support at the state level lack a rigorous method and are often based on back-of-the-envelope 
calculations and spurious assumptions rather than on actual data.62 
Finally, this chapter applies a rigorous and consistent methodology for measuring ethanol 
subsidies, based on a well-established method developed by the OECD and extensively applied in 
the agricultural sector since the 1980s.  In at least six different ways, its resulting subsidy 
equivalent values quantify support more accurately than the study most often cited as an 
authoritative source on US ethanol subsidies.  First, market price support is estimated by 
comparing domestic prices and appropriate reference prices for each year, rather than by assuming 
a fixed market price differential obtained from an exogenous source. 63   Second, government 
payments are based on actual expenditures, rather than on budgetary authorizations and 
appropriations.  Third, feedstock subsidies are incorporated by estimating lower input costs, rather 
than by prorating total agricultural subsidies by the share of feedstock used in ethanol production.  
Fourth, a greater number of state-level tax concessions and payments are quantified, and more 
accurate state-level data are used.  Fifth, subsidies that are widely available to various sectors of 
the economy, and thus are not specific to ethanol, such as accelerated depreciation, are not included 
in the estimate of support.  Finally, data collection is carried out for every year and estimations are 
                                               
62 Although Koplow (2006) and Koplow (2007) quantify state ethanol support for only a part of the states that actually 
provided support, the studies substantially overestimates total state production payments and tax concessions.  For 
example, Koplow (2006) estimates that production incentive payments in Wisconsin generated US$15.8 million in 
state government expenditures in 2006, when official state documents reveal that the correct amount was only US$1.9 
million.  Koplow (2007) estimates that the exemption of E10 from the 4 percent general excise tax in Hawaii resulted 
in US$90 million of revenue foregone in 2006.  However, since E10 sales in Hawaii totaled US$414 million in 2006, 
revenue foregone was actually closer to US$17 million, which is less than a fifth of the estimate provided above.  
Moreover, instead of estimating revenue foregone based on tax rates, fuel prices and sales volumes for each year in 
the 2006-2008 period, the study assumes that revenue losses grow 5 percent annually in 2007 and 2008. 
63 Koplow (2007) confounds the quantification of support with the quantification of the market effects of support.  
Instead of measuring US ethanol market price support by examining the gap between domestic and appropriate 
reference prices, the study assumes a fixed market price differential of 27 cents per liter for each year between 2006 
and 2008.  This figure is based on results obtained by Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006), which find that the removal of US 
import barriers would cause an average reduction of 27 cents in projected domestic ethanol prices in 2006-2015. 
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based on year-specific policies and data, rather than on assumptions about the annual growth rate 
of support.   
The ethanol subsidy equivalent values and associated components allows us to estimate the 
market distortions caused by ethanol support in the United States and Brazil.  The effects of US 
ethanol support varied remarkably between 2002 and 2012, reflecting significant policy changes 
and market developments over time.  However, as a rule, total support to the ethanol sector in the 
United States had a depressing effect on world prices, reduced import levels into the country, 
reduced production and export levels in other countries, and significantly increased the US share 
of the world market.  As these effects were significant in some years, US ethanol support policies 
were vulnerable to international litigation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  
Conversely, Brazilian ethanol subsidies were not susceptible to WTO legal action as they did not 
depress world prices, did not adversely affect production in other countries, and did not lead to an 
increased Brazilian share of the world market. 
As indicated in Subsection 3.2.12, the US additional import duty on ethanol infringed the 
dual requirement established in GATT Article VIII that any additional charge or duty on imports 
must involve a service rendered in connection with the importation of a good and must not 
represent an indirect protection to domestic products.  The fact that the United States included the 
additional charge on its schedule of concessions in the Uruguay Round does not legitimize it.  As 
indicated by DSB findings in Argentina – Textiles64 and European Communities – Bananas,65 
schedules of concession must comply with, and give way to, obligations set out in the GATT itself 
including GATT Article VIII (Guzman and Pauwelyn, 2012).  Therefore, what the United States 
                                               
64  Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
WTO/DS56/R (adopted April 22, 1998). 
65 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted September 25, 1997). 
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labelled as an “other duty or charge” on fuel ethanol imports is likely a prohibited measure that 
does not qualify as either an ordinary customs duty or an additional duty or charge, as described 
in GATT Articles II and VIII.  Despite this apparent breach of multilateral obligations, the US 
additional charge on ethanol was never officially challenged in its 34 years of existence.  
If the DSB were to find the additional duty a violation of GATT Article II and VIII, its 
removal would eliminate the majority of the adverse effects associated with US support to ethanol.  
As the estimates presented for Scenario 2 in Subsection 3.3.4 suggest, the additional import duty 
was the principal source of market price suppression in 2002-2011.  However, if the DSB were to 
find that the US ethanol additional duty did not violate GATT Articles II and VIIII, a complaining 
country could have recourse to claims of adverse effects under the ASCM. 
According to ASCM Article 5(c), no WTO member should cause, through the use of a 
subsidy, serious prejudice to the interests of another member.  Claims of serious prejudice may 
arise when subsidies: (a) displace or impede imports into the subsidizing country (ASCM Art. 
6.3(a)); (b) displace of impede exports from a third country (ASCM Art. 6.3(b)); (c) cause 
significant price undercutting or significant price depression (ASCM Art. 6.3(c)); and (d) increase 
the world market share of the subsidizing country (ASCM Art. 6.3(d)).  The estimates presented 
for Scenario 4 in Subsection 3.3.4 suggest that the various US ethanol support measures 
collectively reduced imports in the US market by 83 percent in 2004 and by 50 to 60 percent 
between 2006 and 2009 (Figure 3.13), and significantly suppressed world prices by 6.2 percent in 
2004 and 4.8 percent in 2006 (Figure 3.14).  In addition, the US share of the ethanol world market 
increased uninterruptedly from 37 percent in 2002 to 61 percent in 2011, and fell for the first in 
ten years only after federal tax credits and the additional import charge were removed in 2012 
(Figure 3.15). 
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Figure 3.13: Relative impact of US ethanol support on US ethanol net trade, 2002-2012 
 
Note: The United States was a net importer of ethanol in 2004-2009 and a net exporter in 2010-2012. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Relative impact of US ethanol support on ethanol world prices, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3.15: US share of the ethanol world market, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based on ANP (2014), EIA (2014a) and USDA (2004a). 
 
Based on these findings, four arguments could potentially be construed against US ethanol 
support as applied between 2002 and 2011: (i) that US ethanol support measures collectively 
displaced ethanol imports into the United States market in 2004 and 2006-2009; (ii) that US 
ethanol support measures collectively displaced ethanol exports of other members from third 
country markets in 2011 and 2012; (iii) that US ethanol support measures collectively caused 
significant price suppression in the world market in 2004 and 2006; and (iv) that US ethanol 
support measures collectively resulted in an increase in the world market share of the United States 
between 2002 and 2011. 
Nevertheless, these arguments are contingent on whether the US additional import duty 
could be considered a subsidy within the meaning of the ASCM.  According to ASCM Article 1, 
a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a financial contribution by a government, or if there is any 
form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and a benefit is thereby 
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outlays are clearly subsidies as they involve a financial contribution by a government and confer 
a benefit.  However, the DSB panel would have to determine whether the additional import duty 
would qualify as a form of price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994. 
As the WTO DSB has never ruled on what constitutes price support in the sense of Article 
XVI of GATT 1994, there is space for argumentation here.  A narrow view of price support would 
be that it relates exclusively to government programs that establish minimum, fixed, or reference 
prices for a commodity; a broad view would suggest that price support involves any government 
scheme designed either to increase prices or to keep prices at a certain level.  The negotiating 
history of the ASCM does not shed any light on the way price support ought to be interpreted.  
However, as the ASCM makes explicit reference to GATT Article XVI when it speaks of income 
or price support, the negotiating history of this GATT article may provide some guidance.  GATT 
Article XVI requires countries to notify “any subsidy, including any form of income or price 
support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce 
imports of any product into, its territory.”  Delegates’ discussions during the GATT 1947 
negotiations convey a broad and unrestricted interpretation of the notion of price support.  Given 
that the obligation under the article was a mere obligation to notify and discuss, the negotiators 
tolerated a broad wording of the provision (Lambert and Rueffer, 2010). 
If the DSB were to find that the additional import tariff constituted a subsidy, the four 
serious prejudice claims enumerated above would have to be backed with strong legal and 
economic evidence of a causal link between US ethanol support and the serious prejudice at issue.  
In addition to the quantitative assessment of the effects of subsidies on market prices and quantities 
as discussed above and in Subsection 3.3.4, this would require examining the magnitude of 
subsidies relative to the value of production, the relationship of market revenues and subsidies to 
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costs of production, the influence exerted by the United States on the world market, and the 
temporal coincidence of serious prejudice and US subsidies, among other factors (Sumner, 2005). 
Figure 3.16 depicts US ethanol subsidy equivalent values relative to production values 
between 2002 and 2012.  The larger the share of subsidies in the production value, the greater their 
presumed distortionary effect.  Subsidies accounted on average for 47 percent of the ethanol 
production value in the United States in 2002-2011.  The relative level of support was even higher 
in the two years on which the claim of significant price suppression is based: 71 percent in 2004 
and 51 percent in 2006.  This suggests a strong causal link between subsidies and price suppression.  
To put matters in perspective, the magnitude of ethanol subsidies is comparable to that of the 
subsidies found to cause significant price suppression in United States – Upland Cotton (12 percent 
to 64 percent in 2004-2006).  Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 3.15, the fact that the United States 
accounted for a large and growing share of world ethanol production in 2002-2011 provides further 
evidence that US subsidies had a significant impact on world prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: US ethanol subsidy equivalent value as a share of production value, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Based USDA (2004a). 
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Nonetheless, if the DSB were to find that the additional import duty does not constitute a 
subsidy within the meaning of ASCM Article 1, only one of the four serious prejudice claims 
would stand, i.e. that US ethanol support measures collectively resulted in an increase in the world 
market share of the United States between 2002 and 2011.  The claims based on significant price 
depression and displaced trade flows would no longer be valid as the additional import duty was 
the single most important source or price suppression and border protection among the various 
individual US ethanol support measures in 2002-2011.  While production payments and lower 
input costs had small depressing effects on world prices, consumption tax concessions actually 
lead to higher world prices (see Scenario 1 in Subsection 3.3.4). 
Finally, a fifth claim may potentially be construed against US ethanol support based on the 
principle of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to WTO 
members under GATT 1994 (ASCM Article 5(b)).  The claim addresses the fact that US blender 
tax credits, combined with the additional import duty, functions as a de facto import substitution 
subsidy, which is a prohibited subsidy under ASCM Article 3.1(b).  When applied simultaneously, 
the tax credit and the additional duty provide financial incentives that encourage blenders to 
purchase domestic instead of foreign ethanol.  The legislative history behind the additional import 
tariff in the US Congress provides evidence that it was created for exactly this purpose.  The fact 
that the additional duty was only eliminated once the tax credit was removed further corroborates 
this claim.  In Canada – Autos,66 the Appellate Body found that ASCM Article 3.1(b) extends to 
subsidies contingent not only “in law” but also “in fact” upon the use of domestic over imported 
goods.  Since the additional import duty on fuel ethanol was set at a prohibitive level, no or minimal 
amounts of MFN imports occurred in most years between 2002 and 2011 (Figure 3.1 and Figure 
                                               
66 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R (adopted 
May 31, 2000). 
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3.2).  As the high additional import duty ensured Brazilian ethanol would not benefit from the 
blenders tax credit, the domestic tax concession functioned de facto as an import substitution 
subsidy, despite the fact it imposed no de jure limitations on the eligibility of Brazilian ethanol. 
A general argument against multilateral challenges to biofuel subsidies is that WTO 
agreements do not properly account for the negative externalities of fossil fuel consumption.  
Subsidies to the ethanol industry could be construed to have a positive effect on society if they 
ultimately lead to the displacement of fossil fuel consumption and the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Under this prism, current international trade law is inadequate and should be amended 
to appropriately account for the role of renewable energy subsidies in addressing negative 
environmental externalities.  Given the global nature of climate change, countries must tackle 
carbon emissions in a concerted multilateral effort.  Attempts to address global warming 
unilaterally may lead to negative unintended outcomes, such as the economically and 
environmentally unsound two-way trade in ethanol between the United States and Brazil driven 
by uncoordinated environmental policies (Meyer et al., 2012). 
The measurement of ethanol subsidy equivalent values and the quantification of their 
effects on prices, production, consumption and trade provide critical inputs for policymakers and 
analysts not only in the area of international trade, but also in agriculture, energy and the 
environment.  This chapter distinguishes itself as the only systematic, detailed and quantified 
comparative examination of ethanol support in the United States and Brazil, the two most 
prominent players in the biofuels sector.  Its methodology and results remain relevant 
notwithstanding the removal of federal tax credits and the additional import tariff in the United 
States and the CIDE differential tax treatment in Brazil in 2012.  The significant downturn 
experienced by the ethanol industry in Brazil in recent years has prompted calls for renewed 
 276 
 
support.  Policy and market developments have shifted the political weight of the US ethanol 
industry towards new areas, such as advanced (non-corn starch) biofuels, cellulosic ethanol, and 
E85 blends, all of which are receiving expanding amounts of support at both the federal and state 
levels.  While still small compared to the support once enjoyed by corn ethanol, these transfers 
could become very significant once these sectors become more widely established.  Government 
support has played an important role in facilitating the growth in biofuels supply and demand and 
is likely to continue to do so in the near future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A.1: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating US Ethanol Consumption Tax Concessions, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World -9.2% -6.0% -5.5% -4.4% 0.0% -3.7% -3.5% -1.3% -0.8% -1.0% -0.1% 
US -7.9% -5.0% -3.5% -3.7% 0.0% -3.0% -2.9% -1.2% -0.8% -1.0% -0.1% 
            
Production 
US -5.1% -3.3% -2.3% -2.4% 0.0% -1.9% -1.9% -0.8% -0.5% -0.6% -0.1% 
Brazil -17.9% -11.7% -10.7% -8.6% 0.0% -7.2% -6.9% -2.6% -1.5% -2.0% -0.2% 
EU -3.0% -1.9% -1.8% -1.4% 0.0% -1.2% -1.1% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% 0.0% 
China -1.6% -1.0% -0.9% -0.8% 0.0% -0.6% -0.6% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 
ROW -2.3% -1.5% -1.3% -1.1% 0.0% -0.9% -0.9% -0.3% -0.2% -0.3% 0.0% 
World -12.3% -7.6% -6.3% -5.2% 0.0% -4.0% -3.7% -1.3% -0.8% -0.9% -0.1% 
            
Consumption 
US -45.5% -28.0% -20.0% -16.9% 0.0% -12.5% -11.0% -3.9% -2.3% -2.8% -0.3% 
Brazil 8.3% 6.5% 6.2% 5.7% 0.0% 5.6% 6.4% 2.5% 1.6% 2.3% 0.2% 
EU 1.7% 1.1% 1.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
China 2.4% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 0.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 
ROW 2.0% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
World -12.3% -7.6% -6.3% -5.2% 0.0% -4.0% -3.7% -1.3% -0.8% -0.9% -0.1% 
            
Net Trade 
US -6774% -5687% -424.3% -434.2% 0.0% -170.1% -171.5% -173.5% 61.4% 26.4% 11.8% 
Brazil -409.0% -340.4% -96.0% -82.7% 0.0% -76.6% -64.0% -37.4% -45.8% -117.5% -3.8% 
EU 23.5% 11.7% 7.8% 3.2% 0.0% 2.8% 3.3% 1.8% 1.3% 1.3% 0.2% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -25.9% -2.6% 
ROW 6.2% 4.7% 2.3% 2.7% 0.0% 17.5% 5.2% 2.4% 0.9% 1.0% 0.1% 
World 311.5% 242.5% -20.2% -16.6% 0.0% -43.6% -36.0% -20.7% 1.3% 4.2% 0.2% 
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Table A.2: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating US Ethanol Import Tariffs, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World 2.5% 3.2% 10.9% 3.4% 3.9% 6.0% 6.1% 2.8% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 
US -5.4% -8.1% -23.9% -7.9% -18.8% -13.3% -12.3% -4.5% 0.0% -2.3% 0.0% 
            
Production 
US -3.5% -5.3% -15.6% -5.1% -12.2% -8.7% -8.0% -2.9% 0.0% -1.5% 0.0% 
Brazil 4.8% 6.3% 21.1% 6.6% 7.6% 11.7% 11.8% 5.4% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 
EU 0.8% 1.0% 3.5% 1.1% 1.3% 1.9% 1.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
China 0.4% 0.5% 1.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
ROW 0.6% 0.8% 2.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.5% 1.5% 0.7% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 
World 1.5% 1.3% 3.8% 1.0% -2.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
            
Consumption 
US 7.3% 8.0% 20.2% 6.2% 0.0% 9.3% 8.3% 3.6% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 
Brazil -2.2% -3.4% -12.2% -4.4% -5.6% -9.1% -11.0% -5.2% 0.0% -3.6% 0.0% 
EU -0.4% -0.6% -2.0% -0.6% -0.7% -1.1% -1.1% -0.5% 0.0% -0.3% 0.0% 
China -0.6% -0.8% -2.8% -0.9% -1.0% -1.6% -1.6% -0.7% 0.0% -0.4% 0.0% 
ROW -0.5% -0.7% -2.4% -0.7% -0.9% -1.3% -1.3% -0.6% 0.0% -0.4% 0.0% 
World 1.5% 1.3% 3.8% 1.0% -2.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
            
Net Trade 
US 1811.4% 3038.6% 839.3% 332.6% 81.8% 275.5% 293.3% 364.4% 0.0% -41.8% 0.0% 
Brazil 109.4% 181.9% 189.9% 63.3% 63.3% 124.0% 109.5% 78.5% 0.0% 185.9% 0.0% 
EU -6.3% -6.2% -15.4% -2.5% -4.2% -4.5% -5.7% -3.9% 0.0% -2.1% 0.0% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.1% 0.0% 
ROW -1.7% -2.5% -4.6% -2.1% 17.1% -28.3% -8.9% -5.1% 0.0% -1.6% 0.0% 
World 109.8% 183.3% 191.9% 64.0% 61.3% 125.3% 110.6% 79.3% 0.0% -1.8% 0.0% 
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Table A.3: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating US Ethanol Consumption Tax Concessions and Import Tariffs, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World -6.8% -2.8% 5.4% -1.0% 3.9% 2.3% 2.5% 0.2% -0.8% 0.0% -0.1% 
US -13.3% -13.1% -27.5% -11.6% -18.8% -16.3% -15.1% -6.8% -0.8% -3.9% -0.1% 
            
Production 
US -8.6% -8.5% -17.9% -7.5% -12.2% -10.6% -9.8% -4.4% -0.5% -2.5% -0.1% 
Brazil -13.1% -5.4% 10.4% -2.0% 7.6% 4.5% 4.9% 0.4% -1.5% -0.1% -0.2% 
EU -2.2% -0.9% 1.7% -0.3% 1.3% 0.7% 0.8% 0.1% -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
China -1.1% -0.5% 0.9% -0.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
ROW -1.7% -0.7% 1.3% -0.3% 1.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
World -10.8% -6.3% -2.5% -4.3% -2.1% -2.9% -3.0% -2.2% -0.8% -1.5% -0.1% 
            
Consumption 
US -38.2% -20.0% 0.3% -10.7% 0.0% -3.3% -2.7% -3.9% -2.3% -2.8% -0.3% 
Brazil 6.0% 3.0% -6.0% 1.3% -5.6% -3.5% -4.6% -0.4% 1.6% 0.1% 0.2% 
EU 1.2% 0.5% -1.0% 0.2% -0.7% -0.4% -0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
China 1.8% 0.7% -1.4% 0.3% -1.0% -0.6% -0.7% -0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
ROW 1.5% 0.6% -1.2% 0.2% -0.9% -0.5% -0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
World -10.8% -6.3% -2.5% -4.3% -2.1% -2.9% -3.0% -2.2% -0.8% -1.5% -0.1% 
            
Net Trade 
US -4962% -2649% 414.9% -101.7% 81.8% 105.3% 121.9% 27.3% 61.4% 0.9% 11.8% 
Brazil -299.6% -158.6% 93.9% -19.3% 63.3% 47.4% 45.5% 5.9% -45.8% -3.8% -3.8% 
EU 17.2% 5.4% -7.6% 0.8% -4.2% -1.7% -2.4% -0.3% 1.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.8% -2.6% 
ROW 4.6% 2.2% -2.3% 0.6% 17.1% -10.8% -3.7% -0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 
World 199.8% 56.2% 94.9% -19.0% 61.3% 47.9% 45.9% 5.9% 1.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
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Table A.4: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating the US Subsidy Equivalent Value for Ethanol, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World -5.8% -1.9% 6.2% -0.2% 4.8% 2.7% 2.8% 0.8% -0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 
US -19.6% -18.7% -31.7% -16.1% -22.7% -18.3% -16.6% -8.8% -2.2% -4.8% -0.9% 
            
Production 
US -12.8% -12.1% -20.6% -10.4% -14.8% -11.9% -10.8% -5.7% -1.4% -3.1% -0.6% 
Brazil -11.3% -3.8% 12.0% -0.4% 9.2% 5.3% 5.5% 1.5% -0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 
EU -1.9% -0.6% 2.0% -0.1% 1.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% -0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
China -1.0% -0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
ROW -1.4% -0.5% 1.5% -0.1% 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.2% -0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
World -11.3% -6.8% -2.9% -4.8% -2.5% -3.2% -3.2% -2.6% -1.1% -1.7% -0.3% 
            
Consumption 
US -38.1% -20.1% 0.2% -10.9% 0.0% -3.3% -2.8% -3.9% -2.3% -2.8% -0.4% 
Brazil 5.2% 2.1% -6.9% 0.3% -6.8% -4.1% -5.1% -1.4% 0.8% -0.6% -0.3% 
EU 1.0% 0.3% -1.1% 0.0% -0.9% -0.5% -0.5% -0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
China 1.5% 0.5% -1.6% 0.1% -1.2% -0.7% -0.7% -0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 
ROW 1.3% 0.4% -1.4% 0.1% -1.0% -0.6% -0.6% -0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 
World -11.3% -6.8% -2.9% -4.8% -2.5% -3.2% -3.2% -2.6% -1.1% -1.7% -0.3% 
            
Net Trade 
US -4260% -1829% 477.1% -22.6% 98.7% 123.4% 137.3% 98.5% 29.2% -7.2% -13.8% 
Brazil -257.2% -109.5% 108.0% -4.3% 76.4% 55.6% 51.3% 21.2% -21.8% 31.9% 4.5% 
EU 14.8% 3.8% -8.8% 0.2% -5.1% -2.0% -2.7% -1.0% 0.6% -0.4% -0.2% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 3.1% 
ROW 3.9% 1.5% -2.6% 0.1% 20.7% -12.7% -4.2% -1.4% 0.4% -0.3% -0.2% 
World 156.5% 6.0% 109.1% -19.6% 74.0% 56.1% 51.7% 21.4% 0.6% -0.3% -0.2% 
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Table A.5: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating the Brazilian Subsidy Equivalent Value for Ethanol, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World -5.8% -5.1% -7.5% -6.8% -7.3% -8.5% -5.0% -6.9% -6.9% -5.3% -3.5% 
US -5.4% -4.5% -5.1% -6.0% -5.7% -6.9% -4.1% -6.4% -6.9% -5.1% -3.5% 
            
Production 
US -3.2% -2.7% -3.2% -3.7% -3.5% -4.4% -2.6% -4.1% -4.4% -3.3% -2.3% 
Brazil -11.3% -9.9% -14.6% -13.2% -14.2% -16.5% -9.7% -13.4% -13.4% -10.3% -6.8% 
EU -1.9% -1.6% -2.4% -2.2% -2.3% -2.7% -1.6% -2.2% -2.2% -1.7% -1.1% 
China -1.0% -0.9% -1.3% -1.2% -1.2% -1.4% -0.9% -1.2% -1.2% -0.9% -0.6% 
ROW -1.4% -1.2% -1.8% -1.7% -1.8% -2.1% -1.2% -1.7% -1.7% -1.3% -0.9% 
World -7.8% -6.5% -8.7% -8.0% -7.9% -9.2% -5.2% -7.0% -7.0% -4.9% -3.3% 
            
Consumption 
US -0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 1.2% 0.0% 1.6% 1.1% 1.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.5% 
Brazil -14.3% -13.2% -21.9% -22.2% -23.4% -29.1% -19.0% -27.1% -27.9% -23.6% -17.7% 
EU 1.0% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 1.5% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0% 0.6% 
China 1.5% 1.3% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 2.2% 1.3% 1.8% 1.8% 1.4% 0.9% 
ROW 1.3% 1.1% 1.7% 1.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 0.8% 
World -7.8% -6.5% -8.7% -8.0% -7.9% -9.2% -5.2% -7.0% -7.0% -4.9% -3.3% 
            
Net Trade 
US 452.1% 702.7% 76.6% 144.1% 23.4% 91.5% 66.5% 311.6% -220.5% -65.2% -211.4% 
Brazil 33.3% 50.0% 22.3% 33.4% 24.5% 51.2% 30.5% 81.0% 192.9% 349.5% 82.6% 
EU 14.8% 9.9% 10.7% 4.9% 7.9% 6.4% 4.7% 9.5% 11.5% 6.9% 7.1% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -134.3% -92.3% 
ROW 3.9% 4.0% 3.2% 4.1% -31.8% 39.9% 7.4% 12.5% 7.9% 5.2% 5.1% 
World 33.3% 50.0% 22.3% 33.4% 21.1% 51.2% 30.5% 81.0% 64.3% 6.2% 34.2% 
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Table A.6: Estimated Market Effects from Eliminating US and Brazilian Subsidy Equivalent Values for Ethanol, 2002-2012 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price 
World -11.6% -7.0% -1.4% -7.0% -2.6% -5.8% -2.2% -6.7% -8.0% -5.6% -3.4% 
US -24.6% -22.9% -36.5% -21.8% -28.1% -25.1% -20.6% -15.5% -9.6% -10.4% -4.4% 
            
Production 
US -16.0% -14.9% -23.8% -14.2% -18.3% -16.3% -13.4% -10.1% -6.3% -6.7% -2.9% 
Brazil -22.6% -13.6% -2.7% -13.6% -5.0% -11.3% -4.2% -13.0% -15.4% -10.9% -6.6% 
EU -3.7% -2.3% -0.4% -2.3% -0.8% -1.9% -0.7% -2.1% -2.5% -1.8% -1.1% 
China -2.0% -1.2% -0.2% -1.2% -0.4% -1.0% -0.4% -1.1% -1.4% -1.0% -0.6% 
ROW -2.8% -1.7% -0.3% -1.7% -0.6% -1.4% -0.5% -1.6% -1.9% -1.4% -0.8% 
World -19.0% -13.3% -11.6% -12.8% -10.3% -12.4% -8.4% -10.0% -8.7% -7.2% -3.6% 
            
Consumption 
US -38.6% -19.7% 0.4% -9.6% 0.0% -1.7% -1.7% -3.9% -2.3% -2.8% 1.1% 
Brazil -9.1% -11.1% -28.8% -21.9% -30.2% -33.2% -24.2% -27.5% -25.8% -22.9% -18.0% 
EU 2.1% 1.3% 0.2% 1.3% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 1.2% 1.4% 1.0% 0.6% 
China 3.0% 1.8% 0.4% 1.8% 0.7% 1.5% 0.6% 1.7% 2.1% 1.5% 0.9% 
ROW 2.6% 1.5% 0.3% 1.5% 0.6% 1.3% 0.5% 1.5% 1.7% 1.2% 0.7% 
World -19.0% -13.3% -11.6% -12.8% -10.3% -12.4% -8.4% -10.0% -8.7% -7.2% -3.6% 
            
Net Trade 
US -3808% -1126% 553.7% 121.5% 122.2% 215.0% 203.8% 340.3% -138.7% -56.8% -225.2% 
Brazil -223.9% -59.5% 130.3% 29.1% 100.9% 106.7% 81.7% 87.2% 131.9% 311.9% 87.1% 
EU 29.6% 13.6% 1.9% 5.1% 2.7% 4.4% 2.0% 9.2% 13.3% 7.4% 6.8% 
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -142.6% -89.2% 
ROW 7.8% 5.5% 0.6% 4.3% -11.1% 27.2% 3.2% 12.1% 9.1% 5.6% 4.9% 
World 128.6% -37.1% 130.0% -14.7% 93.7% 105.5% 81.4% 85.3% 13.1% 6.3% 5.6% 
                        
 
 
